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117 355 



Enlarged Edition 

With a Supplement for the Years 1938 to 1942 by 

and additional maps by 

Issued under the auspices of the 

International Secretariat, 
Institute of Pacific Relations, by 





Copyright, 1942, by the 
Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations 




In sponsoring the publication in the United States of this en- 
larged edition of An Atlas of Far Eastern Politics the Secretariat 
o the Institute of Pacific Relations has been mainly concerned 
to make available to North American readers a book which has 
never had the distribution it deserved in the United States and 
one which recent dramatic developments in the Far East have 
made even more important than when it was first published in 

Though surprisingly little of the earlier edition has been ren- 
dered out of date by the march of events, it has seemed desirable 
to add a supplement dealing particularly with the course of the 
Sino-Japanese war since 1938 and with the impact which the 
European war has had upon the whole Far Eastern scene. This 
supplement, written by Professor George E. Taylor, head of the 
Far Eastern Department at the University of Washington and 
author of The Struggle for North China, has been prepared 
quite independently and without consultation with Mr. Hudson. 
Considerations of time and space have made it impossible to 
model the supplement exactly upon the earlier chapters of the 
Atlas but it is hoped that the principal broad tendencies of the 
past three and a half years have been reasonably well covered. 
It has not been possible to include an account of the reactions in 



sbt ; tb ; the current struggle between Nazi Germany and 

TTie siicfden attack by Japan against Hawaii, the Philippines 
anti^^laya on December 7 followed by the German and Italian 
declarations of war against the United States finally brought 
the Far East and America into another world war. That war will 
change many of the facts and problems discussed herein, but 
for the present the need for such a book is immensely increased 
and it has therefore been decided to issue it without attempting 
revisions to meet the current war developments. 

Though the present edition is issued under the auspices of the 
Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations, neither the Sec- 
retariat nor any of the Institute's national councils accepts re- 
sponsibility for statements of fact or opinion in the book or for 
its maps. The authors alone are responsible for both text and 


Research Secretary 
New York 
March x, 1942, 


PREFACE page 7 















1 . Ways of access to China (modern) page 25 

2. Climatic regions of the Far East 27 

3. Ethnography of the Far East 33 

4. Populations of Far Eastern countries 39 

5. Cities of the Far East 43 

6. Ports of the Far East 47 

7. China under the Ming and Manchu dynasties 53 

8. Provinces of China in the last ten years 59 

9. The territorial expansion of Japan 65 
10. Minerals in Japan and Korea 69 
n. Japanese trade 1936 71 

12. Japanese trade expansion 73 

13. East Siberia: resources and industries 79 

14. East Siberia: communications 81 

15. Manchurian railways 1931 89 

1 6. Manchurian railways 1938 95 

17. Vladivostok and Rashin 97 

1 8. Manchukuo: coal, iron and density of population idi 

19. The Mongols 105 

20. Mongolia and Sinkiang: communications in 

2 1 . China : railways 115 

22. China: roads 117 



23. China: airways 119 

24. China: density of population by provinces 121 

25. China: agriculture 123 
26* China: coal resources 125 

27. China: coal and iron production 1936 127 

28. China: mineral production 1936 129 

29. China: tea, silk, cotton and vegetable oil production 131 

30. China: the Japanese invasion 1937-8 133 

31. Naval and air bases of the Pacific 141 

32. Oil, iron and tin of the East Indies 153 

33. The South China Sea 155 

34. The Southwest Pacific 166 

35. Strategic raw materials of the Southwest Pacific 169 

36. Free China and occupied China, 1941 173 

37. Land communications in China and East Asia 177 

38. The Western Pacific 184 

39. Southeast Asia 188 

40. Northeast Asia and Northern Pacific 197 


Chapter I 


There have been in history three ways of approach to the region 
of the world known as the Far East: the first, by sea from the 
Indian Ocean; the second, overland from the countries of the 
Middle East; and the third, across the Pacific from North or 
South America. 

The trans-Pacific approach belongs to modern times; it dates 
only from the voyage of Magellan in 1519. The Polynesians 
navigated vast expanses of the Pacific in outrigger canoes, but 
there is no evidence that they ever jumped the gaps that separate 
Hawaii and Easter Island from the Americas. Disabled Japanese 
junks have occasionally been carried by wind and current to the 
coast of California, but no definite knowledge of America seems 
to have come to Asia by such accidents. The pre-Columbian 
natives of the New World were not seafarers, and the close 
proximity of North America and Asia at the Bering Strait, how- 
ever important for the peopling of the Americas with human 
stock, belongs to a zone too remote from the areas of old civiliza- 
tion to have significance in history. It may be said without con- 
siderable qualification that up to the sixteenth century of our era 
the Pacific Ocean imposed an absolute limit to human inter- 
course east of Asia. 


The approaches by sea and land from the Middle East, on 
the other hand, have been in use from remote antiquity, and an 
account of them must reveal the natural boundaries of the Far 
Eastern region, for it is just the main obstacles to communication 
with the farther parts of Asia which determine the most suitable 
limits for the three conventional divisions of the continent into 
Near, Middle and Far East. It is always possible, of course, to 
divide an area of the earth's surface merely according to a scale of 
remoteness, but such a regional partition should have more of 
geographical significance than this, and the three degrees of re- 
moval which we recognize in viewing Asia from Europe actually 
do correspond to definable natural areas. 

Leaving out of account the Arctic littoral, Asia has three 
coastlines: to the west, the Mediterranean and Black Sea, to the 
south, the Indian Ocean, and to the east, the Pacific. Before the 
making of the canal, the isthmus of Suez barred any access for 
shipping from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, and even 
now it remains a very definite dividing line. From the Indian 
Ocean to the Pacific there is a continuous natural seaway, but 
the Malay Peninsula, reaching south to within two degrees of the 
Equator, makes a very sharp corner at the southeastern ex- 
tremity of Asia, and Singapore is no less of a boundary than 
Suez. The three Asiatic coastlines are thus clearly separated, and 
their hinterlands may be identified with the three regions of the 
East; by this criterion the Near East includes Turkey and Syria 
(with Egypt), the Middle East, Arabia, Iraq, Iran and India, 
and the Far East, Indo-China and China. 

These divisions by relation to coastline would not, however, 
have so much significance if they did not correspond to two well- 
marked insulating barriers inland. The Ararat highlands and 



the Hamad (Syrian desert) intervene between the Mediter- 
ranean and Persian Gulf lands, and formerly set an eastward 
limit to that Mediterranean-centered political creation, the 
Roman empire. Similarly, a vast mountain system comprising 
the Pamirs-Tibet and Yunnan-Burma highlands shuts off China 
from India and Iran, the mountains being reinforced to the 
north of Tibet by the deserts of Sinkiang. These two great ram- 
parts of natural obstruction may be regarded as fixing the con- 
fines of the Near, Middle and Far Eastern regions. 

The Pamirs-Burma mountain system affords by far the more 
impervious barrier of the two, and accounts for the high degree 
of isolation which was the condition of Far Eastern history until 
quite recently. Though the isolation of the Far East has often 
been exaggerated, it remains true that China has been in the 
past more secluded from cultural contact and interaction with 
an outer world than any section of the region extending from 
Spain to Bengal; the history of China is more self-contained than 
that of India, Persia, Greece or Western Europe. The Achaeme- 
nid kings of ancient Persia, Alexander the Great and the Arab 
Caliphs all bridged the gap between Near and Middle East and 
ruled from the shores of the Mediterranean to the Pamirs, but 
none of them passed the Pamirs and penetrated to China; nor 
did any Indian kingdom extend its sway beyond the Himalayas 
or east of the Salween. Buddhism was propagated from India 
throughout the Far East, but it never displaced the traditional 
native religion of China; Islam also reached China, but it never 
created there a new epoch of history as it did in India. The snows 
of Sarikol and the Kum Tagh sands repelled the temporal power 
of Persepolis or Baghdad and weakened the impact of those 
spiritual forces which they could not forbid. 



By longitude Tibet and Sinkiang, lying north of the Ganges 
plain, should be comprised within the Middle East, but the 
course of history which has made them to this day at least 
nominally parts of China, corresponds to a strong geographical 
, predisposition; they are more accessible from the east than from 
the south or west, though just lately, since the construction of 
the Turksib railway, the gravitational pull of the Soviet Union 
has been very strong in Sinkiang. From the great peak of Khan 
Tengri (23,620 feet) in the T'ien-shan southwest of Kulja round 
to the great gorge by which the Dihong cuts its way down from 
Tibet to become the Brahmaputra in the plains of Assam, the 
formal frontier of China follows the line of the most tremendous 
mountain rampart in the world. The T'ien-shan, the Pamirs, 
the Karakorum and the Himalayas are all mountain ranges on a 
grand scale, and the last-named is backed by the vast plateau of 
Tibet, a country where many tens of thousands of square miles 
lie higher than the summit of Mont Blanc. On these upper 
levels the way for caravans has always been arduous in the ex- 
treme; Marco Polo tells of the forty days' journey on the high 
Pamirs, where "in all this way you shall come to no town, nor 
habitation, nor grass, and therefore it is needful for those that 
do travel that way to carry with them provision and victuals for 
themselves and their horses." 

It is possible to avoid the high mountains by going to the 
north of the T'ien-shan and then southeast to China via Hami. 
There is a clear way from west to east across Asia through the 
gap between the T'ien-shan and the mountains of the Altai 
system. This way went the caravan route from the Sea of Azov 
to Peiping described by Pegolotti in the fourteenth century, and 
this way runs the road from the Turksib railway to Lanchow by 



which Russian munitions are supplied to China in the present 
war. But for access to China from India or Persia such a route 
has always meant a long detour added onto a distance already 
excessive for commerce before the age of mechanical transport. 
For an approach from the direction of the lower Volga it was 
more convenient, but, whatever its natural advantages, it has 
been at most times in history rendered extremely difficult for 
trade or travel by the nomadic barbarism of the steppes through 
which it passes. The same applies in an even greater degree to 
the open country to the north of the Altai; here there could be 
no question of a route from Indian or Mediterranean countries 
to the Far East, and the opening of trans-Asian communications 
in such high latitudes depended on the development of Russia 
and her expansion eastward through Siberia it dates, there- 
fore, only from the seventeenth century. 

Turning from the north to the south of the great central 
mountain block of Asia, we find obstruction of a somewhat dif- 
ferent kind, but no less formidable. From the southeastern 
corner of the Tibetan plateau mountain ranges splay out to- 
ward the south, reaching the sea in Tenasserim, where the 
Malay Peninsula juts out from the land-mass of Indo-China. 
These mountains diminish rapidly in height from north to 
south though there are large areas over 10,000 feet as far south 
as lat. 25 and on this border there are no perils from blizzard 
and avalanche or complications of desert and nomadic ma- 
rauders. But an exceptionally high annual rainfall the world's 
record of 424 inches average is held by Cherrapunji in the 
Khasi hills in Assam clothes the hill tracts facing the Bay of 
Bengal with dense tropical vegetation, which makes them hardly 
less difficult to traverse than the loftier heights of the Pamirs or 



Himalayas. Nor has the human population been more favor- 
able to economic and cultural contacts of a high order than it 
has in the steppe and alpine grasslands of Central Asia. An 
environment of mountain forests has kept a wide region in the 
interior of Indo-China in various stages of primitive culture 
more or less impervious to influences from areas of higher civi- 
lization to west, east and south; the Naga, Mishmi, Kachin and 
Wa tribes were head-hunters until yesterday, and the more 
civilized Shans and Karens, forming numerous petty principal- 
ities in their hill-girt valleys, have always stoutly resisted incor- 
poration in any large, centralized state. 

With such obstacles to overland communication between the 
Middle and Far East, it might seem, nevertheless, that the con- 
tinuous seaway from the Indian Ocean into the Pacific would 
afford a sufficiently close contact. Yet the Malay Peninsula has 
been up to modern times a strong factor of separation, for not 
only did it mean a long, roundabout voyage from the Bay of 
Bengal to the South China Sea, but it diverted maritime traffic 
into waters where piracy used to flourish with peculiar vigor. 
Malaya, Sumatra and Borneo, with their numerous adjacent 
small islands, lying within the zone of equatorial rain forest, 
always remained a region of backward culture, the inhabitants 
of which preferred freebooting to regular trade, so that shipping 
on the way between India and China was at all times in hazard. 
With the arrival of gun-armed European ships in the seas round 
Malaya the pirate proa met more than its match, but in earlier 
centuries the development of commerce in these waters was 
seriously impeded by a piracy too ubiquitous and elusive ever to 
be suppressed. Even after Malacca had grown into a great em- 
porium for trade from Java and the Moluccas, as well as from 



Siam and China, the institutions of orderly economic life were 
little in evidence, and the Italian traveler Varthema, who vis- 
ited Malacca in 1506, complains that "one cannot walk about 
at night here, because people are killed like dogs, and the mer- 
chants who come sleep on their ships. . . . The king has a gov- 
ernor to administer justice for foreigners, but the people of the 
country take the law into their own hands, and they are the 
worst race that was ever created on earth." 

In view of the length and dangers of the voyage through the 
Straits of Malacca and round Malaya, trade tended to make use 
of a portage across the isthmus of Kra, renouncing the advan- 
tages of continuous voyage, but reducing the risks from piracy. 
The isthmus of Kra appears to have been the main center for 
the diffusion of Indian influences in Indo-China during the 
early centuries of our era, 1 and later a route from Bangkok to 
Tenasserim was much in use for the export of Chinese porcelain 
to Islamic countries a trade well attested by the quantities of 
broken wares recovered from the earth in this area. 

With or without the Kra short cut, however, the "southeast 
passage" failed throughout ancient and medieval times to attain 
primacy as a means of access to the Far East, and the overland 
routes through Sinkiang, in spite of their difficulties, retained 
most of the traffic there was. The main trans-Asian caravan 
route in the second century A.D. ran from Antioch in Syria to 
Ctesiphon (on the Tigris below Baghdad) and thence by the 
modern Ramadan, Damghan, Merv, Balkh and the Pamir passes 
to Tashkurgan in Sarikol, where there was a mart for Chinese 
raw silk, which was brought from China Proper through Sin- 

1 The Khmer culture of Cambodia, represented by the famous ruins 
of Angkor, thus received its initial stimulus. 


kiang either by the route to the north of the Taklamakan desert 
(Anhsi-Hami-Turfan-Karashar-Kuchar-Akus-Kashgar) or by^that 
to the south of it (Anhsi-Tunhuang-Charkhlik-Charchan-Keriya- 
Khotan-Yarkand). No road to the north of the T'ien-shan ap- 
pears to have been used in that period, but later on a trade route 
from the Black Sea to Samarkand via Astrakhan and Khiva, 
which became important from the sixth century onward, was 
extended to China by way of Kulja, Urumchi 1 and Hami. In the 
time of Marco Polo both the trans-Pamir and Kulja-Urumchi 
routes were in use, corresponding to lines of approach to China 
from south and north of the Caspian respectively; Marco him- 
self, coming through Persia, traveled by Kashgar, Khotan and 
Charchan, but the elder Polos came from Sarai on the Volga to 
Bokhara, and they probably went on by Kulja. 

From India and from the Bay of Bengal there were two direct 
overland routes to China: one across the Himalayas and Tibet 
via Lhasa, and the other by Burma and Yunnan. So great were 
the disadvantages, however, of both these ways that the main 
lines of communication between India and China, during the 
period when Buddhism was propagated from India all over the 
Far East, were through Sinkiang. From Kashmir there was 
always the road to Kashgar by Hunza and the Mintaka pass 
(15,450 feet), or the Balkh-Kashgar road could be reached fur- 
ther west via Chitral or Kabul a roundabout way of getting 
from the Ganges to the Yellow River, but the best available in 
pre-modern conditions of travel. 

After the arrival of European shipping in the Indian Ocean 
with the voyage of Vasco da Gama in 1498, the sea route round 
Malaya was opened up more than ever before, and became by 
1 Now officially Tihwa, but better known by its old name. 


far the most important approach to the Far East. The traditional 
overland routes fell into decline, and, in particular, the old 
Khotan-Charchan route was almost completely abandoned. On 
the other hand, the last four centuries have seen the develop- 
ment by Western powers of two new lines of approach: the 
trans-Siberian and trans-Pacific. 

The Russians, pressing eastward to the north of the Altai, 
reached Lake Baikal early in the seventeenth century and 
opened trade with China across Mongolia along the route 
Irkutsk-Kiakhta-Urga-Peiping. But when in the last decade of 
the nineteenth century the building of a transcontinental rail- 
way was undertaken by Russia, it was decided to carry it, not 
across the Gobi to Peiping and Tientsin, but to the most south- 
erly Russian port on the Pacific. The political situation in 1896 
having enabled the Russians to get permission from China to 
build the line through Manchuria, it became possible to ap- 
proach China overland from Russia without having to cross 
either high mountains or deserts. The trans-Siberian was even- 
tually linked with the Chinese railway system by the connec- 
tion Harbin-Mukden-Peiping, entering China not from the 
northwest or north, but from the northeast. The Russians have 
had plans ever since the 'nineties for a short-cut line from the 
Trans-Siberian to China Proper via Urga or Hami, but no such 
railway has yet been built, though there is now a line as far as 
Urga (Ulan Bator, the capital of Outer Mongolia). 

The approach to Asia across the Pacific dates only, as has 
been already pointed out, from Magellan's voyage in 1519. Up 
to about 1850 ships came from the direction of Cape Horn or 
the Magellan Straits, having sailed round South America from 
Europe or New England; or they came from the Pacific ports of 

Latin America, Mexico being the most northerly region of 
European settlement on the Pacific coast. Then, with the rapid 
growth of San Francisco as a port of the U.S.A. from 1848 on- 
ward, shipping began to sail thence almost due west actually 
with a slant southward through six degrees of latitude to 
Shanghai, which had been first opened to foreign trade in 1842. 
Japan, which had hitherto held place as the far end of the Far 
East, the Cipangu which Marco Polo heard of but never reached, 
lay in the path of the new oceanic trade route, and it was the 
Americans coming across the Pacific, not the Europeans ap- 
proaching from the south, who in 1853 compelled the self- 
secluded Japanese to enter into relations with the outer world. 



===== Steamship _. 


Over 3000 feet 1/771 Over 9000 feet 

Free access 
^ Access barred 

._.-.. Boundary of 18 out of 
28 Chinese provinces 


Chapter II 


The region of the Far East may be divided into three zones: a 
southern zone extending from lat. 10 south of the Equator to 
20 north of it, a middle one from soN. to 40N., and a 
northern from 40 N. to the Arctic, The southern includes 
Indonesia, Malaya and most of Indo-China, the middle covers 
China Proper, Tibet and the main areas of Korea and Japan, 
and the northern comprises Manchuria, Mongolia and Siberia 
a vast continental area which in it relation to China Proper 
may conveniently be termed the Northland. 

The southern zone of the Far East lies entirely within the 
tropics. It includes an equatorial zone, extending to about five 
degrees on both sides of the Equator, in which there is hardly 
any seasonal variation of temperature or rainfall; this climatic 
belt appears to be very unfavorable to human progress, and to 
such environmental influence must be attributed the fact that 
Indian civilization, diffused over the nearer parts of Indonesia 
and Indo-China, never took root in Sumatra, Malaya or Borneo, 
but flourished remarkably in Cambodia and Siam to the north 
and in Java to the south countries with definite alternations 
of wet and dry seasons. The southern zone of the Far East con- 
tains no deserts; it has almost everywhere a very high annual 



117 - 196 
078 - 117 
56- 78 
LID 39- 58 
29- 39 
19 29 
15 - 19 
It - IS 



rainfall and is for the most part heavily forested in its natural 
state. The rains of Indo-China are provided by the monsoon 
wind system of southeastern Asia. In winter the winds blow 
outward toward the southwest, south and southeast from an 
intense high-pressure belt over Mongolia, Sinkiang and southern 
Siberia; in summer the direction is reversed and they blow in- 
ward from the Indian Ocean and China Seas as bearers of rain. 
Java and the Lesser Sunda Islands, which are affected climati- 
cally by the arid land surface of Australia, have a monsoon 
system of their own with wet west and dry east winds. 

The middle zone of the Far East may be reckoned as sub- 
tropical; it lies within the sphere of the monsoons, and has wet 
summers and dry winters like the lands to the south, but it is 
distinguished by a considerable annual range of temperature 
and by a marked shrinking of rainfall toward the northwest, 
leading to sub-arid conditions on the borders of Mongolia. 
China has everywhere a hot summer, but it has the coldest 
winter south to the Nanling mountains for any part of the 
world in parallel latitudes; bitterly cold northwest winds sweep 
from Mongolia over the North China Plain, and the Poyang 
lake to the south of the Yangtse is sometimes frozen over below 
the latitude of Cairo. The South China littoral, the more shel- 
tered valleys of western China, and Japan, except for its north- 
western coasts, escape these severe winters, and the contrast of 
these areas with North China is emphasized by the still more 
important differences in the matter of rainfall. Mean annual 
rainfalls are 85 inches at Hongkong, 58 at Tokyo, 45 at Shang- 
hai, 25 at Peiping and 14 at Taiyuan (Shansi). Most of China 
south of the Yangtse has over 50 inches of rain in a year and is 
naturally a green and well-forested land; the same holds good of 


Japan, where luxuriant timber covers nearly all the ground that 
is not under cultivation. North China, on the other hand, is a 
region o comparatively low rainfall, declining below 10 inches 
in parts of Kansu; in good years the rains are sufficient for agri- 
culture, but they often fail to reach the necessary minimum and 
the resulting crop failures produce famine. Much of North 
China is now practically treeless; this is partly due to artificial 
deforestation always terribly effective in such marginal lands 
but the country, even in early times, can only have been 
lightly timbered as compared with South China, Indo-China or 
Japan. Its character predestined it to be the original seat of the 
great independent civilization of the Far East, for under neo- 
lithic cultural conditions the zone of decisive initial progress 
was the sub-tropical, sub-arid, the grade between the well- 
watered forest land and the steppe or desert. Indian civilization 
arose in the dry lands of Sind and the Punjab, and only later 
spread over the rain-favored plains of the Ganges; similarly, 
Chinese civilization arose in the basin of the Yellow River and 
had attained there a high level more than a thousand years be- 
fore we find evidence of any such development in the valleys 
of the Yangtse, the Si-kiang or the Mekong. 

The contrast between the Yellow River and Yangtse lands in 
the time of the Han dynasty (206 B.C. A.D. 221) was noted by 
the Chinese historian Ssu-ma Ch'ien, who describes the latter as 
a "large territory sparsely populated, where people eat rice and 
drink fish soup; where land is tilled with fire and hoed with 
water; where people collect fruits and shellfish for food and 
enjoy self-sufficiency without commerce. The region is fertile 
and suffers no famine. Hence the people are lazy and poor and 
do not bother to accumulate wealth; south of the Yangtse and 


the Hwai there are neither hungry nor frozen people, nor a 
family which owns a thousand gold." 1 Yet the Yangtse valley came 
in course of time to be no less intensively cultivated and densely 
peopled than the old China of the Yellow River, and this result 
was brought about by colonization from the north; the natural 
fertility of the south country was made to yield its wealth 
to a technique of agriculture developed under more arduous 

The land areas of the southern and middle zones of the Far 
East are everywhere capable of cultivation except for moun- 
tainous tracts and the higher plateaux of Tibet. In the third 
zone, however, we come to an immense region over by far the 
greater part of which agriculture is forbidden either by aridity 
or frigidity of climate. The Northland, extending from the 
Great Wall of China to the Arctic Ocean, is divisible into three 
sub-zones: one of steppe and desert in the forties of latitude, a 
second, of forest (generally sparse east of the Yenisei), and a 
third, of treeless "tundra" above the Arctic Circle. Of the steppe 
region only the fringes can be cultivated, but the whole pro- 
vides pasture for animals and has thus been traditionally the 
domain of horse-riding, tent-dwelling, milk-sustained herdsmen, 
who represent a culture diametrically opposed to that of the 
sedentary, agricultural Chinese. These nomads have always been 
the neighbors of China to the north, and until recently were 
one of the main factors in Chinese history. 

Before the coming of the Russians regular agriculture in the 
Northland was confined to the piedmont oases of Sinkiang and 
the pale of Chinese settlement in southern Manchuria. The belt 

1 Ssu-ma Ch'ien, chiian 102. Quoted by Ch'ao-ting Chi, Key Economic 
Areas in Chinese History, p. 98. * 



of arable land along the present Trans-Siberian railway to the 
north of Mongolia and in northern Manchuria remained wilder- 
ness, being cut off from Chinese colonization or influence by 
nomad-infested steppe and lacking river communication with 
the south the fact that all the great rivers of northern Asia 
flow either to the Arctic Ocean (the Ob, Yenisei and Lena) or 
to the northerly Okhotsk Sea (the Amur) has contributed much 
to the historic isolation of Siberia. Up to the middle* of the seven- 
teenth century there was nothing in northeastern Asia above 
the forty-fifth parallel of latitude except a barbarism with grada- 
tions from the hunting-and-fishing economy of the Chukchis 
and Ghilaks through the reindeer-keeping of the Yakuts and 
Tungus to the horse-and-cattle nomadism of the Mongols. 

The Northland Pacific littoral has a character of its own which 
is extremely adverse to human habitation. This region com- 
bines the intense cold of the Siberian winter with a chilly, wet 
summer unfavorable either for agriculture or stock-raising. 
East of the Stanovoi mountains the northern limit of cereals 
descends to about the latitude of Paris, and at Vladivostok in 
the parallel of Marseilles the sea freezes for four months in the 
year. The climatic conditions closely resemble those of Labra- 
dor in similar latitudes on the east coast of North America, and 
even Soviet planning has not so far made much out of this 
territory. In former times Possiet Bay was the northern limit for 
shipping, Chinese, Japanese or Korean, and no attempt was ever 
made to colonize the coasts beyond. 

Turning from environment and basic economic types to eth- 
nography, we find that the whole of the southern and middle 
zones of the Far East, with the exception of Korea and Japan, is 
occupied by peoples belonging to three great linguistic families: 


This map is intended to indicate the distribution of the prin- 
cipal ethnic types without reference to density of population. 
For the relative density of population in the provinces of China 
Proper and Manchuria, see maps 18 and 24. 

The Tibetans, Turks, Mongols and Tungus occupy large 
areas on the map, but with very low density; the Chinese and 
Russian areas, on the other hand, are generally of high density, 
and the Chinese and Russians often form the urban population 
in regions where the native peoples still predominate in the 
open country. Thus all the towns of Siberia may be counted as 
Russian and those of the Miao, Shan and Lolo districts of the 
west and southwest of China as Chinese. 



the Austronesian, the Austroasiatic and the Sinitic. It is worthy 
of note, as indicating the separateness of the Far Eastern region 
from very remote times, that neither the Indo-European, 
Hamito-Semitic nor Dravidian families are represented in the 
Far East, and that the three Far Eastern families are not repre- 
sented in Asia farther west than Tibet and central India. 

The Austronesian language family comprises three sub-fam- 
ilies: Indonesian, Melanesian and Polynesian. Its range extends 
over Malaya and all the archipelagoes from Sumatra to Easter 
Island and from Timor to Formosa; it also has a trans-oceanic 
branch in Madagascar. It covers a large number of distinct 
spoken languages, of which the most important at the present 
day are Malay, Javanese, Sundanese and Tagalog all of the 
Indonesian sub-family. 

The Austroasiatic group includes several languages of back- 
ward tribal areas scattered from the South China Sea to central 
India and two important living tongues Khmer (Cambodian) 
and Annamese. 1 Over a wide area between the Bay of Bengal and 
the Pacific older stocks of Austroasiatic speech have been sub- 
merged by later Sinitic-speaking invaders from the north, such 
as the Burmese' and Siamese. The Sinitic family has three 
branches: Chinese, Tibeto-Burman and Tai (including Siamese, 
Shan and the Miao dialects of South China); it belongs entirely 
to the Far East, and has not spread north of the Kunlun moun- 
tains and the Great Wall of China except with Chinese coloniza- 
tion in historic times. 

The greater part of the Northland was held before the arrival 

1 Annamese is classified by some with the Tai group of the Sinitic 
family. See, however, J. Przyluski, Langues austroasiatiques in Les 
Langues du monde, ed. A. Meillet and M. Cohen, pp. 395-8. 



of the Russians by tongues of the Altaian family, classifiable into 
Turkish, Mongol and Tungusic branches. This language group, 
owing to its association with nomadism, is very widely spread; 
its range extends to the Mediterranean (Turkey), to the Arctic 
Ocean (the Yakuts) and to the Pacific (the Tungus), but the 
total of its speakers is small outside the settled communities of 
Turkey, Azerbaijan and Turkestan. 

Beyond the foregoing threefold classification of Far Eastern 
languages fall Korean, Japanese and certain tribal languages of 
the extreme northeast of Siberia and the Primorsk, the affini- 
ties of which have not yet been discovered. 1 The geographical 
distribution of these forms of speech on the farthest rim of 
Asia suggests that they are survivals comparable to Basque in 

On such ethnic foundations cultural tradition and political 
state-making have in course of time created unities and differ- 
ences from which nationalities in the modern sense of the word 
have been, or are being, formed. Besides the two big indigenous 
nations of the Far East, the Chinese and the Japanese, there are 
today about a dozen lesser nationalities which have to be taken 
into account, and in addition, a large number of human beings 
living in tribal or petty local units and eluding any "national" 

By cultural tradition older than the arrival of Europeans the 
peoples of the Far East leaving out of account the more primi- 
tive tribal elements belong to three different domains of civili- 
zation: the Chinese, the Indian and the Islamic. The first of 

1 It is held by some that Japanese is related to the Indonesian group 
and therefore to the Austronesian family of languages, but there is so 
far no consensus of opinion on the matter among philologists. 



these is native to the Far East, whereas the other two are in- 
trusive from the west. 

Chinese civilization, having grown up in the basin of the Yellow 
River, extended its domain in two ways: through colonization by 
the Chinese themselves and through the reception of Chinese 
culture by non-Chinese peoples. The former type of expansion 
prevailed as far south as Hainan and formed the modern China 
Proper, including the Yangtse and Si-kiang basins; the latter 
kind brought Annam, Korea and Japan within the Chinese 
cultural sphere, all these three countries adopting classical 
literary Chinese as the language of education and learning. 

Indian culture from about the beginning of our era penetrated 
by colonization and influenced Indo-China (except Annam) and 
the nearer parts of Indonesia. The traditional culture of Siam 
and Cambodia is thus affiliated, but in Malaya and Indonesia 
the Hindu-Buddhist influence was superseded by Islam in the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and now survives only in Bali. 
In another direction Indian cultural expansion was even more 
far-reaching; from the first century A.D. Buddhism was trans- 
mitted to China along the silk-trading caravan routes through 
Sinkiang, and through China it reached also Korea and Japan. 
Within the sphere of the Chinese literary tradition, however, the 
Indian religion was always a subsidiary element except for a 
while in Japan. More profound was the effect of Buddhism in 
Tibet, where it assumed the special form known as lamaism and 
dominated the whole life of the country. From Tibet Lama- 
Buddhism spread northeastward to Mongolia, and both in 
Tibet and Mongolia modern nationalist feeling has its roots in 
a national "church," even though it is anti-clerical in tendency. 

Following in the wake of India's spiritual expansion, Islam, 



spreading from Arabia and Iran, likewise reached the Far East 
on two courses, one to the south and the other to the north. 
Across the Indian Ocean Arab traders and adventurers prop- 
agated their faith among the Malays of Sumatra, who carried 
it to other parts of Indonesia. The Hindu power in Java was 
destroyed by the capture of Madjopait in 1478 and Java became 
entirely Mohammedan. Islam was spread eastward as far as 
Mindanao, Ceram and Timor, but everywhere except in Java 
prevailed only in coastal districts, the inland tribes retaining 
their primitive paganism. 

In Central Asia the Turki-speaking people of Sinkiang- were 
converted to Islam "as were their kinsmen to the west of the 
Pamirs. The line between Moslem and Buddhist now corre- 
sponds almost exactly to the linguistic division of Turk and 
Mongol. Further, Islam, cutting across the line of Buddhist 
expansion from Tibet to Mongolia, established itself in north- 
west China and created the numerous Chinese-speaking Moslem 
community known as Tungans, who can hardly be counted as 
a separate nationality, but form a very distinct and centrifugal 
section of the Chinese people. 

To these formative factors of cultural inheritance must be 
added, as constituents of nationality, historical traditions of 
political sovereignty and state-making. In China there is the 
great tradition of the "Middle Kingdom" and of the Son of 
Heaven, who before 1860 could not recognize any other earthly 
monarch as his equal. In Japan there is the national sovereign of 
divine descent, who, whatever the chaos of Japanese internal 
politics, was always the mystical talisman of the "Yamato race." 
Korea, Annam, Cambodia and Siam have their traditions of 
strong, organized national kingdoms. The Mongols derive an 



intense racial pride from the memory of the empire of Genghiz 
Khan, and the Tibetans have their long-established sovereignty 
of the holy Dalai Lama. In Indonesia there is still the memory of 
the old Javanese empire of Mataram. These historical conti- 
nuities serve as nuclei for modern national feeling, even when the 
nationalism is anti-monarchical and destructive of traditional 
culture; though popular nationalism and its jargon are recent 
innovations, the main lines of nationality which now exist were 
already drawn before Europeans ever reached the Far East. To 
the old ethno-political units, however, the age of European 
ascendency has added two more: the Russian, which is the prod- 
uct of immigration from Europe, and the Filipino, which is a 
creation of Spanish colonialism. 


Chapter III 


There are today, excluding Manchukuo, nine recognized 
sovereignties within the confines of the Far East. Of these only 
three China, Japan and Siam belong to indigenous nations; 
the rest are held by "Western" nations with their homelands in 
Europe or North America Britain, France, Holland, Portugal, 
the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. All these six powers have acquired 
their territories in the Far East by some kind of expansion, more 
or less violent, since a Portuguese squadron first arrived at 
Malacca in 1509. In the sequel, however, a distinction must be 
drawn between the Far Eastern lands of the Soviet Union and 
the "possessions" of the other Western powers. The latter are in 
every case imperial ascendencies over areas already well popu- 
lated, and the ruling nations are represented by mere handfuls 
of administrators, soldiers, capitalist entrepreneurs and techni- 
cians, who form insignificant minorities among the native in- 
habitants; in Siberia, on the other hand, the Russians have settled 
on land previously uncultivated, as the English have in Canada or 
Australia, and form the great majority of the total population, so 
that Russian nationality, as well as Russian (or Soviet Union) 
state power, has been established there. The Russians are today 
a Far Eastern nation in a way the British, French and Americans 



are not, though their actual numbers are small to the east of the 
Yenisei, and their position as a Great Power is based on their 
wealth of population and resources in Europe and West Siberia. 

The history of European commercial and imperial expansion 
in the Far East begins in 1509, when a Portuguese squadron 
under Sequiera arrived at Malacca to open trade eleven years 
after Vasco da Gama had first reached India round the Cape of 
Good Hope. The usual disputes having arisen, Albuquerque, the 
Portuguese Captain-General of the Indies, attacked and cap- 
tured Malacca in 1511. The Portuguese thus acquired a monop- 
oly of the lucrative trade in spices from the Moluccas; to com- 
plete their control they annexed the Moluccas in 1522 and held 
them until 1583, when they were driven out by a rebellion of the 
natives. Their principal rivals in these waters in the early days 
were the Spanish, who crossed the Pacific from Mexico and tried 
to break the Portuguese hold on the Moluccas; failing in this, 
the Spanish went farther north and conquered the group of 
islands which they named the Philippines in honor of King 
Philip IL From Malacca the Portuguese had meanwhile opened 
up trade with China and Japan, and in China they were granted, 
in return for services in the suppression of piracy, a lease for a 
settlement at Macao in 1557. Macao became a Portuguese 
stronghold and was never lost, though it always remained 
nominally Chinese territory until it was formally annexed by 
Portugal in 1845. 

With the beginning of the seventeenth century the Dutch and 
the English began to make their presence felt in Indonesia. The 
Dutch in 1619 captured Jacatra in Java and made it their Far 
Eastern base under the name of Batavia; in 1642 they also took 
Malacca from the Portuguese, and the latter were finally elimi- 


nated from the Archipelago except for a foothold on the island of 
Timor, the eastern half of which still belongs to them. The Eng- 
lish, who tended more and more to concentrate their attention 
on India, likewise gave way to the Dutch after a period of rivalry. 
The Spanish, however, continued to hold the Philippines. 

Dutch rule was strongly established in Java and the Moluccas; 
elsewhere in the islands their control was slight, and numerous 
petty rajas and sultans retained a somewhat diminished in- 
dependence. The Dutch secured the monopoly of cloves by ex- 
terminating the tree in every island but Amboyna, and when the 
spice trade ceased to be important, they turned their attention 
to coffee, which they produced in Java under a system of forced 
labor. To the north of Indonesia they obtained a monopoly of 
European trade with Japan from 1639 and retained it until 
1854 and made a settlement on the island of Formosa, which 
they held until they were driven out by exiles from China, 
partisans of the fallen Ming dynasty, in 1662. 

Both China and Japan during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries adopted a policy of restricting foreign trade and resi- 
dence to particular ports, partly because of their fear of the 
Catholic Christian missions, which had arrived with the traders 
and had had a very disturbing effect, especially in Japan; 
partly because of the desire of the governments to control the 
trade to their own fiscal advantage; and partly because Far 
Eastern countries had no system of international diplomatic 
intercourse and commercial law such as had been evolved in 
Europe. In China foreign trade was restricted by law to Canton 
after 1757; in Japan it was confined to Nagasaki, and there 
allowed only to the Chinese and the Dutch, from 1639. The 
European nations had to put up with this state of affairs, for up 




to the second quarter of the nineteenth century they were not in 
a position to apply coercion to China or Japan as they applied it 
to the petty principalities of Indonesia. 

The Anglo-French wars from 1792 to 1815 brought English 
armed forces again into the Far East after Holland had fallen 
under the control of France. The English captured Malacca in 
1795 and occupied Java in 1811; these and other Dutch posses- 
sions were restored to Holland in 1814, but in 1819 England 
acquired Singapore by cession from the Sultan of Johore and 
made it into a great commercial and strategic center. 

In the final partition of Malaya and Indonesia among the 
Western powers, none of the native potentates was recognized 
as sovereign, and dominion was distributed in international law, 
that is, by treaties between Western powers, often in advance of 
conquest, or even of exploration. Large areas of Indonesia were 
not brought under any European authority until the present 
century; the conquest of Atjeh in northern Sumatra took some 
thirty years of campaigning. Today, however, it can be said 
that control by the recognized sovereign powers has been made 
effective throughout the whole region. The British hold all the 
Malay Peninsula south of Siam either by direct (Straits Settle- 
ments) or indirect (Protected Malay States) rule. The Dutch 
retain Java and the Lesser Sunda Islands, Sumatra, Borneo, 
Celebes and the Moluccas, with the exception of eastern Timor, 
which belongs to Portugal, and the northern part of Borneo, 
comprising British North Borneo and the British-protected 
states of Brunei and Sarawak. 1 The dominion of the Philippines 

1 Brunei was declared under British protection in 1888, Sarawak in 
1890. The British protectorate over Atjeh in Sumatra was relinquished 
to the Dutch in 1872. 



passed from Spain to the United States of America by the 
Spanish-American war of 1898, and at the same time the residue 
of the Spanish empire in the Pacific, consisting of the Pelew, 
Marianne and Caroline island groups in the ocean to the east of 
the Philippines, was ceded by Spain to Germany, to be taken 
from Germany by Japan in the war of 1914-18. 

To the north of Malaya and Indonesia there were up to 1841 
no European possessions except for the Portuguese leasehold of 
Macao and the Russian territory in the extreme north of the 
continent. The extent of the latter was defined by the Treaty of 
Nerchinsk, the first treaty ever signed by China with a European 
power, which was concluded in 1689. The Russians, whose 
empire in Asia had been founded by Yermak's capture of Sibir 
in 1581, had reached the Pacific coast at Okhotsk in 1647 and 
Lake Baikal in 1651; then they came into conflict with the 
Manchu-Chinese empire which controlled the basin of the 
Amur, and received a severe check. The Treaty of Nerchinsk 
fixed the Russo-Chinese border along the Stanovoi moun- 
tain range and the Uda river, leaving both banks of the 
Amur to China; this territorial settlement was not altered until 

The Russian west-to-east advance through the far north of 
Asia did little to disturb the established order of things in the 
Far East during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for 
it went on in a back-world of primitive tribes Buryats, Yakuts 
and Tungus beyond the ken of high politics. It meant, how- 
ever, that for the first time in history there was a power in the 
Northland which was not founded on nomadism, and with the 
first settlements of Russian peasants east of the Yenisei a new 
nation came into being there. 



The great European drive against China began with the 
Anglo-Chinese war of 1839 and it led to acquisitions in two 
categories: colonial and semi-colonial. The former kind, terri- 
torial gains in full sovereignty, included 

(1) Hongkong: the island ceded to Britain by China in 1841, 
Kowloon on the mainland added in 1860. 

(2) French Indo-China: first annexations in 1862 in Cochin- 
China, protectorate over Cambodia in 1863, protectorate over 
Annam and Tongking (previously under Chinese suzerainty) 
recognized by China after Franco-Chinese war in 1885, Lao 
territory taken from Siam in 1893. 

(3) Russian Far Eastern provinces: all country north of the 
Amur ceded by China to Russia in 1858, territory east of Usuri 
down to Korean border (including site of the future Vladi- 
vostok) ceded in 1860. 

Besides these territories passing under European rule in full 
sovereignty, China was forced in 1898 to cede the following five 
districts under leasehold tenure, the occupying powers having 
complete rights of jurisdiction and military or naval use 

(1) Kiaochow: leased to Germany for 99 years, captured by 
Japanese 1914, restored to China 1922. 

(2) Kwantung (Port Arthur and Dalny, now Ryojun and 
Dairen): renewable 25 years' lease to Russia, transferred to 
Japan by Treaty of Portsmouth 1905, lease prolonged to 99 years 
after ultimatum to China 1915. 

(3) Weihaiwei: leased to Britain for "as long as Russia shall 
remain in occupation of Port Arthur," restored to China 1930. 

(4) Hongkong New Territory, consisting of "all the land re- 


1 Kobe i 12 
2 Yokohama 13 

Sfngfpore } British Colonies 

3 Osaka [ Japan 14 

Haiphong \ p hC I * 

4 Moji 15 

Saigon / rrencn colonies 

5 Dairen J 16 

Batavia } 

6 Tientsin 
7 Tsingtao 


Semarang > Dutch Colonies 
Soerabaya J 

8 Shanghai 
9 Amoy 

China g 

Bangkok, Siam 
Manila, Philippines 

10 Canton 

II Swatow 

Minimum shown: 1,000.000 tons of overseas traffic. Vladivostok (V), Sovetskaya (S). 
Nlkotaevsk (N) and FUshin (R) foil shore of this minimum, but are shown as a matter 
of interest. 



quired for the military defense of Hongkong": leased to Britain 
for 99 years. 

(5) Kwangchow: leased to France for 99 years. 

The leased territories were, and are, to all intents and pur- 
poses the colonial possessions of the states holding them. There 
is, however, another category of foreign treaty or customary 
rights in China which are definitely encroachments on Chinese 
sovereignty without conferring a generalized territorial control; 
these include the autonomous foreign "concessions" and settle- 
ments, the foreign gunboats on inland waters, the Legation 
guards at Peiping and garrisons in the Peiping-Tientsin area, 
and the old railway zone system in Manchuria. 

The foreign settlement system is closely bound up with the 
extra-territorial rights which the Western powers, beginning with 
Britain, acquired for their nationals by treaty. The Westerners 
in the ports were under the jurisdiction of their own consuls, 
lived in quarters of their own near their consulates and had 
their own police. In the long period of disorder and anti-foreign 
outbreaks in China they successfully asserted their claim to ex- 
clude Chinese police and soldiers from the settlements and to 
have their own armed forces local volunteers or marines from 
their countries' warships. Originally suburban quarters, the 
settlements became in some cases in particular at Shanghai 
and Tientsin the principal business areas of their towns and 
drew in a Chinese population outnumbering the foreign resi- 
dents. The growth of these autonomous un-national units 
states within a state provided a grave problem for the time 
when China should begin to organize a modern-style state 
administration, claiming in full the normal rights of sovereignty 
within her borders. 



The patrolling of the Yangtse by foreign gunboats was insti- 
tuted in connection with the foreign settlements up the river 
and the foreign-owned river shipping. The practice was a fertile 
source of incidents, the most notable of which was the battle 
fought by H.M.S. Cockchafer in 1926 with forces of the provin- 
cial army of Szechwan at Wanhsien more than a thousand miles 
from the sea. 

The stationing of foreign detachments for the protection of 
the Legations in Peiping and the guarding of the railway to 
Tientsin was authorized by the treaty of 1901, which settled 
accounts for the "Boxer" anti-foreign outbreak of the previous 
year. The garrisons were meant to provide against renewed 
surprise attacks by anti-foreign bands, but, having once been 
established, they became a permanent institution, and the 
relevant clauses of the treaty have never yet been abrogated. 

The railway zone system in Manchuria was introduced by 
the Russians, whose contract for the building of the Chinese 
Eastern Railway in 1896 gave the company (actually controlled 
by the Russian government) "absolute and exclusive right of 
administration of its lands" with its own police force. Owing 
to the prevalence of brigandage in Manchuria soldiers were 
brought in to serve as police, so that the railway became in 
effect a ribbon of Russian territory across Manchuria. The same 
rights were obtained by Russia in 1898 for the branch from 
Harbin to Port Arthur, a section of which was transferred to 
Japan in 1905 after the Russo-Japanese war and became the 
South Manchuria Railway; by the Treaty of Portsmouth the 
railway guards were limited to 15 per kilometer, but this was 
quite sufficient for a considerable force to be assembled any- 
where along the line. 



The semi-colonial servitudes on Chinese sovereignty were 
the result of China's failure to modernize her administrative 
and fiscal system during the second half of the nineteenth cen- 
tury. China retained enough strength and unity to survive as an 
independent state, but remained too weak and loosely organized 
either to give due protection to foreigners and their enterprises 
(which the official class in any case detested and had accepted 
only under force majeure) or to resist demands which were put to 
it on pretext of the disorderly conditions. The outcome of the 
long series of conflicts between the Western powers and the de- 
caying Manchu-Chinese imperial regime was a compromise 
which made China a unique anomaly in international law, for, 
while continuing to hold rank as a sovereign state, she was de- 
prived of the essential attributes of sovereignty inside her recog- 
nized frontiers. With foreign garrisons quartered in her territory 
and two alien-ruled municipalities in the heart of her biggest 
city, China was not, even after the Washington Conference of 
19^2, in possession of full sovereign rights. Chinese nationalism 
was inevitably imbued with a resolve to get rid of the "unequal 
treaties," but strong vested interests had come to be bound up 
with them, and the position was all the more difficult because 
certain of the privileges claimed by foreigners had long been 
conceded in practice without any real treaty basis. 

Japan escaped from the servitudes imposed upon China by 
her rapid self-modernization after 1868. She was in the begin- 
ning subjected, like China, to a system of extra-territoriality, 
and in the period of her internal troubles in the sixties was 
widely expected to fall to pieces and be eaten up by Western 
imperialism much more easily than China. But, having equipped 
herself with an effectively centralized administration, a Western- 



model legal code and a competent army and navy, Japan avoided 
the regime of foreign garrisons and independent settlements, and 
secured the final abolition of extra-territoriality in 1901. Nor 
did she stop at her own emancipation; even before it was com- 
plete, she had joined the Western powers as a holder of extra- 
territorial rights on the mainland of Asia. The possession of 
such rights came to appear to the Japanese, from their own 
experience on the wrong side of it, to be the distinctive 
attribute of civilized states in relation to backward peoples, and 
its economic value was also appreciated. In Korea Japan was 
actually first in the field and secured a trade treaty with extra- 
territorial rights for her nationals in advance of any other 
nation. She obtained the same privileges in China by the Treaty 
of Shimonoseki after the Sino- Japanese war in 1895, and thus 
entered the ranks of the Western powers who already held them. 
Under the Boxer Protocol of 1901 she shared with the Western 
powers the right of keeping garrisons in the Peiping-Tientsin 
area. By the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905 she took over part of 
the system of rights previously extorted by the Russians in 
Manchuria, including the Kwantung Leased Territory and the 
railway as far as Changchun with its privileges of administration 
and railway guards. In this way Japan gained a foothold inside 
China, and in the end the Western powers discovered that she 
was the principal beneficiary of a system they had originally 
elaborated for their own advantage. 

Chapter IV 


The Chinese empire, as constituted in the first decade of the 
present century, consisted of the eighteen provinces of China 
Proper and the four outer dependencies, Manchuria, Mongolia, 
Sinkiang or East Turkestan, and Tibet. China Proper comprised 
only 1,533,000 out of a total area of 4,278,000 square miles, but 
was estimated to contain well over 95 per cent of the total 

This great empire was the creation of the* Manchus, who cap- 
tured Peking 1 in 1644 and set up the Ch'ing dynasty in China. 
The purely Chinese Ming dynasty, which had reigned from 1368 
to 1644, had not held sway over northwest Manchuria, Mongolia, 
western Sinkiang or Tibet, though its territory in the time of its 
full vigor had extended northwestward by the Kansu corridor 
to Kami and northeastward to the lower Amur and the Japan 
Sea north of Korea. Toward the end of the Ming period the 
Chinese were confined within the Great Wall, while the North- 
land passed under the domination of two barbaric powers: the 
Kalmuks and the Manchus. The former, whose homeland was 

1 Now Peiping. Peking means "Northern Capital," and when it ceased 
to be the capital in 1928, its early name of Peiping was officially restored. 



A Boundaries of 
Manchu Empire 


Year of 





in western Mongolia, were essentially nomadic; the latter, 
whose ascendancy was based on east-central Manchuria, com- 
bined shifting cultivation and horse-breeding with hunting in 
their economy, and were better able to amalgamate with the 
Chinese than the pure nomads. They conquered Liaoning prov- 
ince (Mukden and Dairen) before they penetrated into China 
Proper, and were affected culturally by the long-established 
Chinese population in southern Manchuria; at the same time 
they drew into their confederacy a number of Mongol tribes who 
aided them in their wars against China. 1 The Manchus entered 
China in 1644 to ta ^ e P^t * n a Chinese civil war and at once 
took possession of the capital (Peking), though the south was 
not fully subdued for a generation. Then, toward the end of 
the seventeenth century the Manchus, strengthened by the re- 
sources of China, where their power was now centered, turned 
their arms against the Kalmuks and in a series of campaigns 
incorporated the whole of Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang in 
their empire. 

Outside the limits of Manchu-Chinese rule there were several 
states which could not be regarded as forming part of the 
empire, but were attached to it by formal acknowledgment of 
suzerainty and the payment of tribute. This category of countries 
included Korea, Luchu (Ryukyu in Japanese, the string of 
Japanese-inhabited small islands between Kyushu and Formosa), 
Annam, Burma and Nepal. Such relations of states were not 
recognized in Western international law based on the theory of 
sovereignty, and in the nineteenth century China was required 
either to accept responsibility for the acts of her "vassals" 

1 Each of the Eight Banners (pa ch't) of the Manchu army contained 
three sections Manchu, Mongol and Chinese. 



which she generally declined to do or to disinterest herself in 
their fate. In the end Korea and Luchu were annexed by Japan, 
Annam by France, Burma by Britain, and Nepal, which re- 
tained a semi-independence inside the framework of British 
Indian paramountcy, ceased to pay tribute after the Chinese 
Revolution of 1911. 

Within the internationally recognized borders of the Manchu 
empire the Manchu element gradually declined in importance 
and was swallowed up by the Chinese population. The state was 
always known to Europeans as "China" or the "Chinese empire," 
and Chinese was its official language. 1 The process of assimila- 
tion, moreover, was not limited to China Proper, but extended 
also, and in an even greater degree, to the Manchu homeland. 
The Manchu tribesmen, a warlike but never numerous com- 
munity, were distributed in garrisons over the empire, and Man- 
churia itself was left almost empty; the Manchu emperors, wish- 
ing to preserve it as an exclusive domain of their race, at first 
prohibited the immigration of Chinese, but the prohibition was 
later on relaxed, and in the late nineteenth century Chinese 
settlement was positively encouraged in order to create a human 
barrier against the flow of Russian colonization east of Lake 
Baikal. Manchuria thus became almost purely Chinese, except 
for the arid western tracts which were left to Mongol nomads, 
and the Manchus virtually disappeared as a distinct nationality 
with a territory of their own; formally, however, the administra- 
tion of Manchuria, "the three eastern provinces" (tung san 
sheng), was kept separate from that of China Proper, "the eight- 
een provinces" (shih pa sheng), until 1907. 

1 In the eighteenth century, however, official business between China 
and Russia was transacted in Manchu, and Manchu grammars and dic- 
tionaries were compiled by Russians. 



The order established by the Manchu empire also led to an 
extension of Chinese settlement in two other regions beyond the 
Great Wall: Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang. In the former 
Chinese peasants encroached on cultivable steppe land at the 
expense of the Mongols' pastures, the government officials and 
Mongol princes finding profit for themselves in the process. In 
Sinkiang the settlement was more a matter of policy; colonies of 
Chinese and Manchus were planted, especially in the Kulja and 
Urumchi districts, to protect the western march of the empire, 
at first against the still unsubdued Kalmuks and later against 
Russia. In Tibet and Outer Mongolia, on the other hand, there 
was no Chinese colonization, and Chinese nationality was repre- 
sented only by a handful of officials and traders. 

Within China Proper there was evident throughout the period 
of the Manchu dynasty a deep cleavage between north and 
south in relation to the central government at Peking. In the 
words of a writer on Chinese history: 1 "The Manchus occupied 
northern China by consent, unopposed; they conquered the 
south by force after a long and bitter struggle. This fact domi- 
nated the later history of the dynasty, and still today explains the 
differing attitude of the northern and southern Chinese toward 
the Manchu dynasty and the imperial system." 

The hostility of the south toward the Manchu regime was 
further accentuated by the penetration of Western cultural 
influences into the south in advance of their extension to the 
north, contacts with foreigners being made not only through the 
ports open to foreign trade of which Shanghai was the most 
northerly from 1842 to 1858 but also through Chinese emigra- 
tion, which came mainly from Kwantung to Malaya, the Dutch 
1 C. P. Fitzgerald, China: a Short Cultural History, p. 535. 


East Indies and America. The great T'ai P'ing rebellion, which 
broke out in 1851, was not only anti-Manchu, but also Christian; 
it began in Kwangsi, and its advance, first to Hankow and then 
down the Yangtse to Nanking, foreshadowed the later progress 
of the Kuomintang forces from Canton to the North China 
Plain. The T'ai P'ing rebellion was finally suppressed in 1864, 
but the cleavage between north and south was not overcome, 
and Canton subsequently became the focus of the revolutionary, 
modernizing, nationalist movement in China. 1 

The T'ai P'ing rebels sought to supplant the Manchu dynasty, 
not to break up the unity of the empire; the Moslem rebellions 
which occurred during the same period threatened, however, 
the disruption of Chinese sovereignty. Independent kingdoms, 
which made appeals for British protection, were set up in 
Sinkiang and Yunnan, and the Russians took the opportunity to 
occupy Kulja and the Hi basin in 1871. But the Chinese in the 
end crushed the Moslem revolts and recovered Kulja by nego- 
tiation. The empire within the frontiers of 1860 was thus pre- 
served intact until the Sino-Japanese war of 1894 brought 
Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria into peril. 

The war was fought on the issue of Chinese suzerainty over 
Korea, but military operations were also carried into southern 
Manchuria, and by the Treaty of Shimonoseki the Liaotung 
peninsula, including Port Arthur, was ceded to Japan. Russia, 
however, persuaded France and Germany to join her in com- 
pelling Japan by an ultimatum to restore this territory to China, 
and then took advantage of her position as China's protector to 
penetrate Manchuria herself. In 1898 she compelled China to 

x The Cantonese did not support the T'ai P'ing movement, whose 
leader belonged to the distinct Hakka community of Kwangtung Chinese. 


grant her a lease of Port Arthur, which she proceeded to turn 
into a fortress and naval base; this stronghold together with the 
Russian-controlled railways gave the Russians paramount in- 
fluence in Manchuria, and when in 1900 the Boxer anti-foreign 
outbreak was made the excuse for a general military occupation, 
the country passed completely under Russian dominion. The 
Russian rule was not destined to last long, for in 1904 Japan, 
covered against French or German intervention by the Anglo- 
Japanese alliance, made war on Russia and expelled her forces 
from Port Arthur and Mukden. This did not, however, result in 
a full restoration of Chinese sovereign control in Manchuria, for, 
though the Treaty of Portsmouth required a withdrawal of all 
troops, Russian or Japanese, outside the Kwantung Leased 
Territory (Port Arthur) and the railway zones, these corridors 
of foreign power remained, only they were now shared between 
Russia and Japan. Nor could China count after 1907 on the 
mutual hostility of Russia and Japan, for, having fought each 
other, they soon entered into close political collaboration, and 
by private arrangement between themselves partitioned all 
Chinese territory north of the Great Wall into "spheres of in- 
fluence' ' Russia to have North Manchuria, Outer Mongolia 
and Sinkiang, while Japan reserved to herself South Manchuria 
and Inner Mongolia. 

The Russian empire-building in Manchuria from 1896 to 
1904 was supplemented by Russian intrigues in Tibet, which 
brought about British intervention and a military expedition to 
Lhasa in 1904, Chinese control of Tibet being at that time very 
slight. To reassert the authority of Peking a Chinese army was 
sent to Tibet in 1908 and had just succeeded in its task when the 
Chinese Revolution broke out in 1911. 


;<.> -v. -- 

Jt 1 * &i< j^=^5sSSS:S3g";LL' iV" "' f ii^^ '-'^ ftffiQCIUAiJ 



After the fall of the Manchu dynasty the Chinese Republic 
was recognized internationally as inheriting all the territories of 
the old empire, but both the Tibetans and the Mongols of Outer 
Mongolia repudiated the Republic and took advantage of the 
confusion to gain de facto independence. The Republic adopted 
a flag with five bars to represent the five nationalities which 
were to form the new state Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, 
Moslems and Tibetans, but the driving force in the new move- 
ment was pure Chinese nationalism, and it evoked strong re- 
sistance from the two most coherent of the non-Chinese nation- 
alities of the empire the Tibetans and the Mongols. Of the 
other two the Manchus, as already stated, had ceased to form a 
real nationality, while among the Moslems the great majority 
were Chinese-speaking (Tungans) and, with the modern 
nationalist stress on language rather than religion as the cri- 
terion of allegiance, tended to regard themselves primarily as 
Chinese in the new era; the Turki Moslems of Sinkiang were not 
strong enough by themselves to form an independent state. 

A feature of the Republican regime has been the creation of 
new provinces assimilated to the administrative system of China 
Proper in those nearer parts of Tibet and Mongolia which re- 
mained under Chinese control. Sikang and Tsinghai were 
carved out of eastern Tibet, while Inner Mongolia was split up 
into the four provinces of Jehol, Chahar, Suiyiian and Ninghsia. 

Apart from the Tibetan and Mongol secessions, however, 
there was a great disintegration of the Chinese state after 1915. 
The military governors of provinces engrossed the provincial 
revenues and made war on one another with private armies in 
the manner of feudal barons. Their insubordination was sup- 
ported to some extent by the traditional particularism of 


Chinese provinces and their reluctance to submit to a central- 
ized fiscal system, but in no case was there a real separatist 
movement aimed at setting up a new sovereign state. Among 
educated Chinese the consciousness of nationality was continu- 
ally growing stronger, and the Kuomintang party with its head- 
quarters at Canton was building up a powerful nationalist 
movement with a program of "rights recovery," "abolition of 
unequal treaties," state unification and economic self-develop- 
ment. Nevertheless, as long as the regional tuchun despotisms 
and civil wars continued, China was even weaker in relation to 
foreign powers than she had been under the Manchus, and her 
economic evolution was held up; the country's substance was 
devoured by unproductive spoliation and brigandage, and 
foreign capital did not dare to venture in under conditions of 
such disorder except where it was assured of political control. 

At the Washington Conference in 1922 eight nations agreed 
with China in the so-called Nine-Power Treaty to "provide the 
fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop 
and maintain for herself an effective and stable government." 
Such a prospect corresponded on the whole to the policies of 
Britain and the U.S.A., who took the lead at the Conference; 
a third signatory, however, was by no means of one mind with 
regard to the desirability of assisting the growth of a strong, 
united China. Influential official and business circles in Japan 
believed that their country had a vested interest in Chinese dis- 
union, and that the unification and industrialization of China 
would spell Japan's political and economic decline. In particular 
they feared that a nationalist Chinese central government con- 
trolling Manchuria would soon make an end of the existing 
monopoly position of the South Manchuria Railway. 


Chapter V 


In 1853, when Commodore Perry demanded the opening of 
Japan to foreign trade, Japan was almost completely secluded 
from the outer world and her dominion was confined to the four 
large islands from Kyushu to Yezo (Hokkaido). 1 She had no 
foothold on the mainland of Asia. To the southwest of Kyushu, 
the Ryukyu islands, which are now an integral part of Japan, 
then formed a separate kingdom which paid tribute to China, 
though also recognizing a certain suzerainty of the Japanese 
lords of Satsuma in Kyushu, To the north of Yezo Japanese 
fishermen and petty traders frequented the shores of Sakhalin 
and the Kurile islands, but there was no Japanese administra- 
tion. Yezo itself was scarcely Japanese except in the extreme 
south; most of it was wild forest country still left to the primitive 
Aino aborigines. Japan in effect consisted of Honshu, Shikoku, 
Kyushu and the closely adjacent small islands. 

Under the seclusionist system established early in the seven- 
teenth century Japanese subjects were not allowed to go abroad, 
for trade or any other purpose, on pain of death if they returned; 
foreigners were not allowed in Japan except for a very limited 

1 Hokkaido is really the name for an administrative division including 
Yezo and the Kuriles, but it has come to be used as a synonym for Yezo 
by itself. 


trade, open only to the Chinese and Dutch, in the port of Naga- 
saki. From 1615 to 1853 J a P an had no foreign war and no 
serious internal revolt; this period affords the most striking con- 
trast to the stormy history of modern Japan. 

Since prehistoric times (before A.D. 200) Japan has never been 
successfully invaded. The attempts made by Kublai Khan, the 
Mongol emperor of China, in the thirteenth century resulted in 
complete disaster, and the failure of what was then the strongest 
power in Asia to subdue the islands of the "Yamato race" gave 
the Japanese a traditional confidence in the divinely assured 
inviolability of their country. The Kublai Khan invasion has 
the same place in Japanese, as the Spanish Armada in English, 
memory; the inscription "He blew with His winds and they were 
scattered" on the pedestal of Drake's monument at Plymouth 
affords an exact counterpart to "the divine wind of Ise," the 
typhoon which wrecked the fleet of China's overlord. This 
tradition of security goes far to explain the remarkable vigor 
of the national awakening when the Japanese in the eighteen- 
fifties suddenly found their coasts and ports at the mercy of 
foreign warships. 

Prior to the Sino-Japanese war of 1894 the Japanese had twice 
in their history made temporary conquests on the Asiatic main- 
land. At an uncertain date some time before A.D. 400 they pene- 
trated into Korea, that country being at the time divided into 
several small kingdoms; in 663 they were finally expelled by an 
alliance of the Korean kingdom of Shinra with China, and Korea 
was united by Shinra under Chinese suzerainty. From 663 to 
1592 there was no Japanese intervention in continental affairs, 
though the coasts of Kyushu were a base for corsairs who sorely 
harried the peoples of the mainland; then the great soldier 


Hideyoshi, having united Japan under his own rule (formally 
subject to the authority of the Mikado) after a long period of 
civil wars, designed the conquest of China and invaded Korea 
as a preliminary. After a campaign of varying fortunes the troops 
were withdrawn on the death of Hideyoshi in 1598, and the war 
came to be known as the Ryo-to Fa-bi or "Dragon's head and 
snake's tail" because of its glorious beginning and inglorious 
ending. From 1598 no further attempt at continental expansion 
was made until after the "westernization" of Japan. 

With the entry of Japan into a world of international relations 
and modern navies the possession of outlying islands came to be 
of great importance, and it was to these that Japan's attention 
was first directed after the "Restoration" of 1868. In 1875 a 
treaty was made with Russia whereby Russia acquired sover- 
eignty over Sakhalin and Japan over the Kuriles (Chishima). 
The Bonin islands (Ogasawarajima) to the southeast of Japan 
were formally annexed in 1876, and the Ryukyu islands (with a 
Japanese-speaking population) in 1879, China's claim to 
suzerainty over the latter being ignored. 1 The Kuriles, the 
Bonins and Ryukyu were incorporated in the administrative 
system of Japan Proper and are not today counted as colonial 

The acquisition of a definitely colonial domain began with 
the annexation of Taiwan (Formosa), which was ceded by 
China after the war of 1894-5, The Liaotung peninsula of south- 
ern Manchuria, which had been occupied by the Japanese army 
during the war, was also ceded by the same peace treaty, but 
was restored to China after the ultimatum known as the Triple 
Intervention, in which Russia, France* and Germany partici- 

1 The former king of Ryukyu was given a title in the Japanese peerage. 




pated. During the next few years it seemed likely that Russia 
would swallow up both Manchuria and Korea and exclude 
Japan from any possibility of expansion on the mainland, but the 
Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 turned the tables and left Japanese 
forces in control of Korea, southern Manchuria and most of 
the island of Sakhalin. By the Treaty of Portsmouth, which con- 
cluded the war, Russia ceded to Japan half of Sakhalin and the 
leasehold of Port Arthur and Dalny (Kwantung), which she 
had acquired from China; Korea, nominally a sovereign state 
since 1895, was placed under a thinly disguised Japanese pro- 
tectorate and was finally annexed in 1910. At the time of the 
outbreak of the Great War in 1914 Japan thus held four colonial 
territories: Taiwan, Chosen (Korea), Karafuto (southern 
Sakhalin) and Kwantung, and as a result of the Great War she 
obtained a fifth the island groups in the Pacific north of the 
Equator which had belonged to Germany. Of the five, three 
Taiwan, Chosen and Karafuto were under Japan's full 
sovereignty; in the other two her sovereignty was qualified, 
Kwantung being held on lease from China, and the ex-German 
islands under a mandate of the League of Nations. 

The conquests made by Japanese armies in Manchuria, 
Mongolia and China since 1931 have effected no formal addi- 
tion to the Japanese empire, for a method of "indirect rule" has 
been applied without any annexation or even protectorate of 
the ordinary kind; Manchukuo is in Japanese theory a sovereign 
state, and any nation which so desires can have diplomatic 
representation at Hsinking at the price of recognizing Man- 
chukuo's sovereignty and detachment from China. The world 
in general does not take this theory very seriously and regards 
Manchukuo as merely an alias for Japan. But in keeping up the 



elaborate hocus-pocus of independence for a country she in 
reality controls Japan is simply following an example set by 
Britain with the concurrence of the League of Nations, for the 
admission of India in 1919 to a society whose membership is by 
its constitution restricted to independent states and "fully self- 
governing" colonies or dominions introduced into international 
relations an element of sheer humbug; which the world will yet 
have cause to regret. If a state can be recognized as "fully self- 
governing" when it lacks every attribute of real independence, 
the way is open for an unlimited faking of sovereignty. By virtue 
of the Geneva conception of national independence Japan can 
at least claim that the people of Manchuria have not enjoyed less 
freedom in setting up the government of Manchukuo than 
has the "fully self-governing" Indian nation in choosing Lord 
Linlithgow as its ruler. 

In effect the Japanese empire at the time of writing extends 
to Paotou on the Yellow River and Kiukiang on the Yangtse, 
and its limits are the fronts of the Japanese armies in the field. 
The populations under Japanese rule outside Japan already 
outnumber the conquering nation, whereas up to 1931 the 
inhabitants of the colonies were in a ratio of only about 3:7 to 
those of the homeland. 

Japan Proper has an area of 147,611 square miles (slightly 
larger than Great Britain, but smaller than any one of thirteen 
out of the eighteen provinces of China Proper) and a population 
of over 70 million. The Japanese in their islands form a very well- 
defined and compact nationality, and except for the negligible 
remnant of the Aino aborigines in Hokkaido (now only 20,000 
strong) Japan has no domestic nationality problem. It should 
be remembered, however, in relation to internal politics that, 


although Japan is a small country inhabited by a single na- 
tionality, its surface is so much intersected by mountains as 
well as by the insular divisions that a very strong local particu- 
larism prevails, and ' 'county town" influences are an effective 
counterweight to the political activity of the big cities. London 
is not Britain and Paris is not France; it is even more true that 
Tokyo is not Japan, in spite of a centralized unitary system of 
administration. Up to seventy years ago Japan was divided into 
small feudal units, many of which were very loosely attached to 
the central power, and the old loyalties persist, so that Japanese 
opinion is formed no less in such places as Kagoshima, Saga and 
Kanazawa than in the capital, and the cliques in national 
politics often have narrowly local roots. The strong district 
attachments provide a framework for the separate life of rural 
Japan, industry being concentrated in a few restricted areas in 
the southeast of Honshu and the extreme north of Kyushu. 
The army in Japan specially represents the countryside, for 
most of the officers come from the small landowning gentry 
and the conscripts are selected as far as possible from peasant 
stock rather than from the town population. 

The directly ruled colonies have a total population of about 
30 million, of which less than 2 million are Japanese, the 
remainder being made up of about 22 million Koreans, 6 
million Chinese in Formosa and Kwantung, and one to two 
hundred thousand Formosa aborigines and natives of the 
Mandated Islands. To this total must now be added, as for 
the time being subject to Japan, over go millions in Manchu- 
kuo and approximately 100 millions (minus refugees) in the 
areas occupied by Japan in China Proper since the outbreak 
of hostilities last year; all these are Chinese except for some 




three million Mongols in the west of Manchukuo and in Inner 

The history of Japan's expansion falls into two periods corre- 
sponding to the distinction between her formal and her informal 
empire. The colonial territories acquired up to 1931 were all of 
some value, but they did not give Japan in the long run a strong 
economic position either for commercial competition in a 
world of increasing economic nationalism or for war-power under 
conditions of strategy in which military decision was tending 
more and more to depend on capacity for avoiding economic 
breakdown in time of war. Japan and Korea were more or less 
self-sufficing as regards foodstuffs, and Formosa on the edge of 
the tropics supplemented their resources with sugar, citrus 
fruits and other special products. In minerals, however, and in 
the raw materials of several of her most important industries 
Japan remained largely or entirely dependent on imports for 
essential supplies. Japan is not rich in any important mineral 
except copper; her resources of coal are small, of iron ore 
insignificant, and of oil negligible, for a country which aims at 
large-scale industrial development. Good coking coal is con- 
spicuous by its absence. For textile industries cotton must be 
entirely, and wool almost entirely, imported; the rayon industry 
is also partly dependent on wood-pulp imports. 

To create big industries and support a large population by 
the export of manufactured goods with so inadequate a basis of 
natural resources would be a formidable task even in a world 
of free trade, stable currencies and general political harmony. 
Under the conditions prevailing in the world since 1919, and 
still more since 1930, industrialization has involved Japan in 
very serious difficulties, and the most disconcerting factor in the 







situation has been the prospect of the competitive industrializa- 
tion of China. For China not only has five times the population 
of Japan, but is far better endowed with natural resources and 
capacity for raw-material production, especially as regards coal, 
iron and cotton. If China and Japan had begun their self- 
modernization simultaneously about 1870 and had continued 
at the same rate, there can be no doubt but that China would 
now be the Great Power of the Far East, both economically and 
politically, and that Japan would still be a mainly agricultural 
country and a power of secondary rank, comparing with China 
in much the same way as Holland or Sweden with Britain or 
Germany. But China's late start gave Japan a long lead both in 
economic development and military power, and to retain this 
lead has been the main preoccupation of Japanese policy for 
the last decade. 

If a united and efficiently administered China were to carry 
through a program of industrialization with her advantages 
of abundant cheap labor equal to Japan's and with superior 
natural resources, she would quickly surpass Japan both in 
heavy and light industries, competing ruinously with Japanese 
trade both in the Chinese home market (covered by tariffs if 
necessary) and elsewhere, and also reducing Japan to inferiority 
in power by a greater and more self-sufficient capacity for war- 
material production. Even if Japan were prepared to con- 
template such an economic and political abdication, adjustment 
would be extremely difficult with a momentum of population 
increase adapted to an expanding economic system, and the 
strain on the social structure would probably lead to domestic 
revolution. Hence the "positive" policy toward China, which 
means, in short, to keep China weak and divided, to prevent a 




Kuomintang-directed, anti-Japanese industrialization of China, 
and to control the raw material resources of the country for 
Japan's own use in peace or war. 

Japanese liberals during the nineteen-twenties believed that 
a satisfactory compromise was possible, and they might have 
reached an understanding with the new China but for the funda- 
mental conflict over Japan's vested interests in South Manchuria 
interests which were based on the political supremacy taken 
over from Russia in 1905 and were regarded by Chinese 
nationalists as incompatible with China's sovereignty. The 
conflict reached a climax in 1931, at a time when Japan was in 
the throes of a serious internal crisis due to the effects of a world- 
wide economic depression, and the army chiefs took the oppor- 
tunity to launch Japan on a new era of imperialist expansion. 
The military occupation of Manchuria not only secured the 
vested interests of the South Manchuria Railway but delivered 
all the resources of four Chinese provinces into the hands of 
Japan. Some Japanese leaders hoped to close the account with 
the completion of this conquest. There could, however, be no 
stopping at the borders of Manchuria. China now became 
implacably hostile and acquired a new political unity and 
energy from the principle of "anti-Japanism"; her capacity for 
economic development was not seriously impaired by the loss 
of Manchuria, for her most important economic areas lay 
south of the Great Wall. In 1935 China reformed her currency 
with British financial support and advice, and at the beginning 
of 1937, as a result of the Sian kidnaping incident, the civil 
war between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists was brought 
to an end and replaced by an anti-Japanese People's Front. 
Meanwhile the tariff and quota restrictions on Japanese export 



trade and exchange difficulties due to inflationary finance had 
combined to convert Japanese business circles to a program 
of obtaining economic control over the raw-material resources 
of North China; the fighting services favored the same policy 
as a means of both forestalling the growth of China's war-power 
and strengthening their own. In these circumstances, after four 
years of uneasy truce, the war against China was renewed at 
the end of July 1937. 


Chapter VI 


The territories of the Soviet Union stretch to the northwest, 
north and northeast of both China and Japan Petropavlovsk 
in Kamchatka is nearly 20 degrees of longitude east of Tokyo 
and in Far Eastern politics the Russian power established be- 
tween Lake Baikal and the Pacific stands at the apex of the 
triangle of which China and Japan form the base. The obvious 
strategic importance of East Siberia, however, and its vast size 
on the map do not at all correspond to its significance in the 
economy of the Soviet Union. It is by far the poorest both 
actually and potentially (on known data) of the main regions 
of the Union, and if all territory east of the Yenisei were to be 
eliminated tomorrow, the Soviet economic system would hardly 
be affected by the loss, except perhaps as regards gold-mining 
and the fur trade. 

The economic power of the Soviet Union and its future 
prospects in world affairs are based on its enormous natural 
resources in soil and minerals. The great belt of chernozyom or 
"black earth" soil from the 'Dniester to the Yenisei provides the 
possibility of an abundant agricultural production, while enor- 
mous reserves of coal and iron ore in European Russia and West 
Siberia afford an adequate foundation for a heavy industry on 


the largest scale. Add to these assets the oil of the Caucasus, the 
copper and cotton of Turkestan, the timber of the north, the 
broad cattle and sheep pastures of the steppe margins and the 
fact that Russia is all plain, except for the Urals, from the Baltic 
to the Altai, and the whole of that area is seen to form a grand 
economic unit of prodigious natural wealth. But East Siberia 
falls outside that area and forms a separate region in no way 
comparable in natural resources. It has virtually no black-earth 
soil and very little cultivable land; it is in great part as moun- 
tainous as it is barren; except for gold, deposits of which are 
found mainly in the Lena basin, it has no mineral wealth 
remotely comparable to that of European Russia or West 
Siberia; communications are inadequate for such resources as 
there are and can only be developed at great expense. 1 The 
principal maritime outlet, Vladivostok, does not find a place in 
the first rank of Far Eastern ports in respect of tonnage cleared. 
In a process of normal economic development East Siberia would 
remain a region of "bad lands" like northern Canada, productive 
of gold and furs with a supplement of lumber and fisheries, but 
a mere appendage to the main economy of the Soviet Union. 
Its recent development, under the direction of central govern- 
ment planning, has been highly artificial and dominated by 
strategic-political considerations, which require the existence 
of an agricultural and coal-metal base to support Soviet military 
power in the Far East. 

In 1931 the population of East Siberia, including considerable 
territory to the west of the Yenisei, was as follows: 

Far Eastern Region (of R.S.F.S.R.) . . . 1,593400 

Yakutsk Republic 308,400 

1 Gold and furs from Yakutia are at present transported mainly by air. 



Buryat-Mongol Republic 575>ooo 

East Siberian Region (of R.S.F.S.R.) . . 5,568,400 

Total . 5,045,200 

A population of rather over 5 millions in this vast area and 
it has not greatly increased since 1931 is little enough in com- 
parison with over 400 millions in China and nearly 100 millions 
in Japan and Korea. Moreover, it has not been attained without 
great efforts to promote colonization, begun by the Tsarist 
government after the Russo-Japanese war, when the emptiness 
of .East Siberia was revealed as a great handicap to the Russian 
army operating in Manchuria. Soviet policy has sought to in- 
duce settlers to come east of Lake Baikal and stay there by 
drastic exemptions from taxation; another device has been the 
founding of the autonomous area of Biro-Bijan as a colony for 
Jews in the country north of the Amur. Labor for road and 
railway construction has been supplied in recent years by con- 
victs, who were available in large quantities after the liquidation 
of the kulaks under the First Five-Year Plan. By special induce- 
ments to some and coercion for others the Soviet government 
has during the last decade assembled in East Siberia a greater 
number of Russians than would otherwise have gone there, but 
the total effect on the wilderness has not been very great, and 
the Soviet Far Eastern army still relies less on local agriculture 
and industries than on its magazines and its railway communica- 
tions with the west. 

The Trans-Siberian railway has lately been double-tracked 
and this has vastly increased its efficiency as a route of supply. 
Now that the Manchurian section of the direct Chita-Vladi- 
vostok line (the old Chinese Eastern Railway) has been sold to 


Manchukuo and would be held by Japan in case of war, the 
only line to Vladivostok is that by Khabarovsk, going to the 
north of the Amur. This railway keeps well behind the frontier, 
but it might be cut by a rapid offensive from Manchukuo, or 
the Trans-Siberian might be cut to the south of Lake Baikal by 
a Japanese advance through Outer Mongolia; in either event, 
East Siberia has now a second line of defense based on a railway 
to the north of Lake Baikal, which has been under construction 
during the last three years. The terminus of this line is the new 
town of Sovietskaya on the coast north of Vladivostok. 

In spite of the general indigence of East Siberia, it has two 
assets which are of considerable significance for Japan's eco- 
nomic system. Marine products play an exceptionally large part 
in Japanese food consumption and some of the best fishing 
grounds within convenient range of Japan are inside, or just 
outside, Russian territorial waters in the Gulf of Tartary and 
off the west coast of Kamchatka. The Russians make compara- 
tively little use of these fisheries and their exploitation by Japa- 
nese fishing fleets has long been a source of friction, acrimonious 
discussion and hard bargaining between the two governments. 
The second bone of contention has been the Sakhalin oilfield, 
which lies entirely in the northern, i.e. the Russian, half of the 
island. The oilfield was not known to exist in 1905, or the Japa- 
nese would not have agreed to the partition of Sakhalin as readily 
as they did in the settlement after the Russo-Japanese war. The 
oilfield is of little consequence to the country which possesses 
the wells of Baku and Grozni; it is, however, of major impor- 
tance to the Far East, which is very poor in natural oil outside 
Indonesia, and especially to Japan, a country with only trivial 
oil resources of its own. Since 1955 a Japanese company has 



therefore worked the Sakhalin field with a concession on the 
checkerboard system, and the arrangement has been too profit- 
able to both countries to be upset by the most violent political 
quarrels. If Japan were to be at war with Russia or Russia were 
to apply full economic sanctions against Japan, the supply would 
of course be cut off, and even if Japanese armed forces could 
seize the field, the wells could be put out of action for a long 
time by competent wrecking. On the other hand, it would be 
extremely difficult for Russia, with her lack of sea-power, to hold 
Sakhalin in a war, or to recover it if lost except by a knock-out 
victory elsewhere. The situation is therefore such as to deter 
both powers from going to extremes in this matter, and the 
operations of the Kita Karafuto Petroleum Company have been 
notable for their obscurity rather than for their prominence in 
world affairs, especially since the outbreak of the present Sino- 
Japanese war. 

It has been well said that the Soviet Far Eastern Region is 
worth having, but not worth a major war, and there is good 
reason to believe that this is the view of the Japanese army 
chiefs. There have been two occasions, however, within the last 
twenty years when it appeared for a while that the Russian Far 
East might be overrun without a major war. The first was at the 
time of the civil wars in Siberia just after the Russian Revolution. 
Japan then sent troops to Siberia along with British, French and 
American contingents as part of the Allied intervention on be- 
half of the Czechoslovak legionaries in 1918. As the intervention 
developed into support of the Russian counter-revolution, the 
Japanese evolved a policy designed to give them a protectorate 
over Transbaikalia and the Maritime Province; they backed, 
not the would-be central government of Admiral Kolchak, but 



the Cossack adventurers Semenov and Kalmikov who fought, 
each for his own hand, in East Siberia. The project failed, partly 
because of the solidarity of Russian national feeling against the 
Japanese and their proteges, partly because the Japanese military 
forces at that time lacked sufficient warm clothing to enable 
them to remain in the field during the Siberian winter in more 
than fifty degrees of frost. There was a lack of enthusiasm for the 
campaign in Japan, and the U.S.A. applied pressure for with- 
drawal. Finally, the Japanese evacuated Vladivostok in the 
autumn of 1922; they stayed in the Russian half of Sakhalin 
until 1925, and secured the oilfield concession already mentioned 
in consideration of their departure. 

When the Russians started to develop Vladivostok as an air 
base, Japanese army leaders began to think the place had been 
too lightly given up, and another opportunity to lay hold on the 
Maritime Province seemed to offer itself in 1932. When the 
Kwantung Army took the offensive in southern Manchuria in 
September 1931, the Soviet Union was just entering on the crit- 
ical period of the First Five-Year Plan and was incapable of any 
vigorous action externally; the Japanese, therefore, in confidence 
of immunity from Russian intervention in Manchuria, followed 
up their initial drive in their own railway sphere with an ad- 
vance across the zone of the Russian-controlled Chinese Eastern 
Railway and up to the Amur. They thus placed themselves 
astride the principal line of communication with Vladivostok, 
and a policy group in the army advocated the seizure of all Soviet 
territory south of the Amur by a rapid offensive while the going 
was good. However, the fighting which broke out at Shanghai 
early in 1932 not only diverted Japan's attention elsewhere, but 
brought her into a position of such diplomatic isolation that 


a further military adventure was out o the question. The 
military party therefore contented itself with the elimination of 
Soviet interests and influence from Manchuria, which was a 
solid achievement and greatly strengthened Japan's strategic 

Since 1933 Russia's defensive strength in the Far East has 
been so much increased that an invasion of Siberia or surprise 
attack on Vladivostok has not been a practical proposition for 
Japan. Nevertheless there has been a state of high tension be- 
tween Japan and Russia, and a succession of lively border 
incidents has fed the rumor of an impending war. The Com- 
munists have made it almost an article of faith that Japanese 
penetration of China is merely preparation for an attack on the 
Soviet Union. But for an economically motivated imperialism 
there is no sense in seeking to acquire a territory that is at once 
poverty-stricken and strongly defended when richer and weaker 
lands lie close within reach. The anti-Soviet agitation in the 
Japanese army appears to be due partly to ideological and partly 
to strategic considerations, and it also has a distinct value to the 
military party in its psychological effect on the Japanese public. 

However far the Soviet state under Stalin may have departed 
from the principles of Lenin and the Old Bolsheviks, it continues 
to stand for republicanism, anti-feudalism and agrarian revolu- 
tion, and is therefore anathema to the social class which the 
Japanese officers' corps mainly represents. In China Communism 
has compromised with landlords, but only in order to unite 
the Chinese nation in the cause of anti-Japanism. On all counts 
the Japanese emperor-revering, feudally minded "double pa- 
triot" fears and detests communist Russia. But such a sentiment, 
though it is an important political factor, is not likely to drive 


Japan into war with Russia unless it coincides with the economic 
urge of Japanese expansion, and this urge is otherwise directed. 
There is even a group of business interests which advocates an 
understanding with the Soviet Union in order that Japan may 
concentrate on an anti-British policy; this group is not dominant, 
but its mere existence is very significant. 

Strategically the Japanese military attitude is determined by 
fear of Russian intervention on behalf of China. The building of 
strategic railways and display of military strength toward the 
Soviet border are deterrent by intention; these measures are 
essentially defensive as regards Russia, though their purpose is 
to cover offensive strategy in China. Since the middle of last 
year some 400,000 Japanese troops have been held in Man- 
chukuo to guard against any Russian move to render direct 
military aid to China, and though actual war has so far been 
avoided, the need for such a concentration has made the struggle 
with China far more difficult and costly than it would otherwise 
have been. Japan has had to fight in China with one arm while 
keeping the northern gate firmly shut with the other. 

The strength of the Soviet Far Eastern army and the menace 
of the bombers at Vladivostok to the cities of Japan are genuine 
preoccupations of the Japanese General Staff. But the danger 
involves a compensating advantage, which would make a 
rapprochement with Russia something of a disaster for the mili- 
tary party. It is not possible to obtain strong popular support 
for an expansionist policy involving heavy sacrifices unless the 
people have a sense of being themselves threatened. The 
Vladivostok bombers are a threat to Japan's power, but they are 
an asset to Japanese militarism just because they put the coun- 
try in danger. By frequent air-raid drills carried out with great 



realism in the larger cities the Japanese man-in-the-street is 
made conscious of the devastation that may come at any time 
from the other side of the Japan Sea and is more reconciled to 
the taxation he has to pay for the nation's swollen armaments 
and continental wars. 

If war were to break out between Japan and Russia, there is 
no doubt but that Russian bombers from coastal bases on the 
Japan Sea could do serious damage in Japan. The distance from 
Vladivostok to Tsuruga is 490 miles (as compared with 386 
miles, Hamburg to Hull) and Kyoto and Osaka are only a little 
farther on. Tokyo is less exposed, because bombers would have 
to fly over the mountains of Shinano or Kotsuke, where anti- 
aircraft batteries at high altitudes might be very troublesome. 
The vital centers of Japan are certainly vulnerable to air attack, 
whereas those of Russia are out of reach for Japan; on the other 
hand, it seems unlikely that the war could be decided by air 
action alone, and on the ground the remoteness of the real bases 
of Russian power would tell in favor of Japan in a struggle in 
which the Japanese stood on the defensive, especially if they 
were to evacuate the Amur salient and concentrate on holding 
Harbin with the Gobi desert covering Jehol and Chahar. Unless 
it were quickly decided by some remarkable military victory or 
by an internal convulsion in Japan, it appears probable that the 
emptiness and vast distances of East Siberia and Mongolia 
would make such a war more exhausting for Russia than for 
her enemy. 


Chapter VII 


The territory of the state of Manchukuo, created by the agency 
of Japanese military power in 1932, comprises the former 
Chinese provinces of Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Jehol. 
The first three of these were known to the Chinese as "the Three 
Eastern Provinces" and made up the area known to foreigners 
as Manchuria; Jehol was reckoned a part of Inner Mongolia. 
All four, however, prior to the Japanese conquest were under 
the control of the military despotism established in the years 
following the Chinese revolution by the adventurer Chang 
Tso-lin and inherited in 1928 by his son Chang Hsiieh-liang. 

Manchuria is geographically separated from China Proper by 
the inner gulf of the Yellow Sea and by the mountains which 
shut in the North China plain and extend to the coast at Shan- 
haikwan. The Great Wall follows the line of these mountains 
and was designed to keep the passes by which barbarian raiders 
from Manchuria and Mongolia broke into the lowlands of 
Hopei; it never formed, however, an absolute limit to Chinese 
settlement, and for the last two thousand years the northern 
shore of the Yellow Sea with the hinterland as far as Mukden 
has been inhabited by Chinese. The northern and central parts 
of Manchuria, on the other hand, remained up to the nineteenth 


century in the hands of primitive tribes of Mongol or Tungusic 
speech; sometimes a strong Chinese dynasty would reduce them 
to subjection, but more often the tribes would form a conquer- 
ing confederacy or kingdom and bring the Chinese pale under 
their yoke. Manchuria was thus a country which always con- 
tained a strong Chinese element, but still remained a ''frontier" 
and never became part of the Chinese homeland until quite re- 

To the west Manchuria merges into Mongolia without any 
very clear definition. The Great Khingan mountains, forming 
the eastern escarpment of the Mongolian plateau, are to some 
extent a dividing line, but the Barga district of Heilungkiang 
lies to the west of the range, while the arid steppe country 
typical of Mongolia is continued in a large tract to the east of 
it. Ethnically also the Mongols overflow to the east of the Great 
Khingan. Broadly speaking, however, there is a strong contrast 
between the two regions, in that most of Manchuria is arable 
and well provided with rivers, whereas most of Mongolia is 
riverless and too arid for cultivation. 

It has already been pointed out (Chap. IV) that, as an ulti- 
mate result of the Manchu conquest of China, Manchuria 
became more Chinese than ever before; that the country fell 
virtually under Russian rule from 1900 to 1904; and that 
Chinese sovereignty was only imperfectly restored after the 
Russo-Japanese war. The seeds which came to harvest in 1931 
were sown by the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905. Manchuria 
was recognized as Chinese territory under Chinese administra- 
tion, but the Russian railway system with its military guards 
and its "absolute and exclusive administration of its lands" re- 
mained, only it was now shared between Russia and Japan. 


Chinese Eastern Railway t- Japanese Railways 

South Mancburian -* Russian **** 

Chinese Railways \^^N Riven 


State Boundaries 


Russia retained the continuation of the Trans-Siberian Railway 
across North Manchuria (known as the Chinese Eastern Rail- 
wa y C.E.R.) and the branch from Harbin to the Yellow Sea 
as far south as Changchun now (Hsinking), while Japan took 
over the section from Changchun to the port of Dalny (now 
Dairen). The Japanese line was given the name of the South 
Manchuria Railway (S.M.R.); it was operated by a company 
in which the Japanese government owned half the shares and 
appointed to the highest posts, while the other half of the shares 
were held mainly by a ring of the biggest family trusts the so- 
called Zaibatsu. The C.E.R. was always before 1917 under the 
control of the Russian Ministry of Finance, and from 1924 to 
1935 it was the Soviet government which inherited in a modi- 
fied form the rights of the former Russian company. Both Japan 
and Russia were therefore deeply involved as states in the affairs 
of the Manchurian railways, and every transaction of the rail- 
way companies tended to become a political issue. 

By the treaties and notes of 1915, imposed on China in 
sequel to the famous "Twenty-one Demands," the terms of 
Japanese possession of the Kwantung Leased Territory and of 
the S.M.R. and Antung-Mukden Railway 1 were extended from 
twenty-five to ninety-nine years from the original dates. Be- 
cause of the duress under which the concessions were made, the 
Chinese, in the words of the Lytton Report, 2 "continuously 
denied that these [the 1915 treaties and notes] were binding 
upon them." They demanded the abrogation of the 1915 agree- 
ments at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, at the Washington 

1 The Antung-Mukden line linked the S.M.R. with the Japanese rail- 
way system in Korea. 

2 Appeal by the Chinese Government: Report of the Commission of 
Enquiry, Geneva, 1933, pp. 49-50. 



Conference in 1921-2, and in a note to Japan in 1923; they 
maintained, as German nationalists held with regard to the 
Versailles "Diktat," that the treaties lacked "fundamental valid- 
ity" and so again to quote the Lytton Report "they de- 
clined to carry out the provisions relating to Manchuria except 
in so far as circumstances made it expedient to do so/' Circum- 
stances meant, in the first place, the Japanese military units 
stationed in Kwantung and along the S.M.R. as "railway 
guards" a force with a separate command known as the Kwan- 
tung Army. 

The C.E.R. was less obnoxious to Chinese nationalists than 
the S.M.R., but it also was a cause of trouble, especially after 
the break between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists in 
China in 1927. There were no longer any Russian railway 
guards on the C.E.R. after 1917, and under the Sino-Soviet 
agreement of 1924 the Chinese participated in the operation of 
the line. The Russians, however, retained an effective control 
and made a political use of it, as in 1925, when they supported 
the revolt of General Kuo Sung-lin against the Manchurian 
government of Chang Tso-lin. 

After Manchuria's acknowledgment of the Nanking govern- 
ment (controlled by the Kuomintang or "Nationalist" party) as 
the central government of China, the conflicts of Manchurian 
railway politics came to a head in the two armed clashes of 1929 
and 1931. In the first of these crises the Manchurian Chinese 
authorities seized the C.E.R. properties, alleging the use of the 
company offices for Communist propaganda; the Soviet Union 
responded by concentrating an army on the Manchurian border, 
invading Manchuria, and compelling the Chinese to restore the 
status quo ante on the railway. The violence in 1931 was wider 


in scope because the threat to the S.M.R. came, not from direct 
action, as in the case of the C.E.R., but from a system of Chi- 
nese-operated lines designed with the aid of through-traffic ar- 
rangements and rate-cutting to divert trade from the S.M.R. 
and Dairen to a Chinese port Yingkow (Newchwang) or Hu- 
lutao on the Gulf of Liaotung. 1 Up to 1929 the S.M.R. had 
earned monopoly profits from the economic development of 
South Manchuria, but from that year the intensive state-organ- 
ized competition of the Chinese lines began to make big in- 
roads on the profitability of the Japanese system and produced 
a strong demand for a "positive policy" in Japanese financial 
circles. The result was the campaign of the Kwantung Army be- 
ginning with "the Incident" of 18 September 1931. At the out- 
set Japanese official and public opinion was divided as to the 
aims of policy to be pursued in Manchuria, and a compromise 
settlement with the existing Manchurian authorities, preserving 
at least the nominal sovereignty of China, was possible up to 
the end of the year. But the exaltation of easy military success, 
the growth of a reactionary chauvinist movement inside Japan, 
and anger at the Chinese refusal to enter into bilateral negotia- 
tions 2 combined to persuade the rulers of Japan to adopt the 
policy of setting up a separate sovereign state under Japanese 
military protection in Manchuria. 

1 Some of the Chinese lines had been financed by the S.M.R. as "feed- 
ers," but, having been linked up in the Chinese system, reduced instead 
of increasing its traffic. The Ssupingkai-Anganchi and Mukden-Kirin 
were tapped by the Peking-Mukden and Tahushan-Tungliao-Liaoyuan 

2 The Soviet Union, not being a member of the League of Nations in 
1939, insisted on bilateral negotiations and declined to admit any kind 
of mediation. In 1931 China appealed to the League, and Japan, as a 
member, could not refuse to plead, though she subsequently disregarded 
the League's verdict. 



A number of more or less eminent Chinese of Manchuria and 
certain Mongol princes lent themselves to this scheme, and a 
Declaration of Independence was published by them on 18 Feb- 
ruary 1932; the new state, having taken over the civil adminis- 
tration with the assistance of Japanese advisers, was recognized 
de jure by Japan six months later. Recognition was accompa- 
nied by a treaty which empowered Japan to station troops 
throughout the country for the defense of its newly established 
sovereignty; the Kwantung Army, which had brought Man- 
chukuo into being, thus obtained the right of permanent occu- 

Manchukuo is provided with a monarchy and Chinese min- 
isters and officials, the throne being held by the heir of the 
Ch'ing (Manchu) dynasty overthrown in China by the revolu- 
tion of 1911. The substance of power, however, belongs to the 
commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army, who is also Japa- 
nese ambassador to Manchukuo, and thus performs the func- 
tion of a resident or high commissioner in a protectorate. He 
resides at Hsinking, formerly Changchun, which is now both 
the capital of Manchukuo and the headquarters of the Kwan- 
tung Army. The central administration of Manchuria was re- 
moved from Mukden to Changchun to mark the change of re- 
gime, and the latter was almost entirely rebuilt to give it the 
aspect and facilities of a capital city; at the same time the four 
old provinces of Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Jehol were 
split up to make new divisions with new names, so that the po- 
litical map of the country has been quite transformed since 
1931 (see map 18). 

By the action of 1931 the Japanese not only averted the dan- 
ger to the S.M.R. from politically promoted Chinese competi- 



.tiori, but were able themselves to obtain control of the Chinese- 
operated railways and unite them with the S.M.R. in a single 
system. Nor was the victory of the S.M.R. restricted to its former 
domain in South Manchuria. Just two months after the Mukden 
incident a Japanese column occupied Tsitsihar in Heilung- 
kiang, thus cutting across the Soviet-controlled C.E.R. The 
Soviet Union, paralyzed for the time being by the stresses of the 
First Five-Year Plan, could not risk military counter-measures, 
and remained passive while the Kwantung Army took posses- 
sion of North Manchuria up to the Amur. The potential stra- 
tegic value of the C.E.R. as a short cut to Vladivostok having 
been destroyed by the Japanese advance, the Soviet govern- 
ment decided to cut its losses, and finally sold its interest in the 
C.E.R. to Manchukuo in 1935. 

With the acquisition of the C.E.R. all the railways of Man- 
churia came under a unified. Japanese management. There was 
in 1931 a total railway mileage of 4,000; over 2,000 miles of new 
lines have been constructed since then by the Japanese. Three 
of the new railways have special strategic, as well as economic, 
significance. One continues the Dairen-Harbin line north to 
Heiho on the Amur opposite the Russian town of Blagove- 
shchensk; a second supplements the old Peking-Mukden line by 
an inland route via Jehol (completed early this year); and a 
third runs from Rashin on the Korean coast a little way south 
of the Siberian border to Hsinking, with branches north to 
Harbin and to Sanchiang province, thus giving Japan railway 
access to Manchuria from the Japan Sea as well as from the 
Yellow Sea. 

Before 1931 Japan had land frontiers with the Soviet Union 
only in Karafuto and for a very short stretch in the extreme 




Vladivostok was founded on an uninhabited site in 1860; 
Rashin has been developed from a fishing village into a major 
port within the last five years. Between Yuki and Kunju the 
railway from Rashin into Manchukuo runs close to the south- 
western extremity of Soviet territory. Serious fighting took place 
for ten days from 29 July 1938 over rival claims to the hill of 
Changkufeng between the Tumen river and Lake Khasan, The 
Russians claim that the map attached to a Russo-Chinese 
border-demarcation treaty of 1886 shows that the hill belongs 
to them, though it is not apparently marked by name on this 
map; the Japanese protest that this map was never communi- 
cated to Japan with other Russo-Chinese secret agreements at 
the time of the entente of 191 1 and that maps prepared by the 
Russian Imperial General Staff leave the hill on the Chinese 
side of the frontier. It seems that a serious attempt is now being 
made to arrive at a final demarcation of the boundary in this 



northeast of Korea. With the conquest o Manchuria she took 
over 1,500 miles of China's Siberian boundary, and the fact that 
this boundary had never been precisely demarcated gave plenty 
of opportunity for border incidents between the armed forces of 
two Great Powers on very bad terms with each other. The 
greater part of the frontier was formed by the Amur and Ussuri 
rivers, but even in the river sections there were islands in dis- 
pute, and at each end, near the Japan Sea in the east and to- 
ward the edge of Mongolia in the west, there were no rivers to 
separate the Japanese and Russian outposts. In these circum- 
stances skirmishes have been frequent during the last few years 
and they have served as trials of strength, willingness to risk 
general hostilities being measured by truculence of attitude in 
each case. In June 1937 a fight broke out over possession of an 
island in the Amur and the Russians withdrew after losing a 
gunboat sunk by shell fire; this was soon after the execution of 
Tukhachevsky and other Red Army generals in Moscow, and 
the Japanese army leaders were encouraged by the exhibition 
of Russian weakness to bring matters to a head in North China. 
This year, with the Japanese deeply involved in their war in 
China, the tables have been turned on the Siberian border, and 
it is now the turn of the Russians to press menacingly on the 
Japanese. The aim of Soviet policy is to embarrass the Japanese 
campaign in China by immobilizing as many Japanese troops as 
possible on the Manchukuo border; strategically the most sensi- 
tive spot on the line for Japan (though not for Russia) is 
where the tongue of Russian territory along the coast south- 
west of Vladivostok approaches Japan's new artery of communi- 
cation with Manchukuo, the Rashin-Harbin railway. It is at 
this point that fighting has recently been going on. (See map 17 
and note.) 



The Kwantung Army has a scheme for settling Japanese 
emigrants, mostly ex-service men, in the provinces of Heiho and 
Sanchiang near the Amur; there is still much unoccupied land 
in the far north of Manchuria, and it is here that there is most 
need for a co-national rural population to support the military 
garrisons. The scheme provides for the. settlement of a million 
families in twenty years from 1936. So far Japanese colonization 
in these regions has not prospered, for the conditions of life are 
very different from those in Japan, and financial assistance for 
the settlers is likely to be exiguous in the near future, whatever 
the outcome of the war in China. 

As yet only about ten per cent of the population of Manchu- 
kuo is to be found in the northern half of the country. Economic 
life is still concentrated in the south near the Yellow Sea. Here 
is not only the richest and most closely settled agricultural land, 
with wheat and soya beans as its main products, but also the 
Mukden industrial area based on the coal and iron ore of Feng- 
tien province. The center of coal production is at Fushun, a little 
way to the east of Mukden; to the south is Anshan, site of the 
Showa Steel Works, now Japan's largest heavy industrial plant. 
The development of this industrial area under complete Japa- 
nese control his undoubtedly strengthened Japan both from an 
economic and from a military point of view. Fengtien heavy 
industry is, however, subject to certain drawbacks which can- 
not be eliminated either by political control or administrative 
energy. Manchuria has large coal reserves, but is deficient in 
good coking coal for metallurgical purposes, and its abundant 
iron ore is almost everywhere of low grade and costly to work. 
Good coking coal, on the other hand, is produced in Hopei and 
Shantung in North China, and fairly large reserves of high- 



grade iron ore exist in Chahar to the west of Jehol. The Japanese 
occupation of Manchuria thus left China still with a great 
potential advantage in heavy industry and all it implies, if she 
were to undertake seriously the exploitation of her coal and iron 
resources. Such considerations counted for much in persuading 
the Kwantung Army to extend the "manifest destiny" from 
Manchuria to Inner Mongolia and North China. 



Density of population per sq. mile 
280 (HO 75-50 

225 3 25-12 

15075 Q| Under 12 

Coal and Iron 


Coal production in 

Estimated coal 

Iron production 
in 1935 


Chapter VIII 


Mongolia and Sinkiang under the Manchu empire together 
comprised an area about eighteen times that of Great Britain 
with a total population of perhaps five millions. Since the 
Chinese Revolution the landmarks of this vast region have been 
considerably altered, for the old Mongolia has been broken up 
by the constitution in Outer Mongolia (north of the Gobi desert) 
of the two independent republics of Mongolia 1 and Tannu-Tuva, 
and in Inner Mongolia (south of the Gobi) of the four Chinese 
provinces of Jehol, Chahar, Suiyuan and Ninghsia. Chinese 
colonization in the four Inner Mongolian provinces has greatly 
increased their population during the last twenty-five years, so 
that it now stands at over seven millions, while Outer Mongolia 
and Sinkiang contain together about four million inhabitants. 
Chinese form a numerical majority in the Inner Mongolian prov- 
inces, but are in a minority in Sinkiang and are a negligible 
element in Outer Mongolia. 

Politically the Mongolia-Sinkiang region is now divided de 
facto between China, Japan and the Soviet Union. China con- 
tinues to hold, subject to considerable insubordination of the 

/In fall tide the Mongol People's Republic; often, however, men- 
tioned simply as Mongolia or as Outer Mongolia. 


provincial governors, Ninghsia and Sinkiang. Japan incorpo- 
rated Jehol in Manchukuo in 1933, and has overrun Chahar 
and part of Suiyiian in the campaign of 1937-8, setting up an 
"autonomous" Mongol state to the southwest of Manchukuo. 
The Soviet Union holds under a kind of protectorate Outer 
Mongolia and Tannu-Tuva, which were originally detached 
from China in 1912. 

The predominant characteristic of both Mongolia and Sin- 
kiang is aridity. About ninety-five per cent of the total area is 
either desert of sand or gravel, or grassland, good for pasture 
but incapable of cultivation. Arable land is found only in the 
south near the Great Wall, where the summer monsoons from 
the south bring some rain; in the valleys of the Altai and Sayan, 
which get their rainfall by westerly winds from the Atlantic; 
and at the foot of the T'ien-shan ranges, where streams fed by 
the snows of the high peaks can be used for irrigation in places 
where there is little or no rainfall. In Sinkiang there is more true 
desert than in Mongolia, but irrigated cultivation has been 
carried on in the oases from early times, so that the sedentary 
element of population has always been stronger relatively than 
in Mongolia, where most of the land is of the type intermediate 
between desert and arable and is well suited to an economy of 
nomadic herdsmen. 

The main desert belt is formed by the Taklamakan, Kum 

Tagh and Gobi tracts stretching east-northeast from Yarkand 

to the Great Khingan. Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang lie on the 

farther side of this belt, and Inner Mongolia on the nearer side, 

as approached from China. A "line of enormous sandhills" 1 

marks the actual boundary between Inner and Outer Mongolia 

1 Sir Eric Teichman, Journey to Turkestan, p. 49. 



to the north of the Suiyiian-Hami motor caravan route, and the 
Gobi desert as a whole is a natural frontier of great impenetra- 
bility. It cuts off Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang from China 
while leaving them in close contact with the territories of the 
Soviet Union to the north and west. It is not surprising, there- 
fore, that China should have found it difficult to hold under her 
authority the conquests of the Manchu empire on the other side 
of the "sea of sand," and that Soviet influence should be para- 
mount there, though with different effect at Urga and at 
Urumchi. Inner Mongolia, on the other hand, is well within 
China's reach, and would by now be firmly held by the Nanking 
government were it not for the Japanese penetration westward 
from South Manchuria. 

Apart from the Chinese there are three nationality elements 
in the Mongolia-Sinkiang region. The Mongols are scattered all 
over Mongolia, except for Tannu-Tuva, and are also represented 
in the former "Three Eastern Provinces'' (Manchuria), in cen- 
tral Sinkiang (the Kalmuk enclave north of Karashar) and in 
Tsinghai to the south of the Kansu Chinese corridor; they 
speak various dialects of the Mongol language, and are all 
traditionally nomads by culture and Lama-Buddhists by re- 
ligion. There are between four and five millions of them in all, 
and fully three-quarters of them numerically live in Manchuria 
and Inner Mongolia, but their numbers in these areas are in- 
ferior to the masses of Chinese in close proximity, so that Outer 
Mongolia, which is thoroughly Mongol, has for long been the 
national base. 

To the northwest of Mongolia between the Sayan and Tan- 
nuola mountains dwell the Uriankhai, a very primitive people 
speaking a Turki language; they only number some 50,000, but 


g| Ktalkas 
[3 Kalmuks 
U Euriats 
Hill Others 

B. Banners 
L Leagues 

I Ninghsia 
5 Hope! 

Provincial boundaries 
Boundaries of 'Autonomous 
Inner Mongolia 1 

Boundaries of Leagues 

o IQO 200 soo 



have been put on the map through being endowed by the 
Russians with a state of their own (Tannu-Tuva) separate from 
the Mongol People's Republic. 

On the other side of the Altai, in Sinkiang, are other Turki- 
speaking peoples, some sedentary and some nomad, Moslems by 
religion and thus traditionally akin to the Turki peoples of 
Soviet Central Asia the Uzbeks, Turkomans, Khirgiz and 
Kazaks. The Turkis of Sinkiang appear to number about two 

The Chinese inhabitants of Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang, 
numbering some five or six millions, are of two kinds, ordinary 
Chinese and Tungans. The latter are Chinese-speaking Moslems, 
and have long formed a distinct section of the Chinese people, 
sharply divided from their "pagan" compatriots. Language binds 
the Tungans to China, but religion links them with the Turkis 
in a minority group. In the present generation there is a tend- 
ency for language to prevail over religion as the prime factor of 
affinity, and the Tungans show no sign at present of breaking 
away from China, though they continue to be a somewhat centrif- 
ugal .element in the Chinese body politic. 1 

The first result of the Chinese Revolution in the Mongolia- 
Sinkiang region was the successful revolt of Outer Mongolia. 
The rebels declared that they owed allegiance to the Ch'ing 
dynasty, but none to China, and the insurrection manifested a 
bitter enmity to the Chinese. The improvident Mongol nobles 
were everywhere in debt to Chinese moneylenders, and Chinese 
peasant settlers were continually encroaching on the pastures of 
the Mongol tribes to the north of the Great Wall. The inde- 

1 See page 60 on the symbolism of the five-barred Republican flag 
which counted the Moslems as a "nation." 



pendence movement was general in both Inner and Outer 
Mongolia; that it failed in the former region, while succeeding 
in the latter, was due not only to the advantages the rebels de- 
rived from the remoteness of Outer Mongolia and the barrier 
of the Gobi desert, but also to other factors. The old tribal 
organization of the Mongols had been preserved much better in 
Outer, than in Inner, Mongolia. The Mongols were divided 
into numerous "banners" (hoshuri) grouped into confederacies 
(aimak); of the latter there were only four in Outer, but twenty- 
four in Inner, Mongolia. The Inner Mongols were thus more 
split up than their kinsmen beyond the Gobi, and Peking govern- 
mental control over them was further increased by a system of 
artificial combinations called "leagues" (chiguglari). As many of 
the banner princes also found profit in selling tribal lands to 
Chinese settlers, Chinese domination in Inner Mongolia was 
too strong to be broken down before the arrival of the Japanese. 
The Mongol revolt in Outer Mongolia in 1912 was supported 
by Russia, who extorted from China recognition of Outer Mon- 
golian autonomy under nominal Chinese sovereignty. The 
Russians at the same time made claims to the Uriankhai terri- 
tory, now Tannu-Tuva, and secured its separation from Mon- 
golia; after the outbreak of the Great War in 1914 it was brought 
under direct Russian administration. Russian power, however, 
dwindled after the revolution of 1917, and the Chinese took the 
opportunity to send an expedition across the Gobi and capture 
Urga, the capital of autonomous Outer Mongolia. The Mongol 
princes called to their aid a White Russian force under Baron 
Ungern von Steinberg, who drove out the Chinese, but was 
himself overthrown by a Red Russian column pursuing him 
from Siberia. The new Soviet Russia renewed the independence 



of Outer Mongolia vis-a-vis China, but transformed its institu- 
tions with the aid of a revolutionary party among the Mongols. 
Power had been in the hands of the banner princes with the 
Buddhist metropolitan of Urga, the Khutukhtu or "Living 
Buddha," as the head of the state; this regime was replaced in 
1954 by the Mongol People's Republic with a popular national 
assembly as the legal sovereign. Tannu-Tuva had meanwhile 
been proclaimed a separate republic, the Russian colonists there 
being locally the most important element. 

China has not had any control over the governments of Outer 
Mongolia or Tannu-Tuva for the last seventeen years, and these 
states have external relations only with the Soviet Union, with 
which they have concluded military alliances. Chinese sov- 
ereignty ovei all this territory is still, however, juridically recog- 
nized by all other states, including the Soviet Union, and the 
new republics have not claimed sovereignty as Manchukuo has 
done, though they are quite as effectively removed from the 
jurisdiction of the central government of China. The principal 
reason appears to be that the Mongol and Uriankhai states and 
their Soviet Union protectors are content with the fact of separa- 
tion and are willing to leave the empty form of sovereignty to 
China, whereas the restored Manchu monarchy in Hsinking 
cannot acknowledge even nominally the supremacy of the 
Chinese Republic. 

The Soviet Union does not have to keep an army of occupation 
in Outer Mongolia to prevent it from rejoining China of its own 
volition, for Mongol nationalism can be relied on to resist 
Chinese overtures. The social radicalism of the People's Re- 
public has, however, alienated the formerly privileged noble 
and priestly classes and thus split the national independence 
movement into two factions, both anti-Chinese, but looking to 



different quarters for support. The "Red" Mongols rely on the 
Soviet Union to sustain their cause, but the more conservative 
nationalists in Inner Mongolia, anxious to free themselves from 
the Chinese yoke, and yet afraid to accept aid from the "City of 
the Red Heroes" (Ulan Bator Khoto Urga, as renamed in 
1924), turned to Japan when the columns of the Kwantung 
Army broke out from the Japanese railway zone of Manchuria 
across the Chinese-inhabited corn-lands to the Mongol steppe. 

The Japanese were not slow to realize the value of an alliance 
with Mongol nationalism. No real separatism could be induced 
among the Chinese of Manchuria, but the anti-Chinese senti- 
ment of the Mongols made them an ideal instrument for Japa- 
nese imperialism. The Mongol-inhabited western parts of Man- 
churia, including northern Jehol, were therefore detached and 
made into a new province called Hsingan (subsequently divided 
into four: North, East, West and South Hsingan), and the 
Mongols were given a special status and guarantees against 
Chinese officialdom in the new state structure of Manchukuo. 
The Japanese have not been entirely successful, however, in 
winning the support of the Manchukuo Mongols, for the eco- 
nomic urges of their imperialism have prevented them from leav- 
ing the Mongols alone to continue in their old ways of life. From 
the point of view of Japanese economy Hsingan is of great 
potential value as a producer of wool within the Japanese 
currency area; in time it might free the Japanese wool industry 
from dependence on imports from Australia. But the wool 
hitherto produced by the Mongol nomads is too coarse to be 
suitable for industrial purposes, and Japanese attempts to im- 
prove the breed of sheep have involved a degree of administra- 
tive interference and compulsion much resented by the Mongols. 



The condition of the Mongols in Manchukuo was neverthe- 
less greatly preferable to that of their kinsmen in Chahar and 
Suiyiian who remained under Chinese rule until 1937. The 
Chinese officials there continued to enclose Mongol tribal lands 
and sell or rent them to Chinese settlers from the south. In 1936 
there was a Mongol revolt under the leadership of Prince Teh; 
the Kwantung Army supplied the rebels with munitions, but 
was restrained by the Tokyo government from serious inter- 
vention, and Teh was defeated. In the following year, however, 
after the Lukouchiao incident had precipitated general hostilities 
against China, the Kwantung Army overran Chahar and Sui- 
yiian as far as the terminus of the railway from Peiping at Paotou 
on the great northward bend of the Yellow River. An autono- 
mous Mongol state covering the two provinces was then pro- 
claimed under the name of Meng Chiang. 

The great economic importance of Chahar lies in its deposits 
of high-grade iron ore, which are located about 1 50 miles north- 
west of Peiping. As this area is so closely connected with Hopei, 
consideration of it will be deferred to the next chapter; it suffices 
to point out here that control of the iron ore of Chahar has 
been one of the principal objectives of Japan's North China 
policy ever since the completion of the conquest of Manchuria 
in 1933. 

By her advance westward into Inner Mongolia Japan has 
intercepted the old Russia-China trade route via Urga and Kal- 
gan and also that via Kami and Suiyiian. But the Soviet Union, 
Outer Mongolia, the Chinese Communists in Kansu and Shensi 
and the Kuomintang central government of China have now all 
been brought into a combination against Japan, and they are in 
contact by routes which remain out of reach of the Japanese. 


c Sinkiuijfrontiir 

m Routes availiblt for motor traffic M* Railways 
The Lanchow-Sinklinj route is now , 

In reconstruction *** " ^r construction 

M projected or discussed S, Shan-tan Miao 

_ Rivers 
. Routes now in disuse 
- Other routes 


Motor route from Kalpn to Ulan Ude 

o too go !oo 




One is a trail across the desert from Urga to Ninghsia; another, 
much more important, is the dirt road by Urumchi (Tihwa) and 
Kami to Lanchow in Kansu. It is twelve days' journey by lorry 
from the Soviet Union border to Lanchow, and another five on 
to Sian at the Lunghai railhead. A considerable quantity of 
munitions enters China by this route, though it is quite inade- 
quate as a main channel of supply for the requirements of large- 
scale modern warfare. 1 

Sinkiang is now held by a Chinese army which is implacably 
anti- Japanese because it consists mainly of exiles from Man- 
churia. A large number of troops of the army of Chang Hsiieh- 
liang who fought against the Japanese in 1931-2 finally fled 
across the frontier into Siberia; they were conveyed by the Trans- 
Siberian and Turksib railways and put back into Chinese terri- 
tory over the Sinkiang border. Sinkiang was at the time in the 
throes of a Turki rebellion supported by an army of Tungans 
from Kansu, and it appeared likely that an independent Mos- 
lem state would be set up there, so that China would lose Sin- 
kiang no less than Outer Mongolia. But the Turkis and Tungans 
took to fighting each other, the arrival of the Manchurians 
turned the scale in favor of Chinese authority, and a number of 
Soviet bombing airplanes sent to the aid of the provincial 
government settled the matter. The great Moslem revolt col- 
lapsed in 1934. It may be noted that Soviet policy in Sinkiang 
was the opposite to what it was in Outer Mongolia; in the latter 
region the Russians sustained Mongol separatism against China, 
while in the former they helped the Chinese to crush a separatist 
national insurrection. The reason was no doubt fear of the 

1 The greater part of the Russian munition supply to China goes from 
Odessa to Canton by sea. 



attraction which an independent Turki Moslem state in Sin- 
kiang might have for the ex-Moslem Soviet citizens of Kazak- 
stan, Khirgizia and Uzbekistan. The capitulation of the Turkis 
and the retreat of the Tungans left Sinkiang under the rule of an 
energetic Chinese general who owed his position to support from 
Moscow, who stood for anti-Japanism in an extreme form, and 
who could not be a cause of unrest in Soviet Central Asia. 

Chapter IX 


Of the eighteen provinces of China Proper often known simply 
as the Eighteen Provinces (shih pa sheng) five are of primary 
importance, holding key positions at the center and at the four 
points of the compass respectively. These five contain, or con- 
tained two years ago, the seven most populous cities in China, 1 
as shown in the following table: 

Province Cities 

North , . . Hopei Peiping, Tientsin 

East . . . Kiangsu Shanghai, Nanking 

Center . . , Hupeh Hankow 

West . . . Szechwan Chungking 

South . . . Kwangtung Canton 

The five key provinces are linked together by China's two 

1 The figures as given by the Chinese Year Book of 1935-6 (not applica- 
ble today in view of mass exodus from places in the war zone) are as 

(1) Shanghai - - 3,359,114 (5) Hankow - - 777,993 

(2) Peiping - - 1,496,648 (6) Nanking - - 681,855 

(3) Tientsin - - 1,387,462 (7) Chungking - - 635,000 

(4) Canton - - 1,122,583 

The only other towns given as possessing more than 600,000 inhabi- 
tants are Changsha in Hunan, and Wenchow in Chekiang. 




most important lines of internal communication, which intersect 
at Hankow: the west-to-east Yangtse river and the north-to-south 
Peiping-Canton railway. Of the seven cities Chungking, Hankow 
and Nanking are on the Yangtse, while Shanghai, though not 
actually on the river, acts as the seaport for its whole basin. 

Three of the five provinces, Kwangtung, Kiangsu and Hopei, 
are coastal, and the whole tendency of economic development 
in the last hundred years has been to increase the importance of 
the maritime, relative to that of the interior, provinces of China. 
Even before the opening of China to extensive foreign trade, the 
real economic center of gravity was located on the lower Yangtse 
in southern Kiangsu; in those days the most important inter- 
section of routes was the crossing of the Tientsin-Hangchow 
Grand Canal (linking Hopei with Chekiang) and the Yangtse 
at Chinkiang. With the access of foreign shipping to the Yangtse 
delta, a vast amount of river, canal, coastwise and oceanic trade 
came to be concentrated there, and Shanghai, a medium-sized 
town in 1842, grew and grew until it became by far the largest 
city of China and the sixth largest in the world. 

In 1928 Nanking was declared the capital of China by the 
government of the Kuomintang party, whose forces had cap- 
tured the former capital, Peking, and were also in possession of 
Canton, Hankow and the Chinese-administered section of 
Shanghai. Nanking had the advantage of having been a capital 
at certain, earlier periods in Chinese history, and it was further 
indicated by its proximity to Shanghai; this was specially im- 
portant for revenue purposes, as the maritime customs have so 
far been the surest fiscal asset of any central government in 
China, and Shanghai provided nearly half their total takings 
and an even greater proportion after the Manchurian customs 


_ tarfyaaMfirto roxfs open b /nffif 

ma/a roads ttfter coflj/rvcAiw VKunstrucKon 



had been subtracted in iggs. 1 Shanghai, the commercial and 
industrial metropolis, could not itself become the political capi- 
tal, because half of it was under foreign administration (the 
International Settlement and French Concession). 

As already pointed out in Chapter II, the Yellow River valley 
was the original seat of Chinese civilization, and the Yangtse 
valley long remained a country of forest and swamp with savage 
inhabitants. But the basin of the Yangtse not only contains a 
larger area of cultivable land than that of the Yellow River; the 
Yangtse itself, the fourth river of the world in length, is navi- 
gable for 2,000 miles from the sea, whereas the Yellow River is 
blocked by rapids in its upper, and by shoals and sandbanks in 
its lower course, so as to be of little use for navigation. As the 
Yangtse valley was brought under .cultivation and long-distance 
trade increased, it was inevitable that the economic center of 
gravity in China should tend to shift southward from the Yellow 
River; the center of political power, however, remained usually 
in the north, mainly because the central government had to 
attend to the ever troublesome northern frontier and could not 
afford to be too far away from it, while the Mongol and Manchu 
conquerors of China naturally sought to exert their dominion 
from a point which was convenient for organizing the adminis- 
tration of China, but also within easy reach of their own northern 
homelands. Such a point was Peiping, the Cambaluc of Kublai 
Khan, in the extreme north of China Proper, but about halfway 
between Canton and the Amur. Except for a period from 1368 
to 1421 when Nanking was the capital, the Yuan (Mongol), 
Ming and Ch'ing (Manchu) dynasties ruled from Peiping 
latterly called Peking or "Northern Capital" (1280-1911). 

1930, St.$ 135 out of 281 millions; in 1934 $*.$ *75 out of 335 


The China National The South-western 

Aviation Corporation Aviation Corporation 

Eurasia line 
temporarily suspended 


Eurasia Aviation 

Unes Interrupted 
tw wai- 


All population statistics for China must be accepted with some 
reserve, as no satisfactory census of the country as a whole has 
ever been carried out, and estimates vary from a maximum of 
nearly 500 millions total down to only 250 millions (Legendre). 
It is probably safe to allow just under 400 millions for China 
Proper and the outer lands, exclusive of Manchukuo, at the time 
of the outbreak of the present war. The figures used for the map 
opposite are taken from the Chinese Year Book of 1937, and the 
totals by provinces in millions (to the nearest million) are as 

Province Pop. in millions Province Pop. in millions 

1. Szechwan 1 47 13. Yunnan 12 

2. Shantung 35 14. Shansi - u 

3. Honan 33 15. Shensi 10 

4. Kiangsu 31 16. Fukien 10 

5. Kwangtung 31 17. Kweichow 7 

6. Hunan 28 18. Kansu 6 

7. Hopei 27 19. Sinkiang 2 

8. Hupeh 27 20. Suiyuan 2 

9. Anhwei 22 21. Chahar 2 

10. Chekiang 20 22. Tsinghai i 

11. Kiangsi 16 23. Sikang i 

12. Kwangsi 13 24. Ninghsia i 

1 The 1936 edition of the Chinese Year Book, however, gives the popu- 
lation of Szechwan as only 37 millions. It has on the other hand been 
estimated at more than 50 millions. 


Density of population /oersy. mile 

- iz EH 
25- 60 
60- 125 
250 - 375 

510 -775 



After the Republic had replaced the Manchu dynasty Peking 
remained the capital, but it was now neither the seat o an im- 
pressive imperial court nor the center of the new progressive 
nationalism which had created the Republic. The latter had its 
headquarters at Canton. Kwangtung, separated from northern 
and central China by the Nanling mountain range, has always 
had a strong provincial individuality, and throughout the period 
of the Manchu dynasty had been the focus of antagonism to the 
conquering race; in addition to this it had had long contact with 
Europeans through trade and the emigration of Cantonese to 
the Dutch Indies, Malaya and California. Thus Canton became 
the principal base of the Chinese Revolution, while Peking re- 
mained in spirit a stronghold of the ancien regime even after the 
collapse of the monarchy. 

The spearhead of the revolution was the Kuomintang party 
with a nucleus of Cantonese politicians who, finding it impossible 
to consolidate the initial success of the revolution in China as 
a whole, repudiated Peking and all its works and set up a sepa- 
rate government at Canton in 1917. For nine years the Kuo- 
mintang ruled in Kwangtung, while various factions of "war 
lords" warred on each other in the rest of China; then in .1956 
the party's army, led by Chiang Kai-shek, marched north and 
won, first Hankow, then Nanking and Shanghai, and finally 
Peking, 1 for the new dispensation. China was thus re-unified, 
though the new unity was far from complete, by a movement 
sweeping the country from south to north. It is to be noted that 

1 Peking was not captured by the forces under Chiang Kai-shek, whose 
advance from Nanking was interrupted by the dash with the Japanese at 
Tsinan, but by the army of Shansi under Yen Hsi-shan, who threw in 
his lot with the Kuomintang after their victories on the Yangtse. 


2. to 3 crops 



200 300 400 M 


647 North China Plain 

581 Red Basin of Szechwan 

421 South Yan<tse Hills (a) 417 Southeastern Coast (b) 

p / t 290 Central mountain belt (A) 285 Hills of Llankwan (B) 

L_y>1 286 Mountains of Shantunc,Jehol,LIao-tung(C) 

[fffff] 211 Loess Hijhlxnds 

I. -\ 157 South-western tableland 


Percentace of cultivated land 
(black square) to total area 
of the region (white square). 

Density of population persq. 
mile on cultivated land only. 

// Area of cultivated land per person 
' (In mow; 100 mow= 16.47 acre). 

Figures used to make this map are 
from G. F. Cressey (Geographical Foun- 
dations of Cnfna). Areas of reg fons cor- 
respond to planometer reading and are 
adopted from the same work. 



the effect of the Japanese invasion has been and will be, if suc- 
cessful, to reverse this process. The Kuomintang sequence was 
Canton-Hankow-Shanghai-Peiping; the order of Japanese ob- 
jectives has been Peiping-Shanghai-Hankow, and if these three 
focal points are taken and held by the Japanese, the Kuomin- 
tang power will be put back into the southern region from which 
it emerged in 1926. 

In the present war the essentially strategic aims of the Japanese 
must be distinguished from their economic purposes. The ad- 
vance on Hankow belongs to the former category, whereas the 
invasions of the Peiping-Tientsin and Shanghai-Nanking areas 
correspond to the economic motives of Japanese policy. The 
latter fall under three heads: 

(1) To acquire control, within the Japanese currency area, of 
essential raw materials in which Japan, even after the conquest of 
Manchuria, is deficient, notably coking coal, iron ore and cotton. 

(2) To acquire monopoly or preference in Chinese trade. 

(3) To prevent the competitive industrialization of China, 
both in heavy and light industries. 

The first of the above objectives could be sufficiently realized 
by the control of the "Five Northern Provinces," that is to say, 
Hopei, Shansi and Shantung plus the two Inner Mongolian 
provinces of Chahar and Suiyiian, which the Japanese unsuc- 
cessfully tried to detach from China by intrigue and menaces in 
1935. Aims (2) and (3), on the other hand, required in addition 
a campaign for domination of Kiangsu, where half the trade of 
China had its outlet and a formidable Chinese textile industry 
was growing up in the decade before 1937. 

The Five Northern Provinces are economically important, 

Source : General statement on the Mining Industry fn China (National Geological Survey) 

presented by the Information Bulletin, Council of International Affairs, Nanking. 
The circles for ShansI and Shenst are to be enlarged five and three times respectively. 



not so much for their actual productiveness as for their potential 
wealth as the region of future location for the biggest heavy 
industry in the Far East. To quote from a paper read to the 
World Engineering Congress in igsg: 1 "Disregarding political 
boundaries, perhaps the best potential combination in the Pacific 
region [for heavy industry] would be between the iron ores 
of India or of the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies on the 
one hand, and the coking coal of the northeastern provinces of 
China on the other, with smelting centered on the Chinese coast, 
possibly on the Bay of Pe-chi-li [Po Hai]." In other words, as 
North China has the best supply of coking coal in the Far East, 
and as, owing to the relative tonnages involved, iron ore moves 
to coal rather than the reverse, the seaboard of Hopei is indi- 
cated as the best site in the Far East for the growth of a heavy 
industry. Nor would such an industry be entirely dependent on 
imports of iron ore from the overseas sources mentioned in the 
above quotation; the Five Northern Provinces contain not only 
the principal coking coal deposits of the Far East, but also the 
"most important single iron ore region in China" 2 the Hsiian 
Lung deposits in Chahar estimated at 90 million tons of high 
grade, or more than the entire estimated reserves of Japan and 
Korea put together. The Hsiian Lung field lies about 150 miles 
northwest of Peiping, and its natural outlet is to Hopei, where 
the Kaiping coalfield supplies coking coal. 

To the west of Hopei lies Shansi with more than half of China's 
estimated probable coal reserve, which is about thirty times 
Japan's. Because of Shansi's inland seclusion its coal resources 

1 C. K. Leith, "The World's Iron Ore Supply." Quoted by H. Foster 
Bain, Ores and Industry in the Far East, p. 265. 

2 Bain, Ores and Industry in the Far East, p. 96. 


',. .*'>/ . , 

CHAH^. ; : :v^ 

s ' J "' "*" 


* * 4 


.HUPEH S"\/ 



5 ."- 






can only be made available with the aid of railways, and the 
Japanese in 1936 formulated a plan for a line from Shihchia- 
chwang to Tsangchow to link the Shansi coal mines with the 
coast. China's refusal to grant Japan concessions either for the 
construction of this railway or for the exploitation of the Chahar 
iron ores was one of the principal reasons for the tension which 
led to the outbreak of war at the end of July 1937. The Kwan- 
tung Army and its powerful financial partner, the Manchukuo 
Heavy Industry Company, were determined to obtain control 
of the mineral resources of Hopei, Chahar and Shansi, and the 
government of Chiang Kai-shek was no less determined to pre- 
Vent them. 

Besides coal and iron another raw material sought by Japan 
was cotton. Cotton cannot be produced successfully in Japan, 
Korea or Manchuria, but China Proper is one of the five princi- 
pal producing countries of the world (the other four being the 
ILSA., India, the Soviet Union and Egypt). The great Japanese 
cotton textile industry was built up entirely on imported raw 
material, and in the days of relatively free trade and budgets 
hot too unbalanced this was quite a practical procedure. But 
since 1931 Japan has plunged deep into the mazes of inflationary 
finance, and while her export trade has boomed, her exchange 
difficulties have become ever more and more embarrassing. 
The urge to enclose a cotton-growing area within the currency 
domain of the yen had become very strong in the Japanese tex- 
tile industry by 1 937. It is an essential part of Japanese expansion 
to provide conquered regions with a currency tied to die yen, 
so as to reduce the amount of imports which must be paid for in 
currencies not under Japanese control. Cotton is produced in 
western Shantung, Hopei and southern Shansi, so that en- 

* 128 




I OIL in barrels 



closure of the Five Northern Provinces could be of great benefit 1 
to the Japanese textile industry as well as to heavy industrial 

Apart from raw materials, Japan's principal economic aim 
has been to reverse the trend of Chinese tariff policy. In the 
words of the Japan Year Book for 1Q37: 2 "The Manchurian 
Incident, 1931, enabled Japan to get the lion's share in the 
foreign trade of Manchukuo . . . but on the other hand, com- 
bined with the Shanghai Affair, it intensified the anti-Japanese 
movement in China. Increases in China's tariffs on Japanese 
goods were also effected in rapid succession, thus dealing a great 
blow to Japan's trade with China 3 and at the same time furnish- 
ing a chance for the United States, Great Britain and Germany 
to recover their commercial influence of former years in that 
country." Japan's exports to China declined in value between 
1930 and 1936 (even allowing for subtraction of the Man- 
churian share from the 1930 figures), while the export total to 
Asia as a whole almost doubled. The present war has given 
Japan control of the Chinese seaboard from the Great Wall to 
Hangchow with ports which normally handle about three- 
quarters of China's foreign trade, and through the provisional 
governments set up at Peiping and Nanking the Japanese have 
had the tariff rates revised in their favor, though the fighting 
and devastation have so interrupted trade that there is little 
enough for anyone at the present time. 

If the Five Northern Provinces are of supreme importance for 

1 So far this aim has not been realized, as Chinese guerrillas have pre- 
vented the marketing of the crop. 

* P. 4*4- . 

3 The tariffs did not discriminate against Japan by name, but were 
raised against all types and qualities of goods in which Japan specialized. 


Intensive sericulture 

Main cultivation of tea 

Principal a 

Q Rape seeds 

~ Ground nuts 

| Tung seed 

Q Soya bean 

^ Sesame seed 

Provinces are shown which have an annual production of vegetable oil of 
500.000 piculs minimum. 




heavy industry raw materials, Shanghai is the key point com- 
mercially and has been the special objective of the Japanese 
exporting light industries. A similar distinction o group aims 
may be discerned as regards the negative purpose of Japanese 
policy: the prevention of China's competitive industrialization 
and evolution to Great Power rank. By seizing the only region 
of China suitable for the development of a large-scale iron and 
steel industry, the Japanese have thwarted China's advance to 
economic supremacy in the Far East for as long as they can hold 
the positions they have gained; by the capture of the Shanghai- 
Nanking area they have taken into their own hands the rapidly 
growing Chinese cotton industry, which was already a formidable 
rival to the mills of Osaka and Kobe. 

The economic ends of Japanese policy would be well enough 
served by control of the Five Northern Provinces plus Kiangsu 
without any further advance. But as the Kuomintang has declared 
its resolve to continue the war indefinitely, and as the Chinese 
main army escaped destruction in the Shanghai and Lunghai 
Railway battles, strategy has required a campaign for the cap- 
ture of the third of the five key districts of China Hankow, 
at the intersection of the Yangtse and the Peiping-Canton 
railway. At the time of writing the Japanese have reached 
Kiukiang; it is said that they hope to take Hankow in September, 
or alternatively, to cut the railway to the south of it. 

If Hankow falls, Chiang Kai-shek will have to make a diffi- 
cult choice between a military and a political disadvantage. 
If he retires with his main force into Szechwan, he will still be in 
a central position as between the southern and northwestern 
provinces not yet invaded, but his army will suffer from a shortage 
of military supplies, as Szechwan will no longer have rail and 



river communication with Canton, but only the unsatisfactory 
road connections through Kweichow. If, on the other hand, 
Chiang Kai-shek retreats south into Hunan, he will be in a 
strong military position with Canton and its munition imports 
at his back, but he will be out o touch with Szechwan and still 
more with Shensi and Kansu, so that the recently created 
national unity, depending so much on a centrally situated capital 
and adequate communications, will be gravely impaired. 

If the Japanese are not diverted from China by a war with 
Russia, and if they can take Hankow, it seems likely that China 
will in effect be divided into three parts: 

(1) The South, remaining under Kuomintang rule, with 
Canton as link with the outer world; primarily the three prov- 
inces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Hunan, with Szechwan loosely 

(2) The Northwest, under Communist rule, linked with the 
Soviet Union by the Lanchow-Urumchi road; Kansu and 
Shensi plus Ninghsia and Sinkiang beyond the Great Wall. 

(3) The Northeast, including the Peiping-Tientsin, Shanghai- 
Nanking and Hankow areas; divided between Japanese- 
controlled governments and Communist guerrilla formations; 
Japanese occupation of chief towns and along the Yangtse and 
railway lines. 

The war has already produced a curious reversal of roles be- 
tween the North and the South. For several decades up to last 
year the South was, on the whole, a revolutionary force in conflict 
with the conservative North. Today the North is the strong- 
hold of Communism, while the South is by comparison con- 
servative. The Communists of Kiangsi, driven out by Chiang 



Kai-shek in 1934, made a long trek through Hunan, Kweichow 
and Szechwan to Shensi 1 and there renewed their strength with 
a somewhat modified program; then, as a result of the famous 
kidnaping of Chiang Kai-shek at Sian at the end of 1936 the 
Kuomintang and the Communists came together in a national 
united front, the Communists adopting the national flag, but 
retaining in fact under their own rule the territory they held. 
After the outbreak of the war with Japan the Communist leader 
Mao Tse-tung was made governor of Kansu a province vital 
for communication with the Soviet Union and the Commu- 
nists, alias the Eighth Route Army, took over the conduct of the 
war north of the Yellow River. The old Chinese administration 
in Shansi and Hopei having been broken up by the Japanese 
invasion, the Communist guerrillas have extended control over 
all the districts not actually held by Japanese garrisons. Thus, 
while the South remains more or less solidly attached to the 
Kuomintang, North China has become a battle-ground be- 
tween the Japanese and their handful of ultra-reactionary 
Chinese followers on the one hand and the Communists with 
their mass-mobilization peasant auxiliaries on the other. 

If Hankow falls, Canton will again be the main base of the 
Kuomintang, as it was before 1926. If Canton is lost, resistance 
can be continued in the mountainous Southwest with the rail- 
way to Yunnan from French Indo-China and the newly con- 
structed road to Yunnan from Burma as routes of supply. But it 
is very unlikely that the Japanese will seriously attempt to cap- 
ture Canton. Not -only would it require a large expeditionary 
force, which Japan cannot afford to send out in addition to all 

1 For an account of the "Long March" see Edgar Snow, Red Star over 
China, part v. 



her other commitments, and a landing on a wide front on a well 
defended coast; it would also almost inevitably involve com- 
plications with the British at Hongkong which all but the 
wildest of Japanese extremists desire to avoid, at least in the 
immediate future. The leased New Territory of Hongkong 
would greatly impede any operations against Canton, and 
"incidents" would be sure to occur along the border; the British 
reaction to these would be much sharper than at Shanghai, for 
not only is Hongkong British territory (which the International 
Settlement at Shanghai is definitely not), but it now represents 
the whole stake of British interest in China. While British trade 
in North and Central China has suffered eclipse as a result of 
the war, Hongkong has enjoyed a boom. The foreign trade of 
independent China is again concentrated at Canton, as it was 
before 1845, and Hongkong is Canton's open-sea port. The 
Japanese capture of Canton would put an end to this trade, and 
Britain has therefore the strongest of reasons for doing everything 
possible to keep the open door open here, even though Japanese 
sliding screens may impede entry at Shanghai, Tsingtao and 


Chapter X 


The region of the Far East to the south of China and Formosa, 
lying entirely within the tropics, contains a total of 117 million 
inhabitants divided between six sovereignties as follows: 


State in millions 

Netherlands Indies ....... 60.7 

French Indo-China ....... 23.2 

Siam ............ 14.5 

U.S.A.: the Philippines ..... 13,3 

Britain: Malaya ........ 4.4 1 

Borneo ......... 8 J 5 '* 

Portugal: Macao ......... i ^ 

Timor ......... 5 ' 

It is not easy to fix a natural boundary for this region toward 
the east, but it is convenient to count the Netherlands Indies as 
a unit, including Dutch New Guinea, within the Far East, and 
to distinguish Australia, Australian New Guinea (Papua and the 
former German colony now under an Australian mandate 1 ) and 

1 The administration of Papua, formerly under the British Colonial 
Office, was transferred to the Commonwealth of Australia in 1906. 


all the Pacific islands east of New Guinea and the Philippines as 
"Oceania/' The Pacific archipelagoes, however, are of great 
strategic importance for Far Eastern affairs in view of their 
actual or potential development as naval and air bases, and it 
should be noted that four of the states holding sovereignty within 
the region of the Far East also possess groups of islands in 
Oceania. Thus no study of the Far East can avoid some refer- 
ence to the distribution of "territory" if consisting only of 
coral atolls in the vast ocean spaces between Asia and the 

Japan holds three groups of islands taken from Germany in 
the Great War: 1 the Marianne (or Ladrone), the Caroline and 
Marshall Islands. The Mariannes continue southward the line 
of the Bonin Islands which are reckoned an integral part of 
Japan and lie mostly between latitudes 20 and 10; the 
Carolines and Marshalls form a belt stretching for some two 
thousand miles east and west between 10 N. and the Equator. 
There are about three thousand islands in all, the great majority 
being uninhabited coral reefs enclosing lagoons, useless for pro- 
ductive purposes, but admirable as submarine or seaplane bases. 

To the south and southeast of the Carolines and Marshalls is 
a belt of British Empire ownership in five sections from west to 
east: (i) Australian New Guinea, full sovereignty in the south 
(Papua) and League mandate in the north over former German 
New Guinea; (2) the Bismarck Archipelago, formerly German, 
now under Australian mandate; (3) the Solomon and Santa 
Cruz Islands, British; (4) Nauru, formerly German, now under 

1 See p. 66. The Pelew Islands were formerly reckoned as a separate 
group, but the Japanese have included them for administrative purposes 
in the Carolines. 



British Empire mandate, exercised jointly by Britain, Australia 
and New Zealand; (5) the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, British. 
These areas are, as it were, in the front line relative to the 
Japanese island groups. Farther back, below lat. 10 S., are 
Australia itself, the New Hebrides (Anglo-French condomin- 
ium), the Fiji and Tonga Islands (British) and Western Samoa 
(New Zealand mandate). 

The main area of French possession, including the Tahiti, 
Marquesas and Tuamotu island groups, lies far away to the east; 
in the westerly Australia-Fiji region, however, France also has 
her share in the New Hebrides condominium and full owner- 
ship of the large island of New Caledonia, economically im- 
portant as one of the world's principal sources of nickel/ 

The American empire in the Pacific pivots on the Hawaii 
group, which lies roughly in the latitude of Hongkong. The 
Hawaiian Islands have a total population of 368,000 and con- 
tain the large town of Honolulu and the first-class naval base of 
Pearl Harbor. To the north, in the latitude of Kamchatka, are 
the Aleutian Islands forming a curved chain to the southwest 
of Alaska. Far to the south are the islands of Eastern Samoa, 
adjoining British Tonga and the New Zealand mandate of 
Western Samoa. A distance of more than 2,200 nautical miles 
separates Honolulu from Samoa, but in this vast space of ocean 
are scattered the Central Polynesian Sporades and the Phoenix 
-Islands; among the former the ILS.A. owns the island of Sama- 
rang, and among the latter (which, as a group, are British) dis- 
putes with Britain the title to the two small islands of Canton 
and Enderbury. A curious compromise has just now been 
reached, whereby the question of sovereignty is left in abeyance 
"for a protracted period of time" and each nation accords the 



"First-class" naval bases are those which are capable of docking 
and repairing capital ships, Hongkong was a battleship base 
before the introduction of "Dreadnoughts/ ' but has not been 
rendered first-class for modern conditions; this rank has passed 
to Singapore, where the base was completed in 1937. The U.S.A. 
has so far no first-class base west of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and 
Japan has none south of Sasebo in Kyushu. Cavite (Manila) and 
Mako are cruiser bases like Hongkong. The standstill agreement 
on fortifications and naval bases in the Washington Naval 
Treaty of 1922 was intended to reduce tension by keeping 
battle-fleets at safe distances from one another, and the three 
great naval Powers of the Pacific are still very widely spaced out 
from a strategic point of view. 




other equal facilities for civil aviation; according to the Daily 
Telegraph Washington correspondent 1 "there is nothing in the 
details of the settlement at present known which would prevent 
the [American] navy from taking over the islands in the event 
of war." 

Between Hawaii and the Philippines lie three American- 
owned islands, not in a straight line, but breaking through what 
would otherwise be a three-thousand-mile space of sea contain- 
ing only Japanese land. These three stepping stones are Midway, 
Wake and Guam. Before 1919 they were already stations for a 
trans-Pacific submarine cable, and during the last four years 
they have been in use as airports for the trans-Pacific service of 
Pan-American Airways. They are under the jurisdiction of the 
American Navy Department, and Guam, the only one of any 
size (225 square miles), is a regular naval station. 

The American chain of islands cuts in between the Marianne 
and Caroline groups of the Japanese mandate. Under the 
terms of the League of Nations mandate, which Japan still pro- 
fesses to regard as binding, though she has withdrawn from the 
League, the Japanese islands may not be fortified, and there is 
no evidence that any large regular naval base has been con- 
structed, but harbor works and an aerodrome at Saipan not 
far to the north of Guam could no doubt be militarized very 
quickly if war were imminent. 

It will be clear from the above survey that in the event of a 
naval war in the Pacific, 

(i) If the British Empire and the U.S.A. were allied against 

Japan, their position would be a strong one, and the U.S.A. 

would be able to use Australian New Guinea and neighboring 

1 Daily Telegraph, Aug. n. 



Australian or British islands for supporting American forces in 
Guam and the Philippines. 

(2) If the British Empire were at war with Japan, and the 
U.S.A. neutral, New Guinea and Nauru (important for its 
phosphate deposits) would be exposed to attack from the 
Caroline and Marshall Islands. 

(3) If the U.S.A. were at war with Japan, and the British 
Empire neutral, the Americans would have great difficulty in 
coming to grips with the Japanese in the western Pacific from 
their bases in Hawaii and Samoa owing to the great distances, 
while Guam with Japanese islands to north and south of it 
would be very insecure as a link with the Philippines until the 
Mariannes and Carolines had been entirely cleared of Japanese 
naval and air forces. 

Such strategic considerations have a direct bearing on the 
political problems of the East Indies and Indo-China, for the 
question of the continuance or renunciation of the American 
control of the Philippines is crucial for that part of the world, 
and the position of America as a Great Power in the Far East 
depends on trans-Pacific communications. The European na- 
tions holding colonial territories in the Far East naturally main- 
tain communication with them via the Indian Ocean and the 
Malacca or Sunda Straits; these lines cannot be intercepted by 
Japan. The line Hawaii-Manila, on the other hand, runs right 
across Japan's line Yokohama-Yap. The situation of the Philip- 
pines as a part of the American empire is so exposed that, in 
order to make sure of holding them in an era of imperialist 
struggle, the U.S.A. must in the long run either equip herself 
with armaments far in excess of what would be needed for the 
defense of the homeland and possessions as far as Hawaii, or 



must enter into defensive arrangements with other powers in 
the Far East. From the point of view of the European Powers 
with Far Eastern colonies the final departure of the Americans 
from the East Indies would be a great misfortune, for it would 
uncover the East Indies to Japanese expansion and leave the 
European colony-holders who cannot deploy their full strength 
in the Far East as long as Europe is in a state of discord to bear 
the brunt of it. 

The Western Powers owning territory in the Far East have 
long since ceased to aim at further expansion or to contend with 
one another; they are concerned only to hold what they have, 
with the exception of the U.S.A., who is in doubt whether to 
retain or to abandon her rule. The Western Powers in the 
Southern zone of the Far East are confronted today with politi- 
cal problems of two kinds: the first, that of dealing with the 
nationalist aspirations of the peoples under their sovereignty, 
and the second, that of preserving their territories from the ex- 
pansionist aims of indigenous Far Eastern states in which cate- 
gory must be included, not only Japan, but also Siam. 

Among the hundred million Asiatics under Western rule in 
Indo-China and the East Indies three national movements are 
of real importance the Javanese, the Annamese and the Fili- 
pino. Fully a third of the hundred million are entirely out- 
side these three divisions, and they include the Indian and 
Chinese emigrant colonies, the Malays, the Khmers, the Bali- 
nese, the Bugis and a host of minor peoples and tribes. But 
in a brief survey it is possible only to take note of the three 
big aggregates numbering some forty, twenty and ten millions 

Java and the scarcely detached island of Madura comprise 



only a little over one-fifteenth of the area of the Netherlands 
Indies, but contain more than two-thirds of their total popula- 
tion, or 41.7 millions at 817.5 to the square mile. Java thus 
naturally forms the core of the Dutch East Indian empire, the 
rest of it being termed the "Outer Islands/' Three languages are 
spoken: Sundanese in the west and Javanese in the east of Java, 
and Madurese in Madura. A "Javanese 1 ' may accordingly be 
either an inhabitant of Java or a speaker of Javanese, and in spite 
of the differences of language there appears to be enough com- 
mon civilization in the islands for a Javanese nationality in the 
former sense to exist in fact. The "Indonesian" nationality, on 
the other hand, cannot be said to have any real basis; it exists 
only among a handful from various parts of the East Indies who 
have received a higher education in Dutch, and does not corre- 
spond to any popular consciousness. Outside Java and Madura 
insular and tribal particularism are so far too strong for the 
formation of any "Indonesian" unity, and the Javanese are as 
much foreigners as the Dutch; the Malay language provides a 
lingua franca on the coasts, but no adequate foundation for a 
coherent nationality, and Malay in any case cannot bind the 
Outer Islands to Java. The only vigorous nationalism is that of 
Java itself, but this is quite sufficient to confront the Dutch with 
a difficult problem of government. 

The Netherlands India Constitution of 1925 granted a very 
limited measure of self-government in Java following the ex- 
ample of British concessions in India, but as the Indian example 
also shows, it is not easy to stop at any particular point on the 
road to "Dominion Status." The Dutch have no intention, as far 
as is known, of yielding up ultimate control over their East 
Indian empire, which has in the past been as lucrative as it has 


been easy to manage. But there has certainly been unrest in Java 
during the last decade, and there is always the possibility that a 
discontented element might seek foreign aid for a revolutionary 
movement. An independent Java might rapidly become a con- 
siderable power; it may be noted incidentally that the popula- 
tion of Java and Madura is six times that of Australia, and that 
Java, Borneo and Sumatra together form the most important 
oil-producing area in the Far East. 1 

In French Indo-China the ruling European Power has to deal 
with the growing nationalism of the Annamese, who form over 
90% of the population of the territory. Unfortunately for France, 
the internal problems of French Indo-China are complicated by 
the proximity of an increasingly powerful and unfriendly Siam. 
The French colony 2 is composed historically of (i) the "empire" 
of Annam, including Tongking and Cochin-China, (2) the king- 
dom of Cambodia, and (3) territory taken from Siam, including 
Luang Prabang province and Battambang. Thus, while Annam 
and Cambodia were swallowed whole, Siam was merely muti- 
lated, and today France, with a power depending on a small 
colonial force halfway across the world from the home country, 
is confronted with a modernized state which has a long history 
of wars and is now in the grip of an intense nationalism, has a 
population equal to that of Yugoslavia, is building up an army 
on a basis of universal military service, and has created a not 
negligible navy and air force. Siam in the 'eighties and 'nineties 

1 The oil production of the Netherlands Indies (of which about 97% 
comes from Java, Borneo and Sumatra) was 6,437,910 metric tons in 
1936, and the country stands sixth in the world in estimated oil reserves. 

* Formally only Cochin-China is a "colony/ 1 while Annam, Tongking, 
Cambodia and Laos are protectorates. But the difference is only that 
between French administration in Algeria and in Morocco. 



of the last century only escaped the fate of her neighbors, Burma 
and Annam, because France and Britain could not agree on 
a division of the spoil and preferred to leave the country as 
an independent buffer state. Both Britain and France, however, 
helped themselves to outlying territories of the Siamese kingdom, 
and these losses are too recent to have been entirely forgotten in 
Siam. 1 

Another factor important in shaping Siamese policy is sus- 
picion and fear of China on account of the large Chinese 
minority (si/ millions) in Siam. The Chinese formerly counted 
Siam as one of their "vassal states" on the strength of receptions 
of seal and calendar from Peking, and since the Revolution such 
historic claims have been brought up to date by spokesmen of 
the Ruomintang in the form of proposals for a future federal 
union of these states with China. Siamese nationalists reject the 
idea, and view any increase of China's power with apprehension, 
as they consider it is bound to have a disturbing effect on the 
overgrown Chinese minority and to compromise Siam's inde- 
pendence. They therefore tend to regard Japan's activities in 
smashing up the new Chinese state as extremely beneficial to 
Siam, and it was not without reason that Siam, alone among the 
attending members of the League of Nations, abstained from 
voting on the resolution of the League Assembly which con- 
demned Japan's action in Manchuria in 1933. 

Latent, but unassuaged, grievances against Britain and France 
and a strongly anti-Chinese bias have given Siamese policy in 
recent years an unmistakable pro-Japanese trend. Though the 

1 Britain in 1909 extorted the cession of Siamese suzerainty over the 
Malay principalities of Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu and Perlis in re- 
turn for partial revision of an extra-territoriality treaty. 



rumors of a Japano-Siamese canal through the isthmus of Kra 
to short-circuit Singapore may be discounted for such a canal 
would be as vulnerable in time of war as it would be costly to 
construct Japanese influence in Bangkok has been strong 
enough to cause alarm to Britain and France, who have sought 
to deter Siam from such an undesirable friendship by imposing 
demonstrations of naval and aerial might. Measures of this kind 
may be effective for a while, but the attitude of Siam in the 
event of a European war would be determined by circumstances. 
In 1917 Siam declared war on Germany and seized German 
shipping and property in the country; Englishmen liked to think 
this was because the Siamese in the third year of the Great 
War had become convinced of the righteousness of the Allied 
cause. In another struggle of the European nations, however, 
Siam might decide differently on the question of right and 
invade French Indo-China with the assistance or collusion of 

The position of French Indo-China between the Japanese 
navy and the Siamese army has suddenly become very danger- 
ous, and the French have shown their awareness of the fact by a 
series of vigorous measures increase of the military establish- 
ment, a "French Singapore" to be constructed at Kamranh Bay 
on the Annam coast north of Saigon, occupation of the strategi- 
cally important Paracel Reefs southeast of Hainan, and warn- 
ings to Japan not to encroach on French vital interests by the 
seizure of Hainan in the war against China. But in the long run 
France's ability to hold Indo-China will depend mainly on the 
degree of her success in conciliating the Aimamese; the latter 
have no desire to exchange one foreign yoke for another, but 
if there were enough discontent with French rule (and there 



has been a great deal), Annamese rebels might seek Siamese 
aid, the Siamese to take Cambodia and parts of Laos, which 
historically have a closer connection with Siam than with 
Annam. 1 

British Malaya is in a much less exposed situation than French 
Indo-China. It is relatively secure against a possible attack by 
land from Siam; by sea it is much more remote from Japan and 
is protected by the now completed first-class naval base at 
Singapore. Internally the political problems of Malaya are not 
too difficult from a British point of view. The Malays of the 
hinterland are divided among a number of small protected 
states, and in the Straits Settlements they are outnumbered 
by the Chinese and Indian immigrants, who have flowed in 
with the rapid economic development of the country. In 
these circumstances there cannot be any united nationalist 
movement and the classic formula of divide et impera is easily 
applied. 2 

Singapore is continually being developed as a seaport, airport 
and fortress on the assumption that Britain will endeavor to 
hold Malaya indefinitely, and France and Holland, closely linked 
with Britain in the triangle Singapore-Saigon-Batavia, show 
an equal resolve to stay where they are. In striking contrast 
with this dug-in attitude is the doubt at Manila about the in- 
tentions of the U.S.A. By an Act of the American Congress the 
Philippines are being governed for ten years from 1935 as a 
"Commonwealth" with an elected President and an American 

1 The Siamese national hero Phra Naret subdued Laos and Cambodia 
in the sixteenth century. The power of Cambodia had already been 
broken by Siam two centuries earlier. 

2 The government services have hitherto been reserved for English- 
men and Malays, but now the Chinese and Indians demand a share. 


High Commissioner; in 1945 all American control is theoreti- 
cally due to coine to an end and the country is to become a 
sovereign "Philippine Republic." The abdication of American 
power was brought about in the States by an extraordinary 
log-rolling combination of anti-imperialist liberals, isolationists, 
sugar interests which wanted the Filipinos put outside the 
American tariff wall, and labor unions hostile to Filipino cheap 
labor immigration. The abdication appeared to be as definite 
as legislation could make it. Yet it may be considered improbable 
that the Americans will be out of the Philippines definitely in 

Filipino nationality is of a peculiar kind. The group of islands 
called the Philippines had no sort of political unity before the 
Spanish conquest in the sixteenth century, and takes its name 
from a king of Spain. Further, the tribes of the Philippines 
(except in the extreme south) were converted en masse to Chris- 
tianity a phenomenon without parallel elsewhere in the Far 
East. 1 The nationalism of the Philippines has thus more simi- 
larity to that of Mexico or Peru than to that of Java, Annam 
or Japan, and the revolt against Spain in the 'nineties was 
largely inspired by Hispano-American examples. After 1898 
U.S. American institutions and culture were superimposed on 
Spanish, and today both Spanish and English languages are 
current, the latter being the more widely known. But a nation 
cannot be quite happy with the language of alien conquerors, 
and so this year a law has been promulgated making Tagalog, 
the speech of central Luzon, the official language of the Com- 

ir The nearest analogy is provided by the Minahassa district in the 
northern peninsula of Celebes. But, generally speaking, Christianity has 
made little headway in the East Indies outside the Philippines. 



monwealth. All this has caused considerable confusion; there 
are in fact a dozen vernacular languages of importance, and 
there are as many fair-sized island units outside Luzon. There is 
a strong Moslem minority known as Moros ("Moors") in Min- 
danao, and a Japanese colony, numbering about 14,000, engaged 
in the cultivation of hemp in the district of Davao in the south- 
east of the same island. On a broad view, the prospects of sta- 
bility in an independent Philippine republic do not appear to be 
very bright; and when it is remembered that the most northerly 
island of the Philippines is visible on a clear day from Japanese 
Formosa, it is fairly obvious that the international position of 
the new state would be one of acute discomfort. 

In Japan the program of overseas expansion toward the 
south is called the Nankai ("South Sea") policy. At its minimum 
this means nothing more than an intensified commercial drive, 
but at its maximum it implies a political ascendancy and the 
use of force. In its latter form, the Nankai policy is clearly an 
alternative to expansion on the mainland of Asia, and the debate 
between the Continental and South Sea schools is bound up 
with the professional rivalry between the two fighting services 
in Japan. In the opinion of the Japanese Army the Navy's 
function is to preserve Japan's communications with the con- 
tinent and perhaps to harry enemy powers in war-time with 
commerce raiders, but not to set itself up as an independent 
force with a strategy of its own; the Navy's idea, on the contrary, 
is to restrain the Army from continental adventures, to avoid the 
liabilities of long land frontiers and to concentrate Japan's re- 
sources on building up sea-power. The bridling of the Army by 
the Navy was an evident fact when Admiral Okada was Prime 
Minister and Japan denounced the capital ship ratios of the 


Washington Treaty. But the military mutiny of February 1936 
ended Okada's rule, and the present war in China, even if 
it brings victory to Japan, must involve vast new permanent 
military commitments and reduce the Navy's share both of the 
national budget and of influence on national policy. The Navy's 
failure to prevent the new plunge into continental conquest may 
be attributed partly to the wider popular hold of the conscript 
army as compared with the limited personnel of the naval serv- 
ice, and partly to the fact that the Navy no less than the Army 
demands a large-scale autarchic heavy industry which can only 
be secured by control of North China. 

Nevertheless the attractions of the Nankai program remain, 
and in certain circumstances it might again become practical 
politics. Malaya and Indonesia represent a vast market for cheap 
manufactured goods and also produce (or could produce) a 
great variety of raw materials, notably rubber, tin, oil and iron 
ore. British Malaya comes first, and the Netherlands Indies 
second, in the world's production of rubber; British Malaya 
stands first, and the Netherlands Indies fourth, in the world's 
supply of tin. The Netherlands Indies is the principal oil-pro- 
ducing region in the Far East; oil is found in Sumatra, Java, 
Borneo and the island of, Ceram in the Moluccas. Finally, Min- 
danao in the Philippines and Celebes and southeastern Borneo 
in the Dutch domain contain vast deposits of lateritic iron ore, 
which are costly to work and have as yet been hardly touched, 
but which might in the future be of a great importance for a 
'Far Eastern heavy industry. All these things, and especially the 
oil of Borneo and Ceram, might be objectives of Japanese 

But the crucial question is whether or not the Americans 




finally abandon the Philippines in 1945. If they go, it should not 
be too difficult for the Japanese unless they have suffered some 
crushing disaster in the meantime to gain control over the Fili- 
pino state and make it into a kind of Manchukuo, and with both 
the Philippines and the Carolines in their hands they would 
seriously threaten New Guinea, the Moluccas and eastern 
Borneo at a safe distance from the Singapore base. If, on the 
other hand, the Americans remain in the Philippines and keep, 
under whatever juridical formula, a protectorate over the 
islands, Japan will not be able to dominate the Philippines or to 
invade New Guinea or the Moluccas across the Hawaii-Manila 
line without risking war with the United States, and it is incon- 
ceivable that she should do this as long as she has both Russia 
and China as enemies on the mainland of Asia. The sole con- 
dition on which Japan would be likely to provoke the U.S. A. by 
a South Sea expansion would be a Russo-Japanese rapprochement 
giving rise to relations like those of 1907-17; such an appease- 
ment would give Japan security on the mainland, so that she 
could concentrate again on sea-power, but it is a possibility very 
remote from the facts and policies of today. 

If the Americans stay in the Philippines and continue to take 
an active interest in Far Eastern affairs, a violent expansion of 
Japan to the south or southeast is extremely improbable for a 
long time to come. A frontal attack on Malaya across the South 
China Sea is equally improbable. Hongkong and French Indo- 
China, however, remain in a danger zone, for British and French 
interests in access to China via Canton and Yunnan respectively 
can at any time involve them in the struggle between Japan and 
China which may continue, with intervals of truce, not for years, 
but for decades. In this struggle the possession of Hainan is likely 

British EZ3 French 

Dutch HI US. A. 


Naval Bases 

Brih'sh Trench 

USA. ^ Japanese 

100 200 300 <rOO 500 M. 



in the long run to be o paramount importance. A Japanese 
naval and air base in Hainan, added to the existing base at Mako 
in the Pescadores west of Formosa, would give Japan a strangle- 
hold both on Hongkong and Tongking and the power finally to 
cut off China from the traffic of the South China Sea. 


THE RAJ* EvN.ST, 1938 


W/t/i Additional A/\ap>s by 

Chapter XI 

The United States is not only an imperial power in the Far East 
sharing the interests of the western empires but also a Pacific 
power in her own right. She has therefore always had two distinct 
sets of relations, one with the western empires, sometimes co- 
operative and sometimes competitive, among them but not of 
them, and the other with the independent countries bordering 
the Pacific in particular, China, Japan and the eastern terri- 
tories of Russia. The policies of the United States in this area 
have done more than is generally realized to determine, for a 
hundred and fifty years, the course of events in Eastern Asia. 

The United States, from the territorial point of view, is neces- 
sarily pulled into Pacific affairs. In the north her Alaskan 
boundaries are separated from the mainland of Asia by a nar- 
row sea, Japan is within flying distance of the nearest Alaskan 
bases. United States possessions in western Pacific waters, the 
South Pacific and the South China seas, rival those of any of 
the western empires; her naval bases lie much further from the 
homeland than do any of the Japanese; important airports extend 
from Dutch Harbour in the north to Pago Pago in the south, from 
Pearl Harbour in the east itself 2410 miles from San Francisco 
to Cavite in the west Pacific. The United States operates the 


only trans-Pacific air lines. The argument that America has been 
historically more interested in Europe than in Asia must take into 
account the fact that for decades she has held a position in the 
Pacific which she is only now, for example by the occupation of 
Iceland, beginning to acquire in the Atlantic. Whatever the 
apathy toward or ignorance of her role in America itself, there 
have been no illusions about her role in the Pacific among the 
countries in the Far East. 

The policy of the United States has, indeed, been well defined 
and consistent. The ends of policy remain the same for all regions 
in which she is interested, the means by which policy is achieved 
derive from local and historical conditions. The United States 
has sought in the Far East, as in other regions, first and foremost 
the security of its own territories and the protection of its own 
nationals; for this reason it has a regional as well as a general 
interest in peace. A further end of policy is the development of 
economic interests and this naturally includes an active concern 
with the manner in which trade is conducted and with the main- 
tenance of the economic principles underlying the American 

The main techniques which the United States has employed in 
the Far East to secure regional peace and its own interests are 
maintenance of a balance of power and freedom of the seas. 
Upon these depend the success of keeping an Open Door for 
commercial opportunity. These methods of handling Far Eastern 
affairs came into prominence at the end of the nineteenth cen- 
tury when the United States re-emerged in the Orient after 
several decades of quiescence due to the Civil War. It was a 
different United States and a different Orient. From the end of 
the 1 8th to the middle of the igth century the United States 



joined vigorously in the expansion of European trade and meth- 
ods of trading to the East, partly as a result of her commercial 
rivalry with Great Britain, partly because the merchant capital 
of New England found the clipper trade a far more profitable 
business than expansion across the American continent. The 
British command of the South China seas following the capture 
of Singapore in 1819, the development of the American Pacific 
coast, the growth of the whaling industry and the improvement 
in shipping led to the use of the Pacific route. Rivalry with 
Great Britain gave the impetus to the opening up of Japan. It 
was necessary, as Commodore Perry put it, to anticipate the 
designs "of that unconscionable government, the British Govern- 
ment" whose cupidity was limited only by its capacity to satisfy 
it. "The honor of the country and the interests of commerce 
demand it." This was the language of a trading nation, but the 
United States which re-entered the Pacific scene in 1898 was a 
continental empire with vast industrial possibilities and growing 
accumulations of capital to invest. Revived American energies 
took United States commerce and investments into the Carib- 
bean and Central America, a development forming the back- 
ground of the Spanish-American War which led indirectly to 
the seizure of the Philippine Islands. 

The age of British sea power in the Far East, or at least of 
British monopoly, waned as the igth century came to a close and 
a new balance of power came into being. The building of the 
Trans-Siberian railway brought the Eurasian land mass of Russia 
into the picture and gave a land frontier on China outflanking 
British naval power; the defeat of China by Japan in 1895 
changed the relation between these two Far Eastern powers. 
Completion of German and Italian unification in 1870 hastened 


the tempo of imperialist competition to such an extent that 
Africa was divided in twenty short years and pressures upon 
China became intense during the last decade of the century. 
Under such circumstances the only way in which the United 
States could trade in the Far East was by preserving the formal 
independence of China, her main arena of business, and this was 
possible only on condition that China was not divided. The 
revolt of China against imperialism at this time, the Boxer 
rebellion, in the suppression of which United States troops par- 
ticipated, helped to prevent the partition by compelling the 
powers to unite at the very moment when they were in violent 
competition. Because there was actually a balance of power it 
was possible for the Open Door to be accepted. No one country 
was strong enough to shut it. 

The Open Door policy, as it is called, happened to be a tech- 
nique best suited to the peculiar conditions of the time it has 
never been a moral principle universally applied in all regions 
where American policy was active, or even in the Far East itself. 
But the natural corollary of this was the need to prevent China 
collapsing and thus endangering the balance of forces. The gen- 
eral purpose of American policy toward China has been to keep 
China in that state where she would be weak enough to take 
orders but strong enough to obey them; in other words, the 
United States was as active as any in maintaining those treaty 
rights which she shared with other powers, and which constituted 
a violation of Chinese territorial and political integrity, and inter- 
vened actively, for example, in the igso's, when these rights 
were endangered, but was more willing than some to keep alive 
the goose that laid the golden egg. 

It is generally true that when Russia became too strong the 


United States supported Japan; when Japan became too strong 
support was given to Russia. The Anglo-Japanese alliance, de- 
vised mainly to counterbalance Russian imperialism, came in 
with an American blessing; it went out, when Russian imperial- 
ism was apparently dead, with an American curse. So long as the 
Chinese capital remained in Peking the pivot of American 
policy, the keystone of the balance of power, was Manchuria, and 
various schemes were suggested for making it a more effective 
buffer state. Manchuria fell to the Japanese in 1931 partly be- 
cause it had already lost much of its meaning; the political center 
of China had moved to the Yangtse valley and the character of 
the international situation had changed. The theory that Japan 
was permitted to set up a bulwark against Communism must not 
be exaggerated because in the Siberian campaign of 1919 the 
mission of the American forces was concerned far more with the 
prevention of Japanese expansion than assisting the Czechoslovak 
legionnaires. From 1931 to 1941 the focus of the Far Eastern 
balance of forces moved south until finally it centered in the 
South China Sea. 

The fact that the United States has only rarely used force in 
the Far East can be attributed less to unwillingness to use it than 
to her success in maintaining the balance of power. 

At the same time the ratio of naval forces between Japan, 
Great Britain and the United States, together with the non- 
aggressive policies of the U.S.S.R., made possible a wide margin 
of action on the part of Japan before she endangered her rela- 
tions with the Anglo-American empires to the point of war. 
This continental expansion and southward drive of Japan have 
called forth, on the part of the United States, expressions of 
policy which reflect the general purposes and techniques of that 



policy in new forms, but the essence remains the same. The insti- 
tutions of the United States as well as her geographical position 
combine to support a desire for general peace, essential for the 
security of the nation, and to sublimate the balance of power 
policy into what Mr. Cordell Hull has called "order under law." 
From the American point of view there was a perfect combina- 
tion of principle and interest in insisting upon the maintenance 
of treaty rights, both by China and Japan, upon the sanctity of 
international law, upon the refusal to recognize, at least in the 
Far East, changes brought about by force. While Franco's con- 
quest of Spain was recognized, the spread of Japanese sponsored 
regimes was not, while American treaty rights on the high seas 
were abolished by Congress, in the Neutrality Act, the rights to 
extraterritoriality, to the stationing of troops and gunboats, and 
to administrative privileges, in China, were protected against all 
comers. Yet the maintenance of these rights, from the Chinese 
point of view, constituted a continuous infringement of the 
other American principle of concern for China's integrity. Nor 
was the Open Door open for China; none of the powers conceded 
to China the rights they demanded from her. 

United States policy can be properly stated only if it is under- 
stood that most of the things which are usually called principles 
are really techniques, applied unilaterally to the Far Eastern situ- 
ation. The language of Secretary Lansing in 1914 put the 
situation very frankly: "This Government will be glad to exert 
any influence, which it possesses, to further, by peaceful methods, 
the welfare of the Chinese people, but the Department realizes 
that it would be quixotic in the extreme to allow the question 
of China's territorial integrity to entangle the United States in 
international difficulties." In other words, the United States has 


been far less actively concerned about the integrity of China than 
has Britain about the integrity of Belgium and Holland, for the 
simple reason that it was of less concern to American interests. 
Statements of American as of British policy are more a guide, 
when they deal with principles, to the sort of world they would 
like to live in than to the motives which inspire action. 

It is often overlooked that democracies, as well as dictator- 
ships, spread their ideas abroad. The American government has 
quite naturally been active in the protection of its missionaries 
on the one hand and its own philosophy of economic behavior 
on the other. The effect of American ideas upon Japan and 
China has been impressive, in the latter case revolutionary. It is 
arguable, from the Japanese point of view, that the presence of 
American colleges, churches and business houses in China repre- 
sents a political force as potent as the most active fifth column 
of the totalitarian states. Japan has everything to fear from the 
spread of American influence in China, in fact this is one of the 
things that she is most concerned to wipe out hence the attacks 
upon educational institutions and the curtailment of missionary 
activities. American propaganda in the East is none the less potent 
for not being organized by government; its impact upon Chinese 
society is patent to all, and American consular and diplomatic 
agents have always used the missionary and businessman as a 
source of information. It is the success of this propaganda in 
China, as contrasted with Japan, which accounts for the senti- 
mental stake that the United States has in China, and China in 
the United States. 

United States policies in the Far East cannot be explained in 
terms of investments and trade. American investment holdings 
in China, before the "incident," amounted to only $240,000,000, 



her total trade to $250,000,000. For Japan the amounts ran 
about three times as high. As far as China and Japan are con- 
cerned the United States is interested in preserving opportunity 
for trade and the American way of conducting trade rather than 
in fighting for the preservation of investments as such; from the 
economic point of view she can afford to lose the battle for 
China and let Japan overrun it, as she has, but from the political 
point of view the old concern for China's so called "integrity" is 
important. The power that can control, if not exploit, China can 
challenge the whole balance of power in Eastern Asia and en- 
danger the very important strategic and economic interests that 
the United States and others have in the South China Sea. It is 
the southward drive of Japan which most concerns the United 

The change in United States actions in the Far East came after 
the fall of Holland and France. Up till then the flow of war 
materials to Japan had gone on without serious interruptions, 
the argument being that Japan was bound to expand and that as 
no one was willing, on general principles, to stop her, it was the 
better of two evils if she spent her energies on the continent 
rather than in Southeast Asia. So long as the raw materials for 
war which came from the trade with America were expended, 
and, it was hoped, wasted, in China there was no urgent reason 
to stop the flow, for the imposition of an embargo might well 
have turned Japanese energies in other directions. The U.S.S.R., 
which sought to prevent a Chinese collapse, and would have pre- 
ferred Japanese oceanic expansion, supported China with arms 
and munitions and immobilized the best equipped sections of 
the Japanese army in Manchuria. 

The effect of the policies of the U.S.S.R. and the United 


States was the same, to permit the aggressive power in the East 
to weaken itself against the rising tide of Chinese resistance. 
Soviet trade continued with Japan although some pressure was 
put on Japan with regard to the fishing rights in Russian waters, 
and the United States continued to trade with China although 
insisting on the cash and carry provisions of the Neutrality Act. 
The relations between the United States and Japan changed 
when it became clear that Japan had ambitions in Southeast Asia 
for here lay important interests. The most optimistic studies of 
the degree to which the United States depends upon the Far East 
for strategic raw materials admit that such materials as tin, rub- 
ber, abaca and quinine, if obtained elsewhere, would be in 
quantities sufficient only for immediate American military 
needs; even this depends upon the assumption that the sea lanes 
to the U.S.S.R., South Africa and South America remain open. 
New sources of supply, scrap, synthetic products, and substitutes 
can possibly replace these materials from Southeast Asia, but 
the replacements would be extremely costly and the changes 
involved would be very extensive involving, in some cases, a 
period of several years. Only the accumulation of large stocks 
could avert disaster while these measures were being taken. 
There are no climatic reasons why Far Eastern vegetable prod- 
ucts could not be grown in the Western Hemisphere, but the 
high cost of labor prevents their production in the Western 
Hemisphere in peace time, and new plantations could not be 
made productive enough in sufficient time, during a war emer- 
gency, to be of practical value. Over 85 per cent of American 
rubber imports come now from British Malaya and the Nether- 
lands Indies, a fact of enormous importance in war, for it takes 
between five and seven years to bring a rubber plantation into 




production. Scrap rubber to the amount of one fourth of the 
American demand can be reclaimed, but not used for tires; 
synthetic rubber can be produced at great cost, but at least a 
year would be necessary to expand production. 

The United States, therefore, could not willingly permit the 
Netherlands Indies and the Malay Peninsula, the Philippines, 
south China and the south Pacific to fall into the hands of an 
unfriendly power, both because she depended on this area for 
vital strategic materials and because control of such materials 
would strengthen considerably the power of the enemy. It was a 
necessary part of American strategy that the Japanese drive to the 
south be stopped, a fact which became clear when Mr. Matsuoka, 
while in office as Japanese Foreign Minister, went out of his way 
to convince the world that Japan intended to give no more re- 
spect to the statics quo in the Pacific. 

The naval position of the United States in the Pacific had 
changed even before the armament program got under way 
after the fall of France. It had for years been assumed that in 
time of crisis the British and American fleets might well be act- 
ing jointly in the Pacific, for although the Washington confer- 
ence gave Japan a favorable position in her own waters, the 
cancellation of the Anglo-Japanese pact and the acceptance by 
Great Britain of battleship parity with the United States paved 
the way for co-operation between these two countries. Britain 
and the United States controlled between them the exits to the 
Pacific, thus making possible a long range blockade of Japan, 
which, if enforced, would compel her to fight far from her own 
bases. But it was the ever lengthening radius of air power which 
gave the United States a potential advantage over Japan, espe- 
cially after the abrogation of naval limitation treaties in 1936. 


Guam, which had not been fortified as a naval base, became very 
important as a possible submarine and air base only 1,500 miles 
from Japan; the Aleutian Islands reach out to within 2,000 
miles of Japan's industrial areas. The cancellation of the non- 
fortification agreement by Japan herself worked to the advan- 
tage of the United States; Japan had no territories within 1,500 
miles of American shores. On the contrary, Japan's easternmost 
possessions in the Marshall Islands are still 2,000 nautical miles 
even from Hawaii and her nearest naval station is 6,600 miles 
distant from the Panama Canal. The United States, therefore, 
seemed to have control of the western and considerable power 
in the eastern Pacific. That the time was too short to develop 
these potentialities is a matter of history. 

Full advantage of the treaty situation as regards naval power 
in the Pacific was not taken by the United States until the new 
armament program began in 1940 but pressure was applied, 
though very gently, in the economic sphere. The first step, the 
"moral" embargo of June, 1938, on exports to Japan of aircraft 
armaments, engine parts, accessories, aerial bombs and torpedoes 
practically stopped all trade in these categories. In December, 
1939 the embargo list was extended to include molybdenum, 
aluminum, and equipment or information required for the pro- 
duction of high-quality aviation gasoline. In January, 1940, the 
trade treaty of 1911 was abrogated but not until the fall of 
France did Congress give the President authority to subject 
exports to a licensing system. Actions up to this time on the 
part of America can be explained as much by the restriction 
which Japan put on trade with the U. S. for example, the 
two million dollar tobacco export to Japan fell to two thousand 
dollars in 1939 and to nothing in 1940 as by political motives. 


Nor did the U. S. go out of its way to weaken Japan by giving 
decisive support to its enemies until the events of 1 940 changed 
everything. A loan of $25,000,000, to be repaid in shipments of 
wood oil, was granted China in December, 1938, and one of 
$20,000,000 in March, 1940 to be repaid in tin; these loans were 
of political value to China, but in effect, the United States 
merely financed the importation of strategic materials. 

The United States was well aware, as was pointed out in the 
note to Japan of December, 1938, that the situation had changed. 
"This Government is also well aware that many of the changes 
have been brought about by the action of Japan. This Govern- 
ment does not admit, however, that there is need or warrant for 
any one power to take upon itself to prescribe what shall be the 
terms or conditions of a 'new order' in areas not under its 
sovereignty and to constitute itself the repository of authority 
and the agent of destiny in regard thereto/' But the United 
States did not feel it necessary to act until the whole basis of 
the world balance of power was shaken by the German offensive 
in the spring of 1940. Then came a crisis in American policy; 
for the first time in a century and a half of contact with the Far 
East the United States was faced with a situation in which it 
would have to defend its interests by the threat of full scale 
military and naval operations. 


OiiVws* G;er///aj 

oyfton </ CUe 
ain force* 

Man Aeo^es of 
odn in 1941 


Chapter XII 


The balance of forces in the Far East changed rapidly as a 
result of the Sino-Japanese conflict. By the time that the Far 
Eastern and the European wars merged together more particu- 
larly after the fall of the Netherlands and France in the spring 
of 1940 and the military alliance which Japan made with her 
Axis partners in September of the same year measurable 
changes had taken place in the internal economic and political 
structures as well as the external policy and strategic positions 
of China and Japan. By the fall of 1940 Japan had already taken 
some of the steps mentioned in chapter X, such as the occupa- 
tion of Canton and Hainan island and the putting of pressure 
on French Indo-China to close effectively all routes from China 
to the South China Sea. The course of events after the German 
victories in Europe was largely influenced, in the Far East, by 
the effect of the Sino-Japanese conflict on the two major powers 

The position of China in 1940 was changed indeed from that 
in the spring of 1938. Japanese armies had taken Canton in 
October, the Munich crisis probably encouraging Japan to pro- 
ceed with her plans, and followed this up with the capture of 
Hankow. The drive up the Yangtse was stopped, it is true, at 


Ichang, and the push to the south did not reach Changsha, but 
the positions held by the Japanese in central China were suffi- 
cient to disrupt important Chinese communications and make 
the feeding of widely separated armies a major problem. The 
real turning point of the war, however, had come when China 
survived the loss of Nanking and by refusing to come to terms 
forced Japan to embark upon the annihilation of Chinese arms 
and government. By the winter of 1938-1939 the Japanese armies 
were fought to a standstill and since the spring of 1939 there 
have been few changes in the territorial distribution of the two 
opposing armies. Japanese strategy ceased, apparently, to con- 
sider the cost of further invasion worth the price in men and 
materials and the conclusion of the conflict was sought, from 
this time on, by other means. On the military side this was 
attempted by seeking to close all the gates that China still held 
open on the world, particularly those leading through French 
Indo-China, British Burma, and the remaining unoccupied 
treaty ports, on the political side by attempting to create an 
alternative government, in the occupied territory, to the Chung- 
king regime, which Tokyo had refused to recognize since Janu- 
ary 16, 1938. The stalemate in military affairs contributed, 
therefore, to the Japanese drive to the south and the increasing 
tension in Japan's relations with the western empires. In China 
itself the struggle for territory gave place to a struggle for 

The military stalemate came about only in part as a result of 
the Chinese strategy of fighting the war in three stages a stage 
of withdrawal, a period of stalemate, and finally, after Japanese 
exhaustion and Chinese preparations, counterattack. There is 
no question but that the Japanese invasion was made costly by 


the stubborn resistance of the Central troops at Shanghai and the 
operations of the guerrilla units behind Japanese lines in the 
north. China made full use of her territory as well as of her 
social and economic organization, which made this type of re- 
sistance possible. But the Japanese themselves are responsible for 
important contributions to the smooth working of Chinese 
strategy by failing to prepare those conditions necessary for 
successful blitzkrieg. Instead of dividing China they united its 
two most discordant elements, the Kuomintang and the Com- 
munists. Far from lulling China into a sense of security and 
encouraging lack of preparation they heralded the coming con- 
flict by a series of declarations and actions which left no doubt 
of their intentions. The victim was not isolated by diplomacy 
or by previous encirclement, the way was left open for contact 
between China and the western empires and the U.S.S.R., and 
even the military advisers of Japan's ally, Germany, remained at 
their posts for most of the first year of war. Nor was sufficient 
allowance made, in terms of strategy, for the fact that China's 
communication system did not accurately reflect the economic 
complexity of her economy; strategy was based on the assump- 
tion that control of the cities and means of communication 
would bring with it control of the hinterland, which it did 
not, and time which could have been better spent in imme- 
diate occupation of the hinterland was spent in further ad- 
vances into the interior. Almost every rule for successful war 
was violated, strategy and politics were at variance and diplo- 
macy hindered rather than helped the progress of the armed 

The achievements of the Japanese army must not be lightly 
dismissed, however, by measuring them against perfectionist 


Pro/fee f</ roo.<f t now under 
Western. Southern limits ; _o') 

JLoads '<mjajin.) = secondary 
under construction 

Numbers and letters on the map correspond to the following names: 

- - Hg Hangchow 

K Kwangchowan (Fr.) 
Kf Kaifeng 
M Macao (Port.) 
N Nanking 


2 Lashio 

3 Myitkyina 

4 Tali 

5 Kweiyang 

6 Nanning 


_ Hanoi 
9 Haiphong 
1O Pachoi 

1 1 Ningtsing 

1 2 Batang 

1 3 Silchar 

14 Sadiya 

1 5 Dacca 

16 Hami 

17 Ansi 
A Amoy 

F Foochow 

H Hankow 


Np Ningpo 

P Paochi 

Sh Shanghai 

W Wenchow 

Y Yenan 


standards. If Japanese armies were bogged down in China, Chi- 
nese armies were unable to drive them out of the country and the 
prospects of building up in the west the industry and materials 
for counterattack were no brighter than those of importing war 
supplies from other countries. Japan's flank, admittedly at great 
cost, was protected in case of southward expansion. China had 
lost control of most of her railways, important rivers, and high- 
ways; she had to watch the destruction of the major part of her 
industry, 80 per cent of which had been located in Shanghai; 
she was torn from her main sources of raw materials; she had 
to cope with the migration of millions of her people. Nor was 
the political front, which in many ways showed vast improve- 
ment over the conditions of 1937, entirely satisfactory, the cleav- 
age between the Kuomintang and the Communists at times went 
as far as open conflict and in Nanking Wang Ching-wei had been 
drawn into a rival government under Japanese sponsorship. In 
those areas in which Japanese troops were stationed, control, 
except for occasional assassination of pro- Japanese Chinese pup- 
pets, went unchallenged. China's leaders were as determined as 
ever to continue the conflict but there were few signs, in the 
spring of 1940, to encourage any prospect of an early conclusion 
of the war on Chinese terms. 

The lowest point in Chinese morale probably coincided with 
the closing of the Burma road by the British government in the 
summer of 1940. At the same time there was much to the credit 
side of the balance as far as China was concerned, for she more 
than held her own in the struggle for government. The Japanese 
sponsored regimes the Provisional Government of China at 
Peking, established December 14, 1938, and the Reformed 
Government at Nanking, set up March 28, 1938, both later 


incorporated in the Reorganized National Government of China 
at Nanking under Wang Ching-wei, March 30, 1940 did 
nothing to aid Japanese arms. Mainly owing to the vigor of 
Chinese resistance, from the Border Government in the north, 
the Communist regions based on Yenan in Shensi, to the Kuo- 
mintang in Chungking, and partly owing to the political stupid- 
ity of the Japanese army, the puppet regimes foiled to confuse, 
divide or attract the mass of the Chinese people or the leadership 
of free China. Free China has made it impossible for Japan to 
rule China indirectly through a Chinese regime founded on a 
sound social basis of classes favorable to Japan. Japan had to 
choose between leaving China to the Chinese or ruling it directly 
herself behind the facade of powerless puppets. In this connec- 
tion North China was used as a kind of testing ground, for under 
the Provisional Government a new political party, the Hsin Min 
Hui, and a new political principle, the Hsin Min Chu I, were 
introduced to replace the Kuomintang and the San Min Chu I, 
and the flag of the Chinese Republic gave place to the five- 
barred flag. When Wang Ching-wei was installed in Nanking 
all this was dropped and the position assumed that Wang's 
government was the legitimate heir to the Chinese revolution, 
the orthodox as contrasted with the heretical branch at Chung- 
king. The Reorganized Government at Nanking adopted, there- 
fore, the San Min Chu I, the Kuomintang and the national flag. 
Nothing could illustrate better the political failure of the Japa- 
nese army, for this revealed that the only tactic left open to it 
was the attempt to divide Chinese leadership in Chungking by 
the offer of wealth, power, and personal safety at Nanking. 
Against these temptations the Chinese, in spite of bombings and 
hardships at Chungking, remained firm. 


The building up of a new China went forward, during this 
period, on several fronts. That apparatus of the modern state 
which had been constructed in Nanking between 1928 and 1937, 
which constituted the Kuomintang's main 'contribution to 
China, survived the transfer from Nanking to Hankow and 
Chungking and in certain directions took on new forms and 
strength. China in 1940 had a national army, in some places a 
peoples' army, and had only the Japanese to thank for the 
destruction of provincial forces of the old type; she called the 
long postponed Peoples' Congress. Changes were made in the 
machinery of central government and in some districts an attack 
was made on the problem of modernizing local administration. 
Because the government depended, for ultimate victory, not 
only on the obedience, but also on the spontaneous co-operation 
of the people, the general effect of the war, there is evidence to 
indicate, was to encourage a closer relation between government 
and people and efficiency in administration. Out of the war came 
the impetus which brought forth the Chinese Industrial Co- 
operative movement, a form of association which gave promise 
of a broad basis for new social and economic patterns, tempering 
the necessarily authoritarian regulation of war time. Free China 
had to be a military agrarian state, for the army was the chief 
political force and agriculture, even more than before the war, 
the main part of Chinese economy; the government was the only 
body able to direct, control and invest in industry. The issue of 
the war revolved in large measure, therefore, around the ques- 
tion of political ends, whether they were to be democratic or 
fascist the spirit that would inform the economic and social 
structure and the outcome in 1940 was far from clear. The 
third stage of Chinese strategy, that of counter-attack, waited not 


only on materials of war and industrial growth, but also on the 
fusion of strategy with political and social ends. 

Japan in the spring of 1940 bore many marks of change as a 
consequence of the war. The most obvious developments had 
come on the diplomatic front in the formulation of the New 
Order in East Asia, which later came to be extended to Greater 
East Asia. On November 3, 1938, Premier Konoye described 
Japan's ambitions as the establishment of a new order that would 
insure the permanent stability of East Asia and indicated that 
such purposes constituted the justification for the Sino-Japanese 
conflict. Vague as the statement was it came generally to be re- 
garded as committing Japan to the destruction of Chiang Kai- 
shek's regime and the establishment of another government 
more amenable to Japanese desires, the elimination of "Euro- 
pean Liberalism/' that is, Anglo-American political, economic 
and social ideas, as well as the liquidation of the Western em- 
pires. This meant, in effect, the setting up of a Japanese con- 
trolled economic and political bloc from the Amur river to 
British Malaya and later, as ambition grew, to the Netherlands 
Indies and the Philippines. Japan extended its diplomatic front 
in a hostile world with friends but not allies, for the Anti- 
Comintern pact of 1936 meant nothing to her in terms of mili- 
tary assistance, and it was the unfavorable reaction which the 
New Order received in those countries which stood to lose most 
by it that assisted those Japanese who wanted to turn the Anti- 
Comintern pact into a military alliance. 

The New Order for East Asia was balanced by a new order for 
Japan itself. The Japanese army soon took advantage of the war 
in China to pass through the Diet legislation to initiate senji- 
keizai, or full wartime economy. There is some debate as to the 


exact relation between the army and the big capitalists but it is 
clear that the very difficulties of the campaign in China did much 
to assist the military in securing the support of capitalists and bu- 
reaucrats. The General Mobilization Law of 1938 gave the gov- 
ernment unprecedented powers over the whole of Japanese econ- 
omy. The necessity of stabilizing the situation in China was again 
the chief argument used to justify the further movement towards 
the forms of totalitarianism of August 1940 in Konoye's an- 
nouncement of the New Political Structure and the New Eco- 
nomic Structure. Through this the army achieved an old ambi- 
tion, the abolition of political parties, for which were substituted 
an Imperial Rule Assistance Association. The membership of 
the new Association consisted largely of Konoye appointees. 
With this went the final step, in the New Economic Structure, 
of assuming complete control over industry, commerce, and 
agriculture. The nation had to be fully geared to the task of 
achieving, now, the creation of a New Order in Greater East 
Asia; it had taken the army from September 1931 to August 
1940 to put itself in an unchallengeable position in Japanese life 
and commit the whole resources of the country to imperialist 

The army influence upon Japanese economy was as far-reach- 
ing as its interference in diplomacy. The effect of mobilizing the 
armed forces in 1937 was to draw men away from production, 
and the need for re-armament tranferred men from agriculture 
to industry, a serious matter in a country where there is exten- 
sive application of human capital to the land. The need for arm- 
aments, naval and military, was greatest when the available man 
power was weakest. Production in agriculture, forestry and fish- 
ing went down; standards of consumption, after three years of 


war, were well under the already low levels of 1937; labor pro- 
ductivity suffered measurably from declining consumption. The 
production of producers' goods had gone up, of consumers' had 
gone down; Japan sacrificed butter but she had the guns. 

Those in charge of Japanese policy were naturally those who 
least understood the impasse, diplomatic, economic and mili- 
tary, to which she had been brought. In this respect Japan was 
in a very different position from that of 1931; to say that her 
policies were now entirely subservient to the imperialist ambi- 
tion of the military is the same as saying that decisions were not to 
be based on as careful an examination of the domestic and inter- 
national situation as in earlier years. One of the most important 
factors in the whole development of Far Eastern affairs had now 
come to be the difficult internal position of the army; in order 
to maintain its domestic prestige serious changes had been made 
in Japanese politics and economics, changes which made it easier 
to form and to control opinion, but which did not make it any 
the less necessary to maintain public morale and keep up the 
prestige of the forces abroad. Even totalitarian states ultimately 
govern through opinion. In order to enslave East Asia the Japa- 
nese army first found it necessary to enslave Japan. 

China in the spring of 1940 was compelled diplomatically to 
concentrate entirely on securing friends against Japan. Her po- 
sition had changed, for Japanese occupation of the Chinese mari- 
time provinces made the nineteenth century techniques of con- 
trol meaningless; China no longer had her industry under foreign 
guns, no longer received the Maritime Customs revenues and 
had little to fear from extraterritoriality. For the time being the 
foreign settlements were China's chief outlets to the world and 
important centers of anti- Japanese activities. Japan, indeed, was 


First- class naval base 
dary naval bases 
+ Military reservation 

*-* railway 


o 3oo soo 

/Saipaii^; * Jap. 


finishing one part of the work o the Chinese revolution by at- 
tempting to drive out western imperialism. China had changed, 
in other words, from a strong semi-colonial country at the mercy 
of foreign sea power to a weak though independent state based 
on the inner heart of her land mass. Japan, on the other hand, 
had lost much of her diplomatic freedom of action by commit- 
ting herself openly to the destruction of the Western empires, by 
antagonizing the United States and by formal association with 
Italy and Germany. When the fall of France and Holland opened 
up new opportunities in Southeast Asia the direction of Japa- 
nese policy toward that area had already been prepared not 
only by the steps which followed the China war but also by 
earlier interests and policies in that part of the world. 

Japan's commercial expansion in Southeast Asia and the south 
Pacific countries developed during the World War of 1914-18 
and grew rapidly in the decade preceding the China war. Japan 
competed with advantage in a wide range of cheap goods, the 
most important being textiles, as against the more highly priced 
European and American products. During the first half of the 
thirties, it is asserted, Japan assumed a position of major im- 
portance in the commercial life of this area. The expansion of 
her export trade led to greatly increased imports of raw materials 
from the very countries which bought her goods. With goods 
went retail merchants into Thailand, the Netherlands Indies and 
the Philippines, where they competed with long established Chi- 
nese commercial groups. Nor was Japanese capital inactive in this 
region. Japanese rubber plantations, in which some 36 large firms 
were interested, produced around 20,000 metric tons of rubber 
a year as early as 1934. In Davao, southern Philippines, some 
18,000 Japanese worked on Manila hemp plantations in 1939. 


Japanese agricultural investments in the islands were estimated 
at $16,500,000; the big Japanese houses, such as Mitsui, Mitsu- 
bishi, Nomura, Okura, had built up interests in almost every 
product of the tropics tea, coffee, cinchona; Japanese mines in 
British Malaya produced more than a fifth of Japan's total iron 
ore imports in 1937; Japanese sources estimate total investments 
in the mines, plantations, forestry, fisheries, and commerce of 
Southeast Asia and the South Pacific at about 250,000,000 yen. 

The growth of this vested interest took place mainly in the 
colonies of Europe, of Great Britain, France, the Netherlands 
and Portugal, and partly in the American Philippines. It de- 
veloped in spite of restrictions imposed by the controlling 
powers, which, after the conquest of Manchuria, began to fear 
that the Japanese flag would follow Japanese trade. A vicious 
circle appeared; increasing fear of Japan led to greater restric- 
tions and greater restrictions to increased Japanese irritation, 
and in certain quarters, more sabre rattling. More important 
than this, however, was the financial strain of the war in China 
and the use of foreign exchange resources for munitions of war, 
which reduced Japan's capacity to purchase raw materials from 
this region for peacetime industries and therefore reduced ex- 
ports and foreign exchange. 

The effects of the China conflict became more and more far- 
reaching. If Japan had not embarked upon that adventure she 
would not have required so desperately the raw materials of 
war from the south at a time when she had less and less foreign 
exchange to purchase them with. The effect of the war was to 
make it more and more imperative for Japan to include her 
neighbors to the south in a yen bloc and to secure political con- 
trol over raw materials which she had helped to develop under 



foreign flags. The southward expansion of Japan, which had 
been mainly an economic movement, turned into a political and 
military development in 1940 more as a consequence of the 
China war than of the developments in Europe which orphaned 
the colonies of two western empires; it was the opportunity 
which created the means. 



Chapter XIII 


The role of Holland in the Pacific has been in some respects 
similar to her role in Europe that of a weak power controlling 
very important strategic areas. No great power in the Far East 
could permit any other great power to dominate the rich raw 
materials, the cheap native labor and the strategic position of the 
Dutch East Indies, but Holland could be left in this position 
because she was not strong enough to oppose the policies of the 
powers or to change the general method of doing trade. The 
Netherlands Indies were in this sense the pivot of the Far East- 
ern balance of power; they were the Lowlands of the Pacific. 
When Holland and France fell, therefore, the impact was felt 
immediately in the Pacific. 

The first world war began in Europe and spread to the rest of 
the world; the present conflict began in the rest of the world and 
finally reached Europe. In this sense the Far Eastern conflict has 
from 1931 been a part of the world struggle, though generally 
unrecognized as such indeed the theory that seems to have 
been followed was that the European conflict might be avoided 
if the smaller fires were isolated and allowed to burn themselves 
out. The great system of Anglo-American-French domination of 
the world depended, in one aspect, upon maritime control of 


the industrial revolution, in the sense that none of the Great 
Industry could be permitted to develop too far out of the range 
of naval operations. The blockade was the chief weapon against 
land powers with the Great Industry. The most important and 
the first blow struck at this system, or this relation between land 
and sea power, came through the spread of the industrial revolu- 
tion in die U.S.S.R., the second blow came through the develop- 
ment of air forces, the new power these gave to land armies and 
the new possibilities they opened up for the prevention of naval 
operations through narrow straits or near unfriendly shores. It 
was these things which made possible a battle for the world. 

The Sino-Japanese conflict was from its very inception, there- 
fore, a part of the larger struggle, the struggle to break down 
the domination of the world and its industrial development by 
the United States, Great Britain and France. Gaping holes were 
punched in the political structure of this world domination by 
Japan's invasion of Manchuria, by her withdrawal from the 
League of Nations, in company with her friends in Europe, and 
by the destruction of the treaty structure of the Pacific. If the fact 
of an Axis strategy be admitted, the Sino-Japanese conflict might 
well be considered as part of the "softening up" process in the 
struggle to destroy the world order. Certainly, when France and 
Holland fell, the merging of the Far Eastern conflict into the 
general European struggle became clear for all to see. Tokyo 
"was not compelled to join the Axis by pressure of the United 
States or by a common interest in destroying communism, she 
joined the Axis only after the military had taken over full con- 
trol of Japanese policies here again the importance of the Sino- 
Japanese conflict, which helped to bring this about, is apparent 
and after German diplomacy had succeeded in persuading the 



military diplomats of the ease with which the Anglo-Saxon 
powers could be destroyed and the world divided, to the advan- 
tage of Japan in the Pacific, among the conquerors. 

The German successes of the spring of 1940 naturally strength- 
ened the hands of those Japanese, such as the ambassadors to 
Berlin and Rome, who had earlier made an unsuccessful attempt 
to bring Japan into close relations with the Axis. The importance 
of the political changes in Japan in the summer of 1940 the 
establishment of the New Political and Economic Structures, 
and the destruction of political parties became apparent in 
September, when the new foreign minister, Mr. Matsuoka, signed 
the military alliance of Tokyo with the Rome-Berlin axis. This 
alliance formally drew together the wars in the East and the 
West; it provided, in effect, that if the United States should ex- 
tend its participation in either conflict beyond measures "short 
of war" then the other members of the Axis would engage in 
war with the United States. The intention of the pact, appar- 
ently, was to prevent the United States from acting decisively 
on the Atlantic front, in behalf of Britain, by threatening it with 
war in the Pacific, and to discourage American opposition to a 
Japanese attack on the Netherlands Indies by committing Ger- 
many, in such an event, to war with the United States in the 
Atlantic. Each member of the Axis, however, was left free to 
determine what constituted an act of war by the United 

The next step in Japanese policy was to exploit the pact in her 
relations with the U.S.S.R. and the announced task of the new 
Japanese ambassador to Moscow, Mr. Tatekawa, was the con- 
clusion of a non-aggression pact. Japan had much to gain if the 
U.S.S.R. could be persuaded to guarantee the Manchurian fron- 


tier, and reduce its supplies to China, thus permitting not only 
a conclusion of the China incident but also expansion to the 
south while the U.S.S.R. and the United States were both im- 
mobilized by the pact. Germany had made it clear, after the fall 
of Holland, that she was not interested in the future of the 
Netherlands Indies. German good will in the south was shown, 
moreover, by the pressure put on Vichy to accede to Japanese 
mediation in the border dispute with Thailand. Acceptance of 
Japan's demands on Indo-China in the summer of 1940 gave 
Japan supervisory rights sufficient to close Indo-China as a 
route through which supplies could go to Chungking, air bases 
from which she could reach the Burma road, and an opportunity 
for further embarrassing the colony by getting it into conflict 
with Thailand, over which issue she not only mediated but se- 
cured base facilities at Saigon and other points. If Japan ap- 
peared to have profited little as a result of the changes in Europe 
it must be remembered that Britain had not yet fallen, the atti- 
tude of the U.S.S.R. was uncertain, the Chinese were undefeated, 
the United States had gone out of its way in April, 1940, to point 
out that its policy in the Pacific was based upon respect for and 
maintenance of the status quo. The establishment by Tokyo of 
the Wang Ching-wei regime, March 30, had been followed 
twenty-four hours later by announcement of American loans to 
China and in June by a licensing system on exports to Japan. 
Perhaps the most important reason, however, why the Japanese 
did not strike immediately after the fall of France was that op- 
position in Japan itself had first to be fully overcome and that 
this took most of the summer. By the time that Japan had com- 
pleted her internal changes the forces opposed against her were 
much stronger than those she would have faced in June. 



The Japanese ambassador's mission to conclude a non-aggres- 
sion pact with the U.S.S.R. was brought to a successful conclu- 
sion by Matsuoka in Moscow on April 13, 1941. The Axis mili- 
tary alliance of September did not affect the political status of 
each of the three parties with the U.S.S.R., it was up to Japan to 
get what terms she could. The pact, which runs for five years, 
guarantees friendly relations and respect for the territorial in- 
tegrity of the two parties, and the one is to be neutral in the 
event the other is attacked by a third power. 

The promise to respect the territorial integrity of the Mongol 
People's Republic and the state of Manchukuo merely regulated 
the status quo and was intended to remove boundary disputes 
as a source of friction between the two countries. The pact did 
not apparently include any agreements on the rest of China, and 
Moscow assured Chungking that supplies would continue as 
usual. It is difficult to see what Japan got from the pact, except 
the regularization of her relations with the presumed friend of 
the Axis, and a somewhat more favorable atmosphere for the 
settlement of problems such as Japanese fisheries rights, bound- 
aries and trade. The U.S.S.R., in spite of respecting the territo- 
rial integrity of Manchukuo, did not cease aid to China or re- 
move troops from Siberia. It is probable that Moscow knew in 
April that Germany was preparing to strike very soon and wished 
to prepare for Japanese neutrality as well as to encourage Japan 
to strike south and thus bring the United States and Britain into 
the war in the Pacific. 

The United States, after the Japanese threat to extend its New 
Order in East Asia to Greater East Asia was noisily announced 
in Tokyo, very rapidly revised its whole strategy in the Pacific. 
The aim of her policy, to prevent a Japanese absorption of the 



lands to the south, was implemented by a series of moves which 
were calculated to more than achieve that purpose. A new atti- 
tude toward the U.S.S.R. became apparent in 1940 and early 
1941, the United States apparently attempting to be friendly 
enough with Moscow to frighten Japan but not so friendly as to 
force Japan into the arms of the U.S.S.R. Mr. Oumansky, Soviet 
ambassador to Washington, had conversations with Mr. Welles, 
the Assistant Secretary of State, gestures were made such as per- 
mitting $7,000,000 of machine tools which had been held up on 
the Pacific west coast to proceed to Vladivostok. Secondly, as- 
sistance to China, now an important friend on Japan's flank who 
must be given the means to counter-attack in case of Japanese 
southward expansion, immediately increased, in fact, the United 
States very soon committed itself to assisting China through the 
Lend-Lease Act on a scale sufficient to guarantee her continued 
resistance. Prevention of a Sino-Japanese peace became of su- 
preme importance to Washington. 

Thirdly, the United States assisted the Netherlands Indies in 
defense preparations and by agreements with Great Britain and 
Australia enlarged the facilities for the U. S. fleet in the South 
Pacific. In April, 1941, there were Anglo-American-Dutch talks 
in Manila which, although secret, strengthened the impression 
that the three powers had plans for the joint defense of their 
interests in Southeast Asia. Australia and New Zealand were to 
contribute to the defense of the South Pacific and Australia in 
particular was a potential industrial hinterland for the defense 
of Singapore. Fourthly, the United States put pressure on Japan 
in such a way as to embarrass her war effort yet not, it was hoped, 
to force her into such a desperate situation that she would be com- 
pelled to fight. The effect of American economic measures up till 



the complete cessation of trade in late July of 1941 was consider- 

Fifthly, the United States began to build up around Japan a 
ring of air bases with long range bombers which was expected to 
discourage any aggressive action against the South China Seas. 
These bases extended from Alaska to Pago Pago, from Hawaii to 
Guam and Cavite; in particular, the naval base at Pearl Harbor 
was greatly strengthened and new naval facilities were built in 
Alaska. The importance of small outposts in the Pacific, even if 
not fortified as naval bases, becomes apparent now that air power 
is of such importance in all military operations. 

Most important of all, the United States, by including Great 
Britain and her allies, and China, in the scope of the Lend-Lease 
Act, showed that she considered the Far Eastern conflict to be 
part of the European struggle; there was but one front but many 
theaters of action. Nothing contributed so much to the new 
orientation of American policy as Japan's adhesion to the mili- 
tary alliance with the Axis. If the Japanese really hoped that this 
pact would act as a deterrent upon the United States they were 
very disappointed; the attempt to force Washington to deter- 
mine the extent of its intervention in Europe by threats in the 
Pacific was too clumsy to succeed. There was no more effective 
way of making the New Order in East Asia unpopular in Amer- 
ica than by linking it up with Hitler's New Order in Europe. 
If Japanese policy hinged upon the Axis, as Matsuoka told the 
American ambassador to Japan, then Japan was bound up with 
powers which are out to destroy the British Commonwealth and 
Empire, whose survival the United States had decided was neces- 
sary for its own safety. Without the consent of the United States 
there could not be a Japanese New Order in East Asia. Mr, 



Matsuoka, by his alliance with Germany and then with the 
U.S.S.R., did more to align the democracies against Japan in 
one year than did the continental expansion of a decade; the first 
was, indeed, a logical consequence of the second. 

The position of the U.S.S.R. during the course of the Euro- 
pean war is clearer now than it was before the German invasion. 
The U.S.S.R. and Germany concluded an armed truce rather 
than a non-aggression pact in 1939 and the U.S.S.R. conducted 
its negotiations with each member of the Axis independently. 
The military alliance between the Axis powers, in September 
1 940, was discounted as the regulation of relations already exist- 
ing between them but mention was made, in the Soviet press, of 
the spread of the war to include both East and West. Most im- 
portant were Russian relations with China. From the very begin- 
ning of Chinese resistance to Japan in 1937 t ^ ie U.S.S.R. has sent 
military supplies to China to assist in what the Russians look 
upon as a war of national revolution against an imperial power. 
No strings seem to have been attached to this aid, which went 
direct to Chungking and not to the Communist 8th Route Army. 
This aid continued even when relations between the Kuomin- 
tang and the Communists reached the breaking point and it con- 
tinued in spite of the non-aggression pact between the U.S.S.R. 
and Japan. A Chinese-Soviet trade agreement was signed in 
January 1941 at a time when the New Fourth Army was being 
suppressed by Chungking. The Soviets have apparently been 
more concerned with Chinese independence and capacity to con- 
tinue the struggle against Japan than with assisting the Com- 
munist movement in China, although the two are not uncon- 

Conflict between the U.S.S.R. and Germany changed once 
more the whole balance of forces in the Far East. Japan naturally 



For the United States it is historically fitting that she should 
have entered the world conflict by way of the Far East. It is in the 
Far East that the United States has always been the more deeply 
involved. In Asia the United States has had a position of leader- 
ship from which she could not abdicate, in Asia she has made 
every effort to spread her ideas and institutions. From rivalry 
with the British she passed to open ideological conflict with the 
U.S.S.R.; now she is locked in struggle with Japan to determine 
what political, social and economic concepts shall prevail in 
eastern Asia and the Pacific. There can be no compromise the 
monopoly imperialism of Japan admits of no rivals and no com- 
petition. There is no solution of Pacific problems until Japanese 
imperialism is rooted out of Japanese society. 

America entered the conflict at the last possible moment and 
with the maximum number of allies. She entered it in alliance 
with the western empires, with the Republic of China, with the 
Philippine people, with the U.S.S.R. fighting the chief ally of 
Japan in Europe. She entered the conflict at a time when the sub- 
ject peoples of Asia were no longer indifferent to their fate, when 
nationalist movements were strong, and when the East had had 
ten years to contemplate the meaning of Japan's program of 
Asia for the Asiatics. The cooperation of the subject peoples, 
especially of India, is indispensable to victory, and they have 
already been predisposed in favor of the United Nations by the 
Japanese themselves. But the full mobilization of their resources 
and man power can come only through a realistic acceptance of 
their political aspirations for national independence. Here the 
importance of China as an ally is of overwhelming significance 
China can furnish the biggest land front against Japan, espe- 
cially against Manchuria, a vital industrial base, she can give 


enormous man power to the allied forces, and she can also stand 
as the greatest political factor in the struggle. So long as China is 
kept in the fight the subject peoples of Asia will have hope of 
eventual victory and freedom; so long as China fights, the claim 
of the Japanese that they are leading Asia will stand out as a hol- 
low sham. China is the key to the New Pacific. 



N.B. The plain numbers refer to pages, numbers after M to maps 

Abaca, 168. 

Agriculture, 29-31, 76-7, 99, 103, M 25. 

aimak, 107. 

Ainos, 62, 67. 

Air bases, 159, 170-1, 195. 

Alaska, 159, 195, M 40. 

Albuquerque, 41. 

Aleutian Islands, 139, 171, M3i. 

Altai, 18, 19, 106. 

Aluminum, 171. 

America, 15, 23; see also United States of 

Amur, 31, 45, 46, 78, 80, 83, 86, 94, 98, 99. 

Angkor, 21 (note). 

Anhwei, M8, 120, M26, M27. 

Annam, 34, 36, 37, 46, 146-9. 

Anshan, 99, M 18. 

Antioch, 21. 

Antung, M 16, M 18, Antung-Mukden rail- 
way, 90. 

Ararat, 16. 

Astrakhan, 22. 

Atjeh, 44. 

Australia, 28, 109, 137-9, 142, 146* *94 
M4, Mn, Mi2, M3i, M34, Mft, 
M 38, M 39. 

Austroasiatic languages, 34. 

Austronesian languages, 34. 

Baikal, Lake, 33, 45, 78, 80. 

Bali, 36, 144. 

Balkh, 21, 22. 

Bangkok, 21, M 6, M 34, M 37, M 38, M 39. 

Banners, Manchu, 54 (note); Mongol, 107, 


Batavia, 41, 149, M 6, M 34, M 38, M 39. 
Battambang, 146. 
Biro-Bijan, 78, M 13, M 14. 
Bismarck Archipelago, 138, M 34, M 38. 
Blagoveshchensk, 94, M 16. 
Bonin Islands, 64, Mg, 138, M34, M38. 
Borneo, 26, 146, 152, M 32, M 34. 

"Boxers," 49. 

Brahmaputra, 18. 

Britain, 41, 44, 46, 55, 57, 58, 61, 63, 136, 

137-9* 142* 149 154* i 6l l6 3 17* !94- 
Brunei, 44. 

Buddhism, 17, 22, 36, 104. 
Bugis, 144. 
Burma, 22, 55, 147, 175, 192, M 34, M 35, 

M 36, M 37, M 38, M 39; Burmese lan- 

guage, 34. 

Cambaluc, 118. 

Cambodia, 26, 34, 36, 37, 146, 149. 
Canton, 42, 57, 61, 114, 122, 135, 174, M i, 
M 5, M 6, M 30, M 34, M 36, M 37, M 38, 

Canton Island, 139. 

Caroline Islands, 45, Mg, 138, 142, 154, 


Cavite, 140, MSI, M&, M&, 159, 195- 
Celebes, 44, 150 (note), 152, M 32, M 34, 

M37, M38, M39. 
Ceram, 37, 152, M 32. 
Chahar, M8, 60, 86, 100, M 19, no, 120, 

126, M 27. 

Changchun, 90, 93; see also Hsinking. 
Chang Hsueh-liang, 87, 112. 
Changkufeng, 96, M 17. 
Changsha, 175, Ms6. 
Chang Tso-lin, 87, 91. 
Charchan, 22; 23. 
Chekiang, M8, 116, 120. 
Cherrapunji, 19. 

Chiang Kai-shek, 74, 122, 128, 132. 
chiguglan, 107. 
Chinese Eastern Railway, 49> 7 8 > 8 S> M X 5> 

90* 9i 94- 

Chinese Turkestan, see Smkiang. 
Ch'ing dynasty, 52, 93. 
Chishima, 64, M 9; see also Kurile Islands. 
Chita, 78, M 14, M 15. 
Chukchis, 31. 



Chungking, 114, M 23, MSO, M 36, M 37, 

M 38, M 39. 
Cinchona, 186. 
Coal, 70, M 10, 76, M 13, 99* M l8 > 12 4-8* 

M 26, M 27. 
Cochin-China, 46, 146. 
Cockchafer, H.M.S., 149. 
Coffee, 186. 
Communists, 74, 84, 134, 135* *7 6 * 1 7 8 

i?9 198. 

Cotton, 70, 128, M 29. 
Ctesiphon, 21. 
Customs, Chinese Maritime, no. 

Dairen, 46, 90, 92, 94, M 36. 

Dalny, 46, 66, 90. 

Damghan, 21. 

Davao, 151, 185, M 33* M 34* M 38, M 39. 

Dihong, 18. 

Dutch Harbour, 159, M 40. 

East Siberian Region, 78, M 4, M 13. 
Eighth Route Army, 135. 
Ellice Islands, 139. 
Enderbury Island, 139. 
Extra-territorial rights, 48, 50. 

Far East, extent of, 16, 137; three zones of, 

Far Eastern Region- (of the U.S.S.R.), 77* 

M4, Mi3. 
Fengtien, 99, M 18. 
Fiji, i39> M 3 8. 
Filipinos, 38, 150. 
Fisheries, Siberian, 80. 
Formosa, 34, 4*> 64, M 9 68* 70, 151, 


France, 46, 48, 55, 146, 154* 167. 
Franco, Francisco, 164. 
French Concession, Shanghai, 118. 
French Indo-China, 46, 137, 146-9* J 75 

M 4, M 12. 
Fukien, 120. 
Fushun, 99, M 18. 

Gama, Vasco da, 22. 

Ghflaks, 31. 

Gilbert Islands, 139. 

Gobi desert, 23, 86, 102-4, 1O 7> M 2Q - 

Grand Canal, 116. 

Guam, M 31, 142* *95 M 34- 

Hainan, 36, 148, 154, M33, 174* M36, 

M37, M38, M 3 9. 
Hamad, 17. 
Hamadan, 21. 
Kami, 18, 22, 23, M i, 104, 110, M 20, 112, 


Han dynasty, 29. 
Hankow, 57, 114, 116, 122, 132, M 30, 174, 

Harbin, 23, M i, 49* M 15* 90* 94* 98- 

Hawaii, 139, 143* *54* ^ _ _ _ 

Heiho, town, 94, M 16; province, 99, M 18. 

Heilungkiang, 87, 93. 

Hideyoshi, 64. 

Himalayas, 18, 22. 

Hokkaido, 62, 67, M 9. 

Holland, 41-5, 63, 167; see also Netherlands 


Honan, M 8, 120. 

Hongkong, 46, 136, M 33, M 36, M 37, 
M 38, M 39. 

Honshu, 62, 68, Ug. 

Hopei, M8, 87, 99, no, 114, 115* 120. 
124-8, M 27. 

hoshun, 107. 

Hsingan, M 18, 109. 

Hsinking, 93, 94. 

Hsuan Lung iron ore deposits, 120. 

Hull, Cordell, 164. 

Hulutao, 92. 

Hunan, M 8, 120, 134. 

Hunza, 22. 

Hupeh, M 8, 114, 120. 

Ichang, 175. 

Hi, 57. 

India, 17, 21, 22, 26, 34, 36, 42, M 34. 

Indonesia, 26, 36, 37, 41* 44* *45* W 

Indonesian languages, 34. 
Irkutsk, 23, Mi, M2O. 
Iron, Mio, 70, 99, M 18, 110, 126, M27. 

152, M 32. 
Iron ore, 186. 
Italy, 191, 199* * 01 - 

Java, 20, 26, 37, 38, 41-4, 144-6. 

Javanese language, 27, 145. 
Jehol, 60, 86, 87, 93* 94* M 18, 102, 103, 109. 
Johore, 44. 

Kachins, 20. 

Kaiping coalfield, 126. 



Kalgan, no, M so. 

Kalmikov, Ataman, 85. 

Kalmuks, 52, 54, 56, 104, M 19. 

Kamchatka, 80. 

Kamranh Bay, 148, M 33. 

Kansu, 29, M 8, 104, 112, 120, 134, 135. 

Karafuto, 66, M 9; see also Sakhalin. 

Karakorum mountains, 18. 

Karens, so. 

Kashgar, 22, M so. 

Kazaks, 106; Kazakstan, 113. 

Khabarovsk, 80, M 13, M 14. 

Khan Tengri, 18. 

Khasi Hills, 19. 

Khingan mountains, Great, 88, M 15. 

Khirgiz, 106; Khirgizia, 113. 

Khiva, 22. 

Khmer language, MS, 34. 

Khotan, 22, 23. 

Khutukhtu, the, 108. 

Kiangsi, M 8, 120, M 28, 134. 

Kiangsu, M8, 114, 116, 120, 124. 

Kiaochow, 46; see also Tsingtao. 

Kirin, 87, M 15, 93, M 16, M 18. 

Kita Karafuto Petroleum Company, 82. 

Kiukiang, 132. 

Kolchak, Admiral, 82. 

Korea, 26, 36, 51, 54, 57, Mg, 66, 68. 

Kotsuke, 86. 

Kra, Isthmus of, 21, 148, M 33, 

Kublai Khan, 63, 118. 

Kulja, 22, 56, M 20. 

Kum Tagh desert, 17, 103. 

Kunlun mountains, 34. . 

Kuomintang, 57, 61, 74, 91, 116, 122, 124, 

i34 135* 147* 176, 178, i79> 198- 
Kuo Sun-ling, rebellion of, 91. 
Kurile Islands, 62, 64, M 9. 
Kurusu, Nomura, 200. 
Kwangchow, 48, MSJ. 
Kwangsi, 57, M 8, 120, 134. 
Kwangtung, 56, M 8, 114, 116, 120, 122, 134. 
Kwantung, 51, 58, Mg, 66, 90, 91; Army, 

9 l -3 99 10 9 8- 
Kyushu, 62, Mg, 68. 

Lamaism, 36, 104. 

Lanchow, 18, M i, Mao, us. 

Lao territories (of French Indo-China), 46, 

146 (note), 149. 

Leased territories in China, 46-7. 
Lesser Sunda Islands, s8 t 44. 

Lhasa, 22, 58, M37. 
Liaoning, 54, 87, 93. 
Liaotung, 57. 
Luzon, 150-1. 
Lytton Report, 90-1. 

Macao, 41, M8, 137, 

Madjopait, 37. 

Madura, 144-6; Madurese language, 145. 

Magellan, 15, 23. 

Mako, 140, M 31, M 33, 156. 

Malacca, so, 40, 41, 44; Straits, 143. 

Malay Peninsula, 16, 19, 20, 44, 170; 

language, 34, 145. 
Malaya, 26, 34, 36, 137, 149. 
Malays, 37, 144, 149. 
Manchuria, 23, 26, 30, 49, 51-5, 58, 64-7, 

74, 87-100, 109, 112, 163, 190, 191. 
Manchus, 52-6, 60, 88. 
Manila, M6, 140, 143, 154, M$$, M$4, 

M 38, M 39; Manila hemp, 185. 
Mao Tse-tung, 135. 
Marco Polo, 18, 22, 24. 
Marianne Islands, 45, Mg, 138, 142, 143, 

Marquesas Islands, 139. 

Marshall Islands, M g, 138, 143, 171. 

Mataram empire, 38. 

Matsuoka, Foreign Minister, 170, 191, 195, 


Mekong, 29. 
Mng Chiang, no. 
Merv, 21. 
Miao, 32, MS. 
Midway Island, MSI, 142. 
Mindanao, 37, 151, 152. 
Ming dynasty, 42, 52, M 7. 
Mintaka Pass, 22. 
Mishmis, 20. 
Mitsubishi, house of, 186. 
Mitsui, house of, 186. 
Moluccas, 20, 41, 42, 44, 152, 154. 
Molybdenum, 171. 
Mongolia, 23, 26, 28, 31, 36, 52, 54, 56, 58, 

60, 66, los-is, M 36, M 37, M 38, M 40. 
Mongols, 31, 32, M 3, 35, 37, 54, 60, 70, 91, 

102-12, M 19. 
Moros, 151. 
Mukden, 23, 58, 93, 99. 

Naga tribes, 20. 
Nankai policy, 151-4. 



Nanking, 57, 91, 114, 116, 118, 122, 124, 

134, 178, M 36, M 38. 
Nanling mountains, 28, 122. 
Nauru, 138, 143. 

Naval bases, 139, 140, M 31, 142, 149, M 33. 
Naval forces, ratio of, 163, 170. 
Nepal, 55. 
Netherlands Indies, 137, 145-6, 152, 170, 

185, 189, 194, M34. 
Neutrality Act, 164. 
New Caledonia, 139, M$8. 
New Guinea, 137, 138, 142, 154, M 34, 

M 3 8. 

New Hebrides, 139, M 38. 
New Zealand, M 11, M 12, 139, Mji, 194, 

M 3 8. 

Nine-Power Treaty, 61. 
Ninghsia province, M 8, 60, 102, 103, M 19, 

120, 134; town, Mao, 112. 
Nomura, house of, 186. 

Ogasawarajima, see Bonin Islands. 

Oil, 70, 77, M 13, 80, M28, 146, 152, M 32, 


Okada, Admiral, 151. 
Okhotsk, 45; Sea of, 31. 
Okura, house of, 186. 
Open Door policy, 162. 
Osaka, 86, 132. 
Oumansky, Cons tan tine, 194. 
Outer Islands (of Netherlands Indies), 145. 

Pamirs, 17, 18, 21. 

Panama Canal, 171. 

Pan-American Airways, 142. 

Paotou, 67, no. 

Papua, 137, 138, M 34. 

Paracel Reefs, 148, M 33, M 34. 

Pearl Harbour, 139, MSI, 159, 195. 

Pegolotti, 18. 

Peiping, 18, 23, 28, 49, no, 114, 118, 124, 

126, 134, M 36, M 37, M 38, M 40; see 

also Peking. 

Peking, 52, 54, 56, 107, 118, 122, 163, 178. 
Peiew Islands, 45, 138 (note). 
Pescadores, 156. 
Philippines, 41, 44, 138, 142, 143, 149-51* 

154, 161, 185-6, M 34, M 37, M 38, M 39. 
Phoenix Islands, 139. 
Polynesians, 15, 34. 
Port Arthur, 46, 49, 57, 58, 66, M 15. 

Portsmouth, Treaty of, 46, 49, 51, 58, 66, 


Portugal, 40-2, 44, 137. 
Possiet Bay, 31, M 17. 
Poyang lake, 28. 

Quinine, 168. 

Railways, 23, 31, 78, M 14, M 15, 88-92, 94, 
Mi6, 96, Mi7, M2o, Mai, 116, 132, 
M 30; zones in Manchuria, 49, 58, 88-90. 

Rashin, 94, 96, M 17. 

Ratio of naval forces, 163, 170. 

Republic, Chinese, 60, 122; Philippine, 150. 

Rubber, 152, 168, 170, 185, M 35. 

Russia, 19, 23, 32, 40, 45, 46, 49, 57, 58, 64, 
66, 88, 107; see also Soviet Union. 

Ryojun, 46, M 15. 

Ryukyu (Luchu), 54, 62, 64. 

Saigon, M 31, 148, 149, M 33, M 34. 

Saipan, MSI, 142. 

Sakhalin, 62, 64, 66, M 13, 80-3. 

Salween, 17. 

Samarkand, 22. 

Samoa, 139, 143. 

Sanchiang, 94, 99, M 18. 

San Francisco, 24, 159. 

Santa Cruz Islands, 138. 

Sarawak, 44, M 32. 

Sarikol, 17, 21. 

Sasebo, 140, MSI. 

Sayan mountains, 104. 

Semenov, Ataman, 83. 

Sequiera, 41. 

Shanghai, 24, 28, 48, 56, 83, 114, 116, 122, 

132, 176. 

Shans, 20, 32, M 3. 
Shansi, 28, M 8, 120, 124, M 26, 126, M 27, 

128, 135. 
Shantung, M8, 99, 120, 124, M26, M*7, 


Shensi, M8, no, 120, M 26, 134, 135. 
Shihchiachwang, 128, M 30. 
Shikoku, 62, Mg. 
Shimonoseki, Treaty of, 51, 57. 
Shinano, 86. 
Shinra, 63. 

Showa Steel Works, 99. 
Sian, 74, 112, 135. 
Siberia, 19, 26, 31, 76-86; see also Russia 

and Soviet Union. 



Sikang, M8, 60, 120. 

Si-kiang, 29. 

Singapore, 16, 44, 140, MSI, 149, 

Sinkiang, 18, 22, 28, 52, My, 54, 56, 57, 

M 8, 60, 102-13, 134, M 37. 
Solomon Islands, 138, M 34. 
South Manchuria Railway, 49, 74, 90-4. 
Sovietskaya, 80, M 14. 
Soviet Union, 40, 76-86, 90, 91, 94-8, M 13, 

M 14, M 17, 107-13, 134-5, 162, 163, 167-8, 

176, 191, 192, 193, 194, 198-9, 202. 
Spain, 164. 
Ssu Ma-ch'ien, 29. 
Suiyuan, province, M8, 60, 102, no, 120; 

town, 104, no, M 20. 
Sumatra, 20, 26, 34, 37, 44, 146, 152, M 32. 
Sundanese, 34, 145. 
Sunda Straits, 143, M 43. 
Szechwan, M8, 114, 120, 132, 134. 

Tagalog, 34, 150. 

Tahiti, 139. 

Tai languages, 34, M 3. 

T'ai P'ing rebellion, 37. 

Taiwan, M 36, M 38, M 39; see also 

Taiyuan, 28. 

Taklamakan desert, 22, 103, M 20. 
Tannu-ola mountains, 104. 
Tannu-Tuva, 103, M 19, 106, 108. 
Tartary, Gulf of, 80. 
Tashkurgan, 21. 
Tatekawa, 191. 
Tea, 186. 
Teh, Prince, no. 
Tenasserim, 19, 21. 
Thailand, 185, 192, M 34, MSS, M 37, 

Tibet, 18, 22, MS, 34, 36, 38, 52, M7, 

54, 58, M 8, 60, M 3. 
T'ien-shan mountains, 18, 103. 
Tientsin, 48, 114, 116, 124, 134. 
Timor, 37, 42, 44, 137. 
Tin, M 28, 152, M 32, M 35, 168. 
Tokyo, 28, 68. 
Tonga, 139. 
Tongking, 46, 146. 
Tojo, General, 200. 
Trade restrictions, 171. 
Trans-Siberian railway, 161. 

Triple Intervention, the, 64. 

Tsangchow, 128. 

Tsinghai, M 8, 60, 104, 120. 

Tsingtao, MSO, 136; see also Kiaochow. 

Tsitsihar, 94, M 16. 

Tsuruga, 86. 

Tuamotu Islands, 139. 

Tukhachevsky, Marshal, 98. 

Tungans, 37, 60, 106, 112. 

Tungsten, M 35. 

Tungus, 31, 32, M3, 35, 88. 

Turkis, 60, 112. 

Turkish languages, 32, MS, 35, 37, 104. 

Turksib Railway, 18, 112. 

Twenty-one Demands, the, 90. 

Ulan Bator, M 37, M 40; see also Urga. 
Ungern von Sternberg, Baron, 107. 
United States of America, 24, 40, 45, 137, 

1 39-44* *49> *54> *59 e* && naval forces, 


Urga, 23, 104, 107-10, M 20. 
Uriankhai, 104, 107. 

Urumchi, 22, 56, 104, M 20, 112, 134, M 37. 
Usuri river, 46, M 15, 98. 
Uzbekistan, 113. 

Varthema, 21. 

Vladivostok, 46, 77, 80, M 14, 3-6, 96, 
M 17, 194, M 37, M 38, M 40. 

Wake Island, MSI, 142. 

Wang Ching-wei, 178-9. 

Wanhsien, 49. 

Washington Conference, 61, 90; Naval 

Treaty, 140. 
Wa tribes, the, 20. 
Weihaiwei, 46. 
Welles, Sumner, 194. 

Yakuts, 31, 35. 

Yakutsk Republic (Yakutia), 77, M 13. 

Yangtse, 29, 49, 57, 116, 118, 132, 174. 

Yellow River, 29, 36, no, 118, 135. 

Yenisei, 31, 76, 77. 

Yezo, 62. 

Yingkow, 92. 

Yunnan, 22, 57, M 8, 120, M 28, 135. 

Zaibatsu, 90.